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2ABSTRACT
The theme of the thesis centres around the system 
of social stratification of Ifureidah* I give a general 
description of the system as it operates in the village and 
then show how the processes of change in the country and 
outside , are affecting the situation in IjTureicJah.
^adramaut, sometimes aptly referred to as "madlnat 
al-muhadjirln1 (the country of the emigrants) has as a basic 
feature, a constant economic crisis in producing enough food 
for its population. As a result, migration and emigration 
have been going on since time immemorial. The country has 
thus never been isolated and its overseas ties have always 
played a major, if not dominating, role in the country. The 
Qu’aity Sultanate which was created by IJadramis based in 
Hyderabad (India) is a crowning example of this. Recently, 
this ’overseas’ dependence has, if anything, increased. But 
world wide changes have shifted this dependence from India 
and the Far East, to the neighbouring Arab countries, thus 
incorporating IJadramaut in the wider processes taking place 
in the Arab World. This is to say, the history of IJadrami 
society has been shaped considerably by its ties with India 
and the Far East, while the pi*esent social organisation is 
being dramatically affected by its participation in the 
wider field of the Arab society.
Social stratification is a dominant feature in
3Ijtatjrami society. In studying its operation in ]Jurei<J.ah, one 
cannot isolate the village in space or in time* The people 
1 commute1 constantly between §urei$.ah and the surrounding 
countries, ignoring geographical (physical) and political 
boundaries. Similarly, the Par Eastern 1Alawx-Irshadi 
conflict of the past, the Pan-Arab Nationalism of the 
present, and the 'coming Revolution* of the future, all 
influence the social life as it exists in ^ureidah. Thus 
my analysis of the historical conflict, the continuing 
process of migration, and the political forces operating at 
different levels (in the country and outside), is essential 
in understanding the processes behind the formal social 
hierarchy of present day gurei^ah*
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PREFACE
This thesis is hased on field work carried out in 
the village of gurei^ah, gadramaut. Without the help and 
co-operation of 33ureidahrs people, it would have been 
impossible to gather enough material and to understand the 
complicated processes inherent in their social life* Their 
co-operation was excelled only by their excessive hospitality 
and their patience to, what seems to them, my pointless 
inquisitiveness* I therefore express my deep gratitude and 
thanks to all the people of gureigah as well as those in 
other villages and towns who also helped me in many ways.
But I am especially indebted and grateful to the following 
people;~
(a) My three assistants Shaikh *Ali bin Sa!id Filkan,
Shaikh 'Umar bin lAbdallah Ridwan, and Saiyid Abubaka 
bib 1Umar al-'Al^as.
(b) The local Government officials Saiyid 1Abdul'-Rahman 
bin *AlwI al-!At£as, Shaikh Al^ onad al-Yazxdi al-Yafi!i, 
and Saiyid Abdallah bin Hadun al-fA£tas.
(c) Mansab fUmar bin Zein, Saiyid Ali bin Salim al-’Attas, 
Shaikh Salim bin Shaikh Basahl, Mbarak bin Jassar al~ 
Jafedy, Faisal Bad^ledeh and Abubakar Basahl*
While in the field, Professor P.,G, Bailey gave me 
constant and very valuable advice. In London Dr, A.C.Mayer 
guided me in the initial analysis of the unsystematised
7material I had ‘brought from the field. To both I express 
my sincere thanks. Professor C. von Eurer-IIaimendorf has 
been my academic supervisor and has given me invaluable 
help and advice in all the stages of the thesis. To him I 
am very grateful and thankful for his constant advice and 
patience. I also take this opportunity to thank all my 
colleagues in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology 
at the School of Oriental and African Studies for the many 
informal discussions of the material during the writing of 
the thesis.
The Arabic words and names used in the thesis
4
have been transliterated in accordance with the system used 
by the new edition (i960) of the Encyclopaedia of Islam.
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INTEODUOHgE
This thesis is hased on field work carried out 
between July 1962 and June 1963* The field research was made 
possible by a grant from the Colonial Social Science Research 
Council* I am very grateful to the Council*
The research was carried out in a village called 
gureijah in the interior of ]Ja$ramaut, Southern Arabia* The 
village is situated in one valley (Wadi 'Am§.) which forms 
part of a system of intersecting valleys - the Wadi System
f->0
(see map/, I did an intensive study by participating and
observing in the life of the village; but I also made 
extensive visits of most parts of the valley system*
IJureidLah consists of a main village and four small 
surrounding settlements (see sketch map). In the past, i#e. 
until about 194-0, the settlements were independent political 
units of the tribes (Gaba'il), while the main village used 
to be a religious sanctuary (bawtah), where non-tribal 
groups lived (see Chapter I). Today §urei£ah is part of the 
Qu’aiti State, administered by Central Government officials 
and the Local Council. The political division of the past 
is no longer significant.
The people of Hureidah depend for their subsistence 
mainly on the tillage of land irrigated by an elaborate 
canal system. They live in mud built houses of varying size, 
from a three-floor twenty roomed house to a small one with 
only two rooms above the ground floor. Each house has a yard
W A D I  *A K| O
10
(wasar) attached to it where domestic animals are kept and 
various household tasks are carried out* Inside the house 
the ground floor is always used as a store place* The houses 
are built close to each other and in many cases they are 
attached to form blocks of many different shapes. Building 
land within the village is scarce. Outside the village 
settlement is difficult because of lack of water and insecur­
ity (in the past) from the tribesmen who monopolised firearms* 
Water is still a major problem and the twenty-two wells of 
§ureidah have an average depth of 270 ft. These wells are 
the sole supply of water for the daily consumption of both 
humans and domestic animals,
u^rei^ Lah was a famous .^awtah in this part of the 
country. It has produced famous scholars whose reputation 
extended beyond ijadramaut to the far flung corners where 
JEadrami immigrants have settled. Many of its people have, 
until recently, emigrated (and migrated) to overseas, 
especially to India, Singapore and Indonesia. Its ties with 
these places were very strong and its best houses and 
mosques, are monuments to the strong economic dependence on 
past overseas remittances. This link was severed by World 
War II, and its effect is generally considered as an economic 
disaster not only for ^ureidah, but for ]Ja<Jramaut as a whole*
"As a result, many of the rich families of the area had
1fallen on sadly reduced days,"
1. Johnston, C.H., 1964*
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In the winter of 1937-38, Freya Stark spent four
months (December to March) in ^urei^atu Her diary of the
daily events and activities in the village, give a vivid if
—  1literary description of the life of the people of Hureijah, 
Although the village has ;not changed physically since then, 
social life is going through an important process of trans­
formation, Since the end of the War, increasing migration to 
the nearby Arab countries, the rise of Nationalism, the 
coming of mass media and the recent political upheavals in 
the region, have all made Ijaglramaut increasingly part of the 
wider field, These processes have inevitably affected life 
in IJurei^ ah and are transforming it,
The Problem
I went to §udramaut unaware of this transformation.
My intention was to study the role of the 3Jawtah - like 
ljureldah - in the traditional political system of ]Ja£ramaut. 
However within three months of my arrival in IjEureigLah, the 
Yemeni Revolution took place (September 1962)* I was struck 
by the Intense reaction and identification of gureicj.ahfs 
factions to the events in the Yemen, This led me to investi­
gate a different problem from the IjEawtah,
The reaction to the Yemeni Revolution divided the 
people of Hurei<Jah Into two blocks P The line of cleavage was 
that of the ruling group - the ^Jtas, versus the rest of the 
people - the non- ’ A'Jjtas - who were politically dominated. As
1, Stark, F#, 194-8, (ed,).
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time went by, it became clear that tlie cleavage was based 
on a structural conflict between the two sides within the 
village0 However the language used in the ensuing debate, 
was that of Nationalism and the arguments were the same as 
those used in an important conflict among the ]Ja$lramis in 
the Far East (the 1A1 awl -1 r s hadi conflict).^ It became 
apparent that what had happened was that the local conflict 
had been clothed in the historical framework of the !AlawI- 
Irshadi debate and that the presence of Nationalism had 
provided a new dimension to the conflict* Even more important 
is that the conflict between the 'Al^ Jas and non-1 A£$as in 
the village had developed out of a clash of interests 
between the two blocks within the contexts of the village 
structure. The people of I^ ureigLah were in fact fighting 
their specific conflict within the ideological continuum of 
the recent history of the country and its participation in 
the wider field of the Arab World in the presence. The 
issue in the conflict was change In the system of social 
stratification*
1. See Chapter II.
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CHAPTER I 
THE, ECOLOGICAL BETTING
The term lladramaut is now generally applied to the 
two States of the Qu'aitbi and Kathiri Sultanates* It falls 
roughly within longitude 47 to 50 East, and between latitude 
15 to 17 North* It is bounded in the north by the great 
Rub1 al-Khali (the Empty Quarter), in the south by the sea, 
in the west by the ‘AwlaqI mountains, and In the east by the 
Hahra mountain range*
IJa^ Lramaut has two basic physical features* Immediately 
behind the coast lies a range of mountains whose rugged 
peaks rise up to 5?000 feet, This range is the beginning of 
that vast and dry plateau (jol), with a mean height of 
2,500 feet9 that extends northwards for about 500 miles, till 
it is broken by the narrow interlocking valleys of the Wadi 
System* North of this system begins the northern plateau 
which continues northwards till it peters out into the Rub! 
al Khali * These two plateaus, the Northern and Southern Jols 
as they are called, make up almost 90% of the land area of 
the Badramaut, The Northern Jol is more barren, more desolate 
and more sparsely populated than the Southern Jol, because 
It merges slowly with the desert. The Southern Jol is what 
the geographers call a ‘tame desert1 - meaning that although 
It is barren and desolate, It can nevertheless support life, 
though at a very meagre level. In fact both the northern 
and southern jol are inhabited by semi-nomadic tribesmen
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scattered over a wide area with a very low population 
density. The two jols are divided hy the network of valleys 
which makes up the Wadi System* Some of these valleys start 
from a long way back in the plateaus and it is at such • 
starting points that the nomadic tribesmen find water and 
cultivate when there is rain. During the frequent periods of 
drought these tribesmen move around with their animals 
(camels, sheep and goats) looking for water* When the rain 
comes, they go back to their own areas and resume cultivation* 
The second basic physical feature of the region is 
the Wadi System, The Wadi System, as we have noted, separates 
the two plateaus* The most famous and largest of the valleys 
is the Wadi ]Ja<3r amaut, which begins in the east where it is 
40 miles wide, and stretches westwards, becoming narrower 
all the way* At its narrowest point, it is only 2 to 4 miles 
wide. After Tarim, It turns southwards and begins its long 
journey through Mahra country to the sea, About 40 miles 
from its mouth in the east it is joined by the other main 
valleys, Wadi Dow‘an, Wadi al-‘EIn, and Wadi ’Amd, all three 
forming Into one channel at al-Kasir, just before joining 
the Wadi ^ajramaut* Each of these main wadis has one or two 
major tributaries and innumerable Inlets on either side, 
dispersed at short distances, From al-Kasir the main wadis 
are only two to four miles wide and they become progressively 
narrower until near their source on the plateau, where they 
are only a few yards wide. The same thing applies to their 
major tributaries. The side inlets are very short and reach
MUPL flTMu
*L-
SOu.TH€*N 
fl.*T€*U C***0
KEV A $ ACTION OF THC W*
uore
t Cou-rst Of flood.
• Q. u5dity Xoions,
- Non*t r ib a l >Mlajcs.
V _
•  T ^ b o ^ f [GvLbci'it ]  vill^CS.
O  rvly | »Hkp9<^A.»Ct ToOtvS * . * 4  ✓ J l« ^ C fc  
kAVC. tcCW. im^(lCO.tC«C 0* Tfc.it .
the Talleys from the top of the plateaus within a distance 
of about two to three milesc The most noticeable feature of 
the main wadis and their tributaries is the precipitous, 
almost perpendicular, rock walls on either side of the 
valleys and the tableland formation on the top - the plateau 
The mean height of these rock walls is about 2,500 feet. The 
floor of the valleys is flat and earthy at the wide end 
becomes pebbly and stony towards the source.
The valley system makes up less than ten per cent 
of the total area of the Ha<Jramaut, but it is densely 
populated and holds almost one third of the total population 
Throughout the length of these valleys and their tributaries 
there are villages and towns scattered at a distance of less 
than a mile between each. Wadi IJa^ ramaut is the most 
populated of all the main wadis, with large towns - the 
famous ’skyscraper1 towns, such as Shibam, Salwun and Tarim 
- each with anything from 10,000 to 20,000 people. In the 
other wadis, the largest towns such as gureidah, would have 
a population of less than 2,000.
When it rains up on the plateau, the water flows 
down the valleys, gathering water from the tributaries and 
inlets, and flowing through a well-marked course, more or 
less in the centre of the valleys. Every village and town 
then diverts some of this water by a canal, and directs it 
to its own cultivated area. There it is distributed by a 
complicated canal system to every plot and date palm. The
17
system is a maze of interlocking channels. Since water is 
very important, and since the floods, which come rather 
infrequently, are the only source of water for cultivation, 
its distribution is very important, and the whole system is 
intricately designed to distribute the water to every farmer.
As a region in Southern Arabia, the climate of 
^adramaut is very dry. On the coast it is subject to the 
monsoon rains and here, between May and June the minimum 
temperature is 95°E* In the winter (November to December), 
the minimum temperature is about 75°E* The average rainfall 
on the coast is about two inches, though in exceptional 
years it has exceeded five inches, though much of this may 
fall in a single storm* The largest cultivable area in the 
country is on the coast-
The Wadi System is not under the monsoon influence 
and therefore has different climatic conditions to those 
which prevail on the coast. The two barren plateaus and the 
nearby Empty Quarter (the vast desert of the Rubf al-Khali) 
are important factors affecting the climate of the Wadi 
System. In this area the mean day maximum temperature is 
between 105° and 110°E during the summer (April to September) 
with a relative humidity of 35%• In winter the maximum range 
is between 85° and 87°E* with night maximum temperatures of 
55° to 60°E. and a relative humidity of 44%, The average 
annual rainfall at Seiyuun is less than two inches. This is 
a generous figure for the whole Wadi system because rain
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does not fall over an extensive area, but tends to fall in 
small areas of a few square miles. In addition cultivation 
does not depend on the rain itself, but on the resultant 
floods (sell) which follow a marked course along the valleys. 
Thus if the amount of rain falling at the head of the valley 
is considerable, the floods will then irrigate all the 
cultivable areas down the valley. But if the rain is not 
heavy, the floods will be used up before they get far down 
the valley. Similarly, if the rain falls at the main end of 
a valley, then only a few villages will be irrigated by the 
stream from their local inlets.
In this densely populated Wadi system, cultivation 
depends entirely on the floods, which in turn depend on 
rainfall - both the amount of rain and the place it falls. 
Between 1962 and 1963 there was half an inch of rain in 
gurei^ah which lies at the lower end of Wadi *Amd. This rain 
was not enough to form into a local flood and thereby 
irrigate the cultivated fields. It was therefore useless to 
gureidah. But about a hundred miles up the 'Amd valley there 
was 'heavy' rainfall whose floods reached gureidah and 
irrigated parts of its drought-stricken fields.
Because rainfall over the plateau and the Wadi 
system is very small, droughts, prolonged or short, are a 
frequent occurrence throughout the country, imposing a heavy 
burden on the very limited agricultural resources. According 
to government estimates the whole country has 120,000 acres
1
of land under cultivation„ Thus in relation to the estimated 
total population of Hadramaut (310,000) there are about 1*9 
acres of cultivable land per household (assuming an average 
of five people per household).^ In addition, since the non- 
cultivable area has almost no vegetation the fertile area 
must also feed about 1,240,000 domestic animals - camels, 
cattle, donkeys, sheep and goats. Furthermore, the productive 
capacity of the land is low because of the frequent droughts. 
In short, the general climatic conditions and the limited 
resources of cultivable land make agricultural scarcities a 
permanent feature of the general economy of ga<Jramaut.
In the Wadi system the settlements are dispersed in 
a definite pattern. Along every main valley the villages are 
built on either side, generally on raised ground directly 
below the steeply rising and almost perpendicular walls of 
the valley, thus avoiding the floods. At the mouths of the 
main valleys, where for a short distance they broaden out to 
between two and four miles, some villages are situated near 
the centre of the valley bed.
1. ,lIt is estimated that not more than approximately 1%, or 
700,000 acres of the Protectorate is potentially cultiva­
ble, Of this about 130,000 acres is cultivated every 
year*” Protectorate here means both ]Ja<Jramaut and the 
former W.Ao Protectorate - See Aden: Report for 1957- 
1958: HoM.S.O, 1961,
2, Figures from u^rei(J.ah show that the cultivated land, in 
relation to population is 1,2 acres per household of 4,4 
people.
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There are two types of Settlements:
Type A, First there are towns and Tillages in which 
there are representatives of all groups in 
the social hierarchy« Under the traditional 
political system such towns and villages came 
under the political authority of the Sultans 
or Sadah and Mashayikh groups# Many were 
gawtahs or sanctuaries. In the past no tribes­
men' Yived permanently in such settlements 0
Type B> Secondly there are tribal villages populated 
entii'ely hy Gaba1!! tribesmen with a few 
Masakln families attached to them*, In the 
past, each tribe had its own territory divided 
into segments# Such tribal areas, together with 
their settlements were jurally outside Type A 
settlements since they came under the tribe1 s 
political authority.
Under the traditional political system, this pattern 
of settlement was an important feature since settlements of 
Type A formed important focii of interaction with the 
surrounding villages of the Gaba'il tribes - Type B settle­
ments# In spite of the disappearance of the traditional 
political system, by the extension of the Qu’aiti and 
Kathiri States, this settlement pattern has remained 
unaltered.
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In this chapter, I will first give a general des­
cription of the main strata in Hadrami society, and the 
traditional political system that operated until the out­
break of World War II# From this I will proceed to outline 
the significant conflict (over the system of stratification) 
between the tAlawi and Irshadi, among gadrami migrants in 
the Far East,
The gagramaut consists of a vast barren plateau (the 
ejol), which is intersected by a number of interlocking 
valleys (the Wadi system)• The plateau is sparsely populated 
by semi-nomadic tribes, while the Wadi system is densely 
populated, with a sedentary population in towns and villages 
The tribes (known as Gaba1!!), live in both the valleys and 
on the plateau.
Within this area, all people speak the same gagrami 
dialect of Arabic, they are all Sunni Muslims of the Shafi1 
School, and there is intensive internal mobility within the 
area, gagrami society is a unit within which people are 
divided into groups and horizontal strata, but all are 
•united within one broad value system.
Social Stratification:
Social stratification is a basic feature of gadrami 
social organisation. There are three general and universal
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strata throughout the Hadramaut, which are ranked as follows:
(i) The Sadah (sing, Saiyid)
(ii) The Mashayikh (sing. Shaikh), and the G-aba1!! (sing* 
G-ablli) *
(iii) The Masakln or Du'fa (sing. Maskln or Da*If).
The operation of this stratification at a village 
level will he the subject of a detailed analysis in subse­
quent chapters* However a brief description of the general 
strata is necessary here.
The basic and common criterion which defines the 
position of an individual or group in this stratification 
system is ancestry or descent (nasab) which is graded in 
status. The Sadah are a collection of descent groups (here­
after referred to as House), who claim to be the descendants 
of the Prophet Mohammad* They substantiate this claim by 
elaborate and well-kept genealogies which trace their 
descent to the Prophet and beyond. Because of their connect 
tion with the Prophet they are considered to be religious 
Houses and to possess supernatural powers.
The Mashayikh stratum is composed similarly of a 
number of Houses, but they claim descent from well-known 
religious leaders and savants of the past. By virtue of this 
connection which most of them can substantiate with geneal­
ogies they have an ascribed religious status* Like the 
Sadah, they too are considered to have inherent supernatural 
powers.
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The Gaba'il are a large number of bribes who claim 
to be the descendants of distant Arab tribes, and ultimately 
of Qalyfcan,^  Unlike the Sadah and Mashayikh the Gaba'il have 
no religious status at all, Nevertheless, the status of 
their ancestry is considered to be equivalent to that of the 
Mashayikh, and for this reason the two are placed in the 
same stratum. Within the stratum, the Mashayikh are distin­
guished from the Gaba'il by their religious status,
The Masakln (the Poor) ox* Du'fa (the Weak) are a 
collection of small, scattered and dispersed descent groups. 
Each descent group is isolated and without any genealogical 
connection with other similar descent groups. Their genealo­
gies stop short within a few generations, and they do not 
belong either to the line of the Prophet or to that of 
Qalyban; neither do they have any recognised religious 
leaders as ancestors.
Certain characteristic features of each stratum 
which help to define more clearly the statuses and functions 
of the groups of which they are composed. The Sadah, since 
their arrival in ]Ja£ramaut, have always been categorised
1, The Arabs are divided broadly into two groups: the
Northern and the Southern Arabs. The Northern Arabs^trace 
the iridescent to 'Adnan, those of the South to QaT^ tan.
The Sadah are a group of Northern Arabs who emigrated 
southwards to the Mashayikh and Gaba'il
on the other hand, belong to the Southern Arabs. This is 
the historical basis for the distinction between the two 
categories in gadramaut today. (See Nicholson, 1930, 
p«:xviii),
as a religious stratum, because of their specialisation in 
missionary activities, the search for and teaching of film 
(knowledge), and their peace-making and mediating among the 
Gaba'il tribes. The Sadah (and Nashayikh also to some extent) 
have been the custodians of learning and Islamic studies, 
and all the famous centres of learning in £ta<Jramaut have 
been run and maintained by them. Their activities amongst 
the tribes however, have always had political aspects. They 
have acted as peace-makers between feuding sections of 
tribes, mediated in disputes, and conducted people safely 
through hostile areas. Both their missionary and political 
roles gave them what is called sulutat al^ub-iyyah - 
spiritual influence - over the tribes amongst whom they 
lived and worked.
The Mashayikh are distinguished from the Gaba'il 
tribes by their reputation and specialisation in religion*
On this criterion they are akin to the Sadah (but with an 
inferior descent) in that they have been missionaries, 
specialised in 'ilm (learning), played a religious and 
political role amongst the Gaba'il tribes and acquired 
'spiritual influence1 over them. In fact, in areas where the 
Sadah were absent or their numbers insignificant, the 
Mashayikh played the role of the Sadah. But between individ­
uals, or in the general stratification, the Mashayikh take 
second place to the Sadah because of their inferior descent.
The Gaba’il in general are looked down upon as less
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religious and more primitive. They had a segmentary political 
organisation of their own and feuds between them were 
endemic, They were armed with rifles and in many areas pre­
vented the Masakin from possessing them (those Mashayikh 
and Sadah who lived in towns and settled areas, voluntarily 
did not carry arms). The Gaba'il were thus considered to be 
warriors, with a rigid code of honour in which bravery, 
shame, and such allied values were of great importance.
The most important feature of the Masakln stratum 
(besides that of being made up of small unconnected descent 
groups) was economic specialisation in occupations involving 
the sale of services. Hence manual labour, craft and 
ceremonial services were all carried out by the different 
sections within the Masakln stratum, since the other strata 
would never do any work for payment. Thus in general, the 
Masakln lived mostly in towns, specialising in this type of 
economic activity, and in Gaba’il villages as agricultural 
workers attached to Gaba’il lineages. Throughout the Wadi 
system, where the population is sedentary, the Masakln 
stratum preponderates in relation to the other strata, but 
they are a minority in Gaba’il villages. There are very few 
villages entirely occupied by Masakln.
The Traditional Political System of gadramaut;
Until 1937? when Britain began to intervene actively 
in the country, gadramaut had three kinds of political
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1 authorities1:
(i) Two rival Sultanates - the Qu'aiti and Kathlri, 
Between^them they controlled the major towns in 
the Wadi system and on the coast. They had no 
authority over tribal areas,
(ii) A number of minor towns and large villages
scattered throughout the country were 1ruled!Jby 
Mansabs (chiefs), either of the Sadah or Mashayikh 
stratao Such places were sanctuaries (fcawtaFJ 
founded by the ancestors of the Mansabs ruling 
them, Hureidha was a famous and important village 
with this type of political ‘authority1,
(iii) In both the Wadi system and on the plateau there
are a large number of Gaba‘il tribes, covering the 
rest of the country outside the_territories of 
(i) and (ii)0 Each of these Gaba'il tribes, large 
or small, had its own territory with a segmentary 
political organisation. Each tribe was a jural 
community with effective control over its own area. 
Neither the Sultans nor the Mansabs exercised any 
secular authority or control over them*, Two of 
such tribes were the Ja*da_and the Nahd, whose 
territories surrounded Hureijah.
The relationship between the two Sultanates used to 
be one of rivalry, hostility and war, a state of affairs 
which had existed since the founding of the Qufaiti dynasty 
in 1255 A,H, (1839 A,!,),'*' In 1917 the British Government 
made a treaty between the two Sultans which ended their 
hostility. Of the two Sultanates, the Qu!aiti was the 
largest and better organised. It had a centralised adminis­
trative structure and a judicial system extending throughout 
its dispersed territory, with a military and police force 
to preserve a precarious peace in the areas under its control, 
Qu'aiti territory, apart from the provinces of Mukalla and
1, See Sheikh Said Awadh Bawaziir: Mecca, 1954.
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Shibir on the coast, consisted mainly of towns and their 
satellite Tillages in the Wadi system, isolated and sur­
rounded by Gaba1!! territories - eag* Shibam, igourah, or al- 
Qatn. To maintain contact between the capital and other 
parts of the territory entailed passing through Gaba’il 
areas, ruled and controlled by individual tribes. Thus the 
relationship between the Sultanate and the tribes within 
the orbit of its scattered towns was of paramount importance0 
The relationship was regulated by treaties between the 
Sultan and individual tribes, as well as by the giving of
1
annual subsidies to the more powerful and faithful tribes.
But in spite of this, whenever the Sultan visited his 
interior outposts, he had to be accompanied by a heavily 
armed guard*
Outside the Qu'aiti towns were the tribal territories, 
each tribal grouping with its own area divided between its 
component units on a segmentary basis down to the lowest 
unit - the lineage or the village a Each tribe in the country 
was an independent jural community, with a segmentary 
political organisation. Throughout the tribal area there 
were widespread and endemic feuds between tribes and between 
segments within tribes, Most of the tribesmen were armed 
with rifles, and the barren terrain, with its intersecting 
valleys and strategically placed 'castles1 (husn), was 
particularly suited to intensive and bitter feuds,
1. Ingrams, W,H. 1936.
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disrupting, and in some cases paralysing, normal movements 
and agricultural activities»These feuds were deeply rooted 
in the segmentary political system of the tribes, and were 
ideologically justified in terms of honour, revenge, and 
collective responsibility* The effect of the feuds was 
worsened by the destruction of the date palms (by burning or 
pouring kerosene on their roots) which were an important 
source of food* However, in spite of the feuds and the 
general insecurity throughout the country, there was an 
elaborate system of truce and !safe conduct1 whereby inten­
sive and widespread mobility of people from one place to 
another was ensured* There was considerable movement of 
goods and people between the coast and the Wadi system, as 
well as between different parts of the Wadi system* This 
large-scale mobility was essential to the general economy 
of the gadiramaut* In the Wadi system, the movement of 
harvests from one area to another was vital because of the 
high degree of local climatic variation* In addition there 
was trade with the Yemen and certain areas of the present 
South Arabian Federation* At the same time, the general 
economy was heavily dependent on Imports of overseas goods 
and foods and the emigration of people to India, the Far
East and East Africaa Hence the movement between the coast
1and the interior*
1* In 195^ approximately 85,000 loaded camels left the 
ports of Mukalla and Sliirir for the interior carrying 
mainly food and some piece goods* (Ingrams, De 194-9)*
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Within this wider context, a sanctuary (gawtah) 
such as gureidah played an important political, religious 
and sometimes economic role* Such a place was a centre for 
important groups of Sadah and Mashayikh, who took the tribes 
surrounding them under their influence P The rulers of 
gawtahs - the Mansabs - were different from the chiefs of 
tribes and the secular gultans. The Mansabs, as will be seen 
in the case of gureidah, were both religious and political 
leaders. Their hawtahs were holy places in which killing was 
forbidden* This prohibition was sanctioned by an agreement 
between the Mansabs and the surrounding G-aba’il. As a result 
such places became sanctuaries for the Masakln groups, as 
well as neutral places for the hostile and feuding tribes*
In some cases they became centres for annual religious 
visits (ziara), which were the occasion for important 
markets where townsmen and tribesmen mingled. Such markets 
were, and still are held at Mashhad, al-Qatn, Buga, and 
Nafgun, to mention only a few in the Wadi system. As centres 
of religious learning, hawtahs were bases from which both 
the Sadah and Mashayikh went out amongst the tribes, preach­
ing, peace-making, and settling disputes * Scattered through­
out the gadramaut, the gawtahs were important points in an 
intricate network of relationships between themselves and 
the surrounding tribes. Each gawtah had specific political 
relationships with its ‘own1 surrounding tribes* Within the 
context of gadrami society as a whole, they played an
important political role by minimising the inherent feuds 
between the tribes. Most of the impox*tant gawtahs were to be 
found at strategic points - between two large tribes, at 
important agricultural areas, or at reputably evil places 
(e.g. Mashhad, built at a robbers1 haunt), gawtahs thus 
played an integral and important part within the wider con­
text of the gagrami political situation*
gawtahs had certain specific features that disting­
uished them from tribal villages or large towns under the 
Sultanates* Firstly, gawtahs were ruled by a specific group 
of Sadah or Mashayikh, and had a political organisation 
different from that of the tribes and the Sultanates„ 
Secondly, the ruling group of a gawtah (Sadah or Mashayikh) 
exercised a religious influence over the surrounding tribes, 
and within this framework maintained reciprocal political 
relationship with them* Thirdly, gawtahs were centres of 
educated people scattered in tribal areas* gureigah, as an 
important gawtah, had all these features and played an 
important political role within Wadi Amd*
This is a brief outline of the traditional political 
system of gadramaut. It was a system with three different 
types of political organisation, all interconnected at 
different levels. That type of political organisation found 
among the tribes was the most extensive since the tribes 
occupied the largest area of the country and were the most 
numerous in relation to the total population* But since each
31
individual tribe, large or small, was an independent 
political unit, divided on a segmentary basis to its smallest 
component, it is not surprising to find that Ingrams thought 
that there were two thousand governments in gagramaut in 
1934— 5 ^  Through Ingrams'work, active British Intervention 
changed the traditional political systems of gaijramaut, as 
outlined above, into two Sultanates (the Qu'aiti and Kathlri) 
with reasonably efficient administrative and judicial 
structures, which now maintain law and order throughout the 
country.
Up to the eve of World War II gadrami society was
therefore politically highly fragmented and had very little
security. This and economic necessity, forced many people to
migrate to distant countries. Migration (and emigration),
have in fact always been permanent features of the society,
and gagLrami historians trace the process back to the early
2 3period of Islam, Ingrams"^  estimated that in 1934* between 
20% and 30% of the population of gadramaut lived in the Far 
East, East Africa, or Egypt and the countries bordering the 
Red Sea4
The Ear East, especially Indonesia and Singapore,
1, Ingrams W.H,, 194*5? p*24A,
2a Al-Bakary, S* 1935• VolcII« Cairo j. There is a famous 
’myth' in gadramaut about the Banl Hilal tribe who 
emigrated en masse to Burga wu G-abis (N. Africa) because 
of the continuous bad droughts in gadramaut *
3. Ibid,
was the most important area of gadrami migration. Not only 
did the majority of migrants go there, but also because it 
was an important source of annual remittances, estimated in 
1936 to be about £600,000 a year*1 The prominent ll-Kaf 
family (Saiyid) for instance, today subsists on a capital of
£25 million invested in Singapore; before the War the family
2
was powerful enough to mint its own coinage. In Indonesia, 
IJa<Jrami are the second largest Oriental Community (after the 
Chinese), reaching a figure of 85?000 in 1952.^ "Over the 
centuries they [i„e* the Arabs] have managed to occupy a 
unique, and in many cases indispensible place in society in 
the Indies, particularly in connection with religious and
ZL
economic life*"
In the Far East, ga^ramis constituted a distinct 
group, living in heterogeneous societies under colonial 
rule, which had more developed political systems (compared 
to gadramaut) and complex economic organisations* They 
acquired wealth as a ‘merchant class* and thus became an 
important economic group* In these countries the Hajramis 
came out of their isolation and subjected to outside contact 
and influence. Under these conditions, and because they were 
outside their own society they were able to examine their 
social system and were in a position to debate and disagree
1. Ingram, I). 19^9»
2* Serjeant, R.B* 1957*
3* van der Kroef, J.M. 1953*
4* Ibid*
on many important principles of the system without disrupting 
the society at home, This was what happened and a major 
conflict over the system of stratification took place, 
dividing the Ha^ Lramis into two opposing camps of Sadah and 
non-Sadah.
The 'Alawi-Irshadi Conflict,"^
,TShortly after the First World War there arose a 
hitter dispute, which continued well into the 1thirties,
between two groups of emigrant gajramis the 'Alawxs and
-  2Irshadis, in Indonesia," (The dispute in fact goes back to
the beginning of the century. In 1903 the Ifadramis formed a 
Welfare Association in Indonesia which set up a school to 
teach religion and Arabic to their children. However the 
Association was dominated and run by the Sadah, In 1911? khe 
Sadah imported a Sudanese 'alim (scholar) to teach at the 
school. But in 1914? the Sudanese (Ahmad al-Surkti) was 
pressed by the Sadah to resign from the school. In the same 
year, non-Sadah formed the 'Reform and Guidance Association*
1, The two terms 'Alawi and Irshadi are very significant,
The 'Alawi, properly called Ba 'Alawi, are the descendants 
of 'Alawi, the grandson of Ahmad bin 'Isa (the Emigrant)
—  the first ancestor of the Sadah who emigrated to 
gadramaut, The Irshadis are those people who belong to 
the "Jum'iyat al-Iglah wal-Irshad" the Reform and Guidance 
Association" formed in 1914-, It is a non-Sadah organisation 
In the Far East^ , such people were addressed as Shaikh 
(sing,) or Mashayikh (plural). This term has a different 
meaning in IJa'JramauE itself -- see Chapter III*_Thus the 
'Alawi were * exclusively the Sadah, and the Irshadi, the 
Reformist ~  mainly non-Sadah.
2, Serjeant, R,B. 1962*
(the Irshadi Association) and appointed the Sudanese as the 
head of their schools.
The developing conflict was brought Into the open 
and raised to an ideological and theological level, by an 
important event in 1905* In that year, a Sharif a (a Saiyid 
woman) -- of the 'Alyfas House was married to an Indian Muslim 
with the consent of her parents, A ga^rami then wrote to the 
al-Azhar journal —  al-Manar —  asking if such a marriage 
was £.alal (lawful within Islamic sharia) or whether it was 
.^aram (forbidden). The editor —  a scholar of al-Azhar, gave
a fatwah (legal decision, casuistry) saying that the marriage
-  1was .^alal and published his answer. This raised a controv­
ersy among the ga^ramis, since in their society such a 
marriage had always been considered baram. The Sadah who 
had always maintained this JJadrami interpretation of marriage 
rule, were particularly incensed by the fatwah from al-Azhar. 
The leading 3Ja£rami scholar at the time — - Seyyid Omar 
,A*bt?as —  gave his own fatwah on the marriage and said that 
it was bar am. His fatwah was printed and circulated. His 
argument was that the marriage broke the rule of kafa1 ah
(eligibility in marriage —  Serjeant; equality of partner —
P —Levy). According to the 'Atfas scholar, the basic criterion
of kafa'ah, is nasab (descent) and that this has four 'ranks' 
(daradjat). These are:-
1, The fatwah is published In al-Bakary, 1935? Vol.II,
Cairo,
2, Serjeant, R.B, 1957s LevyR,, 1962.
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i* Arab women are not eligible to marry non-Arabs* 
ii* Quraish (the Prophet's tribe) women are not eligible 
to marry non-Quraish* 
iii* Hasliimite (tbe Propb.et!s lineage) women, are not 
eligible to marry non-Hasbimite* 
iv. Women descendants of IJasan and ijusein (the two sons of 
Fatimah, the Prophets daughter), are not eligible to 
marry the rest of Hashimite * (The Sadah are descendants 
of Husein).
The 'AJJas scholar quoted verses from the IJor'an and the 
Prophet's sayings (hadlth) as evidence for this interpreta­
tion of kafa'ah* He argued that sharaf (nobility) was of two 
types: (i) inherent nobility (dhati), and (ii) achieved 
nobility (gifati)* The inherent nobility of the Prophet is 
based on the fact that he was chosen by God for the Prophet- 
hood before Greation. This nobility of the Prophet is trans­
mitted to his descendants (dhurriyyah) and that no achieve­
ment of any kind by other people can equal this nobility* It 
follows therefore that no man who is not a descendant of the 
Prophet, has nobility (equal descent status) to match that 
of a sharlfah* Such prospective spouses are unequal partners, 
and thus their marriage is haram* Furthermore, since such a 
marriage would lower the dignity of the sharlfah, it would 
be a deliberate act of annoying and displeasing the Prophet, 
which is also haram and unthinkable * Thus the willingness of 
the parents or guardian of the sharlfah to give their
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daughter to a non-Saiyid, does not make it any more halal, 
since Islam itself forbids such a marriage*
The fatwah of the ’A££as scholar was then sent to 
the editor of al-Manar, Mohammad Rashid, who published a 
reply to it* In his reply, the editor argued that nasab 
(descent), has nothing to do with kafa1ah0 The basic criteria 
in kafa1 ah which had been accepted by leading Muslim scholars, 
are: ~
I. Religion (whether a spouse is a Muslim or not), 
freedom (i«e* a free person or a slave), character 
(i*>e0 the compatibility of the two spouses), and 
wealth (i.e. whether the man can support a wife or not), 
ii. Permission of a girlfs parents or guardian.
These then, are the important factors to be considered in 
marriage* Within an Arab or Muslim society e*g* that of the 
]Jacb?amis, the willingness of the parents or guardian of the 
girls, is an important factor since they will look after her 
interest and dignity in the light of individual case* But 
descent should never be the criterion for rejecting a man, 
as the 'At^ as scholar had argued, since this was against 
the teaching of Islam and Its spirit which insists on the 
equality of all Muslims. He attacked the argument of the 
'Attas, that the Sadah had an Inherent nobility by virtue 
of being the descendants of the Prophet* He marshalled
1. The original fatwah of al-Manar, the fatwah of the ’At-fas, 
and the reply to it, are all published in Al-Bakary,
VolsII, 1955. Cairo.
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verses from the Kur1 an, hadlths, and opinions of other 
eminent scholars and argued that Islam treated all Muslims 
as equals, irrespective of race or tribe; that nobility was 
achieved by a person's deeds (especially in the field of 
piety) and not by ascription through his descent. He there­
fore denied that any Saiyid had a special nobility and status 
by virtue of his descent from the Prophet.
According to al-Bakary, the 1905 event was the first
crisis which shook gadrami thinking in the Par East. To him,
the crisis made some people realise "the freedom of thought
and the spirit of equality inherent in Islam"; but the crisis
was not violent enough nor were the conditions ripe for a
1major division amongst the IJa^ Lramis. It is important to 
note here that for the first time, the gadramis have 
appealed to an Islamic authority outside their own society, 
an authority that is considered to be 'higher* and therefore 
its interpretation of Islam more correct. Purthermore, the 
Issue of appeal was nothing less than the role of descent 
ranking as symbolised in hypergamous marriage —  in 
ga^ Lrami society. Descent ranking is a basic principle in the 
system of stratification and has always been accepted without 
question. Now this basic principle has been raised to a 
theological plane and its very legality is being questioned. 
This then was the first step on the road to questioning 
other aspects of the system of stratification as it operates
1. Al-Bakary, 1935*
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in g[ad.rami society* In this questioning, the highest 
religious authority (al-Azhar) has been brought in on the 
side of change (or reform)* The 1905 event, as al~Bakary 
has noted, set the spark for the great debate on the system 
of stratification which divided the gagramis into two 
bitterly opposing camps —  the 1Alawi and Irshadis*
In 1914-j the Sudanese teacher suddenly became the 
focal point of the debate* By then he had been accepted as a 
scholar of integrity, repute and versed in Islamic jurispru­
dence (he was recruited from Mecca where he had made his 
mark)* His forced resignation from the Sadah run school, was 
because of his public pronouncement that a marriage between 
a sharifah and a non-Saiyid, was g.alal* He thus became, in 
effect, the local authority for a non-Sadah Interpretation 
of Islam* Thus the non-Sadah immediately formed their own 
reformist association and made the Sudanese the head of 
their schools, the first of which was opened early in 1915»
It Is interesting here to note that non-Sadah gagramis first 
appealed to Cairo (1905) and later (1914-) to the Sudanese 
(an outsider again)* This is important because in !ga£ramaut, 
and in the Far East, the Sadah or their disciples have always 
been the ultimate religious authority and their interpretation 
of Islam predominates in IJadrami society* Thus non-Sadah had 
to appeal to outside authorities In order to question basic 
tenets in Sadah teaching* It was held by the Irshadis that 
until then, the Sadah had 'captured their minds1, 'poisoned
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their thinking’ and ’corrupted their beliefs’ and made them 
’worship* the Sadaho Thus education was considered to he the 
key to change all this, hut the religious sanction to this 
change, had to come from outside Hadrami society.
The Irshadi association then started its own schools 
immediately. By 1935 > they had established nearly thirty 
schools, where religion and Arabic were taught and had sent 
abroad (to Egypt) about 40 students* They had their own 
newspaper which conducted a bitter campaign against the 
Sadah and set up their own social clubs 0 The Irshadi move­
ment rallied the non-Sadah and the organisation was specific­
ally anti-Sadah* In the constitution there was a clause which 
excluded any Saiyid from holding any office in the association
The Sadah rallied around their Welfare Association, 
increased their schools and conducted just as bitter a 
campaign against the Irshadis * "To present a united front 
against the anti-Saiyid Irshadis, the Saiyids formed a 
society entitled al-Rabi£ah al-*Alawiyah"^- in 1927* This new 
association was more exclusive, as its name suggests, than 
the former organisation which was originally intended for 
all Hadramis*
1> Ot
The dispute between the two sides became very bitter. 
There were a number of street fights in which three people 
were killed and many injured. Their public debates —  through
1. Serjeant, R„B* 1957-
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1their numerous newspapers and pamphlets —  he came involved 
in the details of stratification, personal attacks of 
leaders, and attempts to involve (in the dispute) the Dutch 
and British G-overnments (the latter because of Singapore and 
because it was responsible for the external affairs of the 
two Sultanates of IJa^ Lramaut), Irshadi accused the Sadah 
of using Islam to maintain inequality and their superior 
status in the society, of teaching people khurafat (heresy, 
nonsense) such as kissing their hands, 'worshipping1 their 
shrines, insisting on exclusive terms for themselves etc.
The Sadah were the reactionaries who had kept Ha<Jramaut in 
1 darkness and ignorance1, had exploited the love of the 
people for Islam In order to maintain their hegemony* The 
Irshadi insisted that all people were equal irrespective of 
their descent and deliberately used the term Saiyid to 
address everyone; they intermarried —  between Gaba'il, 
Mashayikh and Masakln —  and taught all these 'new' ideas
in their schools. The Sadah on the other hand, accused the
— — PIrshadi of being kharitjls (seceders), that they were going
1* The IJadramis in the Far East had nearly twenty newspapers 
- daily, weekly and monthly; but most of these newspapers 
were ephemeral and did not last long*
2. The kharijl was a fanatic movement in the early period of 
Islam, which was responsible for killing 'Ali bin Talib, 
the fourth khalifa, cousin of the Prophet, husband*of 
Patimah(the Prophet's daughter) and father of Hasan and 
Husein the ancestors of the Sadah* In early Islam, the 
kharijls disputed the necessity of having an Imam as head 
of Islam; "but that If it were found necessary to have one, 
then a worthy believer was to be elected, and that without 
regard to his being either a slave or a free man, Arab or 
non-Arab", Levy described them as "democratic Arab tribes­
men"* Levy, E*, 1962, p.279.
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against Islamic teaching by attacking the "children of the 
Prophet" (ahl beiyt al-Rasul), and that they were introducing 
Bolshevik ideas amongst the Ha<Jramis, They even wrote to the 
Sharlf of Mecca asking him to stop the Irshadi from making a 
pilgrimage to Mecca, The Sadah insisted that the term Saiyid 
was exclusive to the children of the Prophet, and that by 
virtue of this they had inherent nobility and superior status 
and that as a result it was £aram for a non-Saiyid to marry 
a sharlfah.
The conflict between the two parties created a 
serious cleavage, which many thoughtful gajrami considered 
disruptive and harmful to the interest of the community as a 
whole in an alien environment, Thus attempts were made by 
leading personalities —  Sadah and non-Sadah —  to reconcile 
the two parties and restore the unity of the community. Prom 
1919 onwards, at least three attempts were made by people 
from within the community in the Par East; but the attempts 
failed. Efforts were also made by people from outside the 
community, to unite the two parties. The two Sultans of 
Ha^ramaut, wrote a joint letter to the ’Alawi and Irshadi 
urging them to stop the disruptive ’bickering’ and offering 
to mediate. The editor of al-Manar of Cairo, and the Shaikh 
of al-Azhar, also made similar appeals and suggested a 
settlement through their mediation, A reputed and highly 
respected Saiyid scholar from Bia^ ramaut, actually went to the 
Par East and gave speeches in the mosque urging the two sides
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to go to him for a settlement* All these attempts failed, 
mainly because the issues involved could not really he 
reconciled, even if the leaders of the two respective parties 
were willing. "In effect this was a struggle for predominance 
in the community between the more conservative Saiyids who 
had always wielded great influence, and those ga^ Lramis who 
denied their claims to privileges inaccessible to other 
ordinary Muslims."'*' This contradiction could not therefore 
be resolved by appeals to moderation and by mediation between 
the leaders of the two organisations,
Effects of the Conflict on gadramaut.
The conflict between the Sadah and non-Sadah was 
important enough to attract attention from IJagramaut a;a(3- 
other parts of the Arab World. The depth of the conflict is 
shown by the failure of the many attempts at reconciling 
the two parties* But to what extent has -this important 
dispute affected the society in gadramaut itself? Apart from 
the attempts of the two Sultans and the Saiyid scholar at 
mediation, al-Bakary published a letter written by a leading 
Saiyid in IJa^ Lramaut (who had influence over the Xafi1 tribe), 
addressed to the Tali' tribesmen in Indonesia urging them 
not to join the Irshadi movement* Another published letter, 
also written by a Saiyid, was sent to 5&<Jramaut urging the 
people of the author's House not to listen to Sadah lies
1. Serjeant R*B., 1962.
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and puts a strong defence of the Irshadi case. Apart from 
these published letters, we can reasonably assume that 
because of the interaction between the Far East and gadramaut, 
the dispute was inevitably taken to gagramaut. Serjeant says 
that after the formation of the al-Habitat al-fAlawiyah, 
other Sadah societies later sprang up in both the Far East 
and gadramaut, Talking of the gagramaut, he said that "I knew 
well a number of members of the Society of Brotherhood and 
Cooperation to which many young men [Saiyids] in Singapore 
and Tarxm [gagramaut] belonged, and formed the impression 
that they genuinely wished to improve conditions in gagra­
maut; but an anti-Saiyid acquaintance of mine affirmed that 
this society had a secret agreement containing a proviso 
that the children of ga!xfs (Masakln) peasants were to be 
instructed only up to a certain standard, with other clauses
to perpetuate Saiyid hegemony. Such statements are constantly
x
on the Ixps of anti-Saiyid gagramis.... "
One important effect, according to Serjeant, was 
that "the lengthy wrangle found its expression in the 
publication of pamphlets and newspapers activity, and to it
we owe perhaps in very large degree the impulse to embark
2upon the writing of history*" The first printed history to 
appear (1935) were the two volumes (Political History of 
gagramaut) by the Gaba’il Salah al-Bakary. He gave an anti- 
Sadah interpretation of the recent history and supported the
1. Serjeant, R.B. 1957*
2. Ibid., 1962,
Irshadi case. Later, Saiyid Ali bin Jwahir Al-Haddad, the 
"doyen of the historians" (according to Serjeant), published 
(194-9-50) two volumes purporting to be a biography of an 
'Ai^ as Mansab* The two volumes in fact "contain much general 
history of the Saiyids, an inquiry into their ancestry for
which an impressive range of classical Arabic sources ...
1 —have been depouille," In 1957 Said Awadh Bawazir (a Shaikh)
published a book (Pages from gagrami History) which gave an 
anti-Sadah emphasis to gagrami history as a whole. Thus 
writers of both the 1Alawi and Irshadi camps, have been 
writing gagrami history to support the case of one side or 
the other.
Before World War II, the Sadah in gagramaut were 
very powerful and even the Sultans were predisposed towards 
them. This is mainly due to the conditions of the country 
at the time, and the important political and economic role 
they played. The Irshadis were unable to organise themselves 
in gagramaut and many migrated abroad. "The Irshadi were not 
permitted to rear their heads in gagramaut because the
p
Sultans wished to remain friendly with the Saiyids." Thus 
it was only after the War, when Governments were established, 
that the Irshadi influence began to appear. After the inde­
pendence of Indonesia (194-9), many gagramis returned home 
and amongst them were many Irshadis* But even then when many
1. Serjeant R.B., 1962.
2. Ibid.
45
Irshadis were actually in IJa^ ramaut (or in transit), they 
were not organised* This was partly due to the poor communi- 
cations within the country'} and the economic conditions 
which forced many people to migrate again, giving them no 
time to organise reformist organisations. But in spite of 
this, their influence in gagramaut has "been growing steadily 
since the War*
In the last twenty years, gadramaut has "been in­
creasingly interacting with the Arab World and has cut off 
the ties with the Bar East* This has been intensified since 
the Sues crisis by extensive migration. The increasing use 
of the mass media, and the deeper involvement of Pan-Arab 
Nationalism in the area. This has culminated in the recent 
political developments in Aden and the South Arabian 
Federation, as well as the Yemeni Revolution, Thus the post­
war history of ]Ja$Lr amaut, has seen the rise of Nationalism, 
which has incorporated within it the pre-War Alawi-Irshadi 
conflict, A pamphlet published in Indonesia (1962) by the 
Irshadi, continues the war with the 'Alawx but ends up by 
claiming that it was the Irshadi which had warned the people 
against the Hashemite reactionaries as far back as 1914-.
They thus welcome the Free Yemenis i.e, the Revolution and 
say "the hour of Arab Nationalism in South Arabia has 
arrived; let the Hashemite reactionaries fold their network 
of intrigues and conspiracy, for the Free Yemenis have 
placed the last nail on their coffin which shall never
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return* In. fact "both the 'Alawi and Irshadis have used 
the idiom of Nationalism to continue their conflict and 
have aligned themselves to opposing forces in the turbulent 
politics of the Arab World,
1* "Hadha Bayan linasn# Published in Djakarta# 1962#
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CHAPTER III
The four settlements surrounding the main village, 
are within a radius of between a 100 yards to ^ a mile* For 
the purpose of this thesis, I will consider the four settle­
ments and the main village as one social unit, and the name 
gureidah will be used to refer to this unit as a whole# The 
four settlements will be considered as spatially separate 
locations of $urei$ah* There are a number of reasons for 
treating the main village and the settlement as one unit:-
(a) One of the settlements is only a stone*s throw from one 
end of the main village* The other three settlements are 
all located within the small cultivated area used by all*
(b) The settlements and the main village are one economic 
unit in that they share a common cultivated area, the 
canal system and the market square* The latter is in the 
main village, surrounded by a number of little shops*
This is where all major economic transactions and 
shopping takes place for the people of the whole unit*
(c) All major religious and communal activities such as ?Id 
prayers and festivals, Friday prayers and ceremonies 
during the month of Ramadan, are carried out in the main 
village and all people participate as one community.
Three of the settlements have no mosques and their
1. Only the largest and most distant settlement (-J* mile) has 
a small mosque which was built recently. The fact that
until recently all the mosques were in the main village, 
adds to the general attributes of Gabafil as being "irre­
ligious" and "primitive11. It also indicates the important 
religious role of the 'AJ^ as centered in the hawtah.
burial ground is the same as that of the main village#
(d) No major communal activities e.g. in marriage etc# are 
carried out in the settlements without the participation 
of people from the main village# Furthermore, there is a 
daily and intensive interaction between the people from 
the settlements and those of the main village.
(e) The Village Council of gureidah considers the settlements 
and the main village as one administrative unit#
The spatial separation of the G-aba'il settlements 
from the main village was an important fact of the tradit­
ional political system that ceased to operate about 19^0* The 
main village was a religious enclave and ruled by the ’Ai^as 
whose authority was based on religious power* It was inhabi­
ted by many different and unarmed groups# The settlements 
on the other hand were independent political units, 
inhabited by tribesmen (Gaba'il) who monopolised the use and 
carrying of rifles* But since the establishment of the 
Qu'aiti State, the political distinction between the two 
sides has disappeared; now they have become one political 
unit, strengthening the other unifying factors e#g* economic 
and religious, and thereby bridging the physical separation. 
There are therefore good reasons for treating the settlements 
and the main village as one social unit* In fact the people 
themselves today refer to this unit as gureidah*
The social hierarchy of Hurei^ah encompasses a 
number of ranked groups, categorised into three main strata
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which, are internally differentiated. The following table 
illustrates the hierarchy
TABLE A. SOCIAL HIERARCHY IN ffURBiPAH
No. General Strata *o^5 Groups in Local 
Hierarchy
Number House­
holds
1 . SlDAH 1. 585 131
2. MSHSYIKH-GABA'IL 2. Basahl :Mashayikh
82 20
3. Ja’da: Gaba*il(ii 
(and other tribes>j 541
5122
15
114
3. MASlKlN or 
DU'BA girthan (i) 190 42
5. Akhdam (ii) 390 80
.
6. Subyan (iii) 99 24
Total 1,912 426
The different groups in gureidali tend to live in 
separate localities (Ref. sketch map, pp. fm ) Almost all 
the !A^tas live in that part of gureigah called al-bilad 
(the town). In the past no member of the other groups lived
1. Settled in gureigah during the last ten years* Most of 
them belong to various tribes in different parts of 
gagramaut* They came as individuals and do not fit into 
the local Gaba'il structure. They married into the 
various groups and live matrilocally in the main village.
2. Made up of the four tribal settlements in gureigah.
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in this area, nor did they own a house or a plot. There were 
some non-1 A'f'fas servants attached to large ’At^as families 
and living in their masterla houses. A few such servants 
have noitf heen ahle to acquire land and huild houses in this 
location* But these are exceptions* There are some servants 
who are still attached to their masters. The location (hafah) 
as a whole is still an 'A^as area, vaguely divided into 
various wards (ejor), named after specific fAt£as descent 
groups. A small part of the al-hilad area, near the centre 
of the village, is occupied hy girthan and some Akhdam 
families.
The Basahl live in the part of Hureidah called al- 
5asusa (constituting the rest of the main village). Within 
this area, they occupy a raised ridge entirely to themselves 
(G-arn Basahl —  Basahl Bidge). The rest of the al-Hasusa is 
occupied hy the Akhdam and the Subyan, with a tendency for 
small patronymic groups to congregate together.
The settlements are occupied hy the trihal groups, 
each heing made up of an agnatic descent group which in the 
past formed the hasic independent political unit* Two of 
the settlements have Jalda groups, which are part of the 
segmentary framework of the nearhy Ja'da trihe.
This pattern of residence is partly an expression of 
the social hierarchy, and partly a product of the traditional 
political system and the long process of past movements of 
the different groups into Hureidah. Thus for instance the
£j/;« |
Tap pictures A section of Hureidah.
Bottom picturoi A visit (liars) to the ohrino of •Umar, the ancestor
of the 'Attas.
-
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girt ban, the only indigenous group in gureidah, occupy the 
oldest and highest part of the main village* On the other 
hand* the Akhdam and the Subyan, most of whom have come into 
gurei^ah within the last forty years, live hapahazardly 
within the residual area left hy the other groups.
The significance of residential separation as a 
reflection of the social hierarchy is emphasised hy a similar 
separation of graves in the burial grounds. Within the 
ideological framework of Islam distinction between graves 
on the basis of their shapes, as well as segregating them 
into separate groups, can only be based on the criterion of 
the religions virtues of individuals and not on ascribed 
status. Yet within the burial grounds of §ureijah, each 
group has a specific area where its dead are buried and the 
best part of the ground —  in terms of the nature of the 
soil and its usefulness in relation to the technical 
problems of the graves —  belongs to the !A$$as# Furthermore, 
almost all ’Attas graves are cemented at the top and white­
washed* Non-1 A'ftas have only stones placed on the top of 
the graves to mark their siz;e. Thirdly, the two largest 
domed shrines ( sg. Qubbah) beautifully decorated and white­
washed, belong to the ancestors of the 'A'f'fas. Among the 
non-'A££as, only the Basahl have a small mud-built shrine 
on the grave of their ancestor. This differentiation In the 
graves and the segregation in the residence pattern 
obviously have important social significance and indicate
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that stratification is a dominant feature of the social life 
of gureigah.
The groups in Hureidah are not all of the same type 
nor are they all corporate groups. Groups 1 to 3 (see Table 
Amp are all descent groups, with genealogical frameworks, 
nodal ancestors and other symbols with which they can con­
ceptualise their unity. Their size, strength of their 
cohesion and their internal structures vary and express 
their different roles within the stratification system. But 
they are all corporate descent groups. On the other hand, 
groups 4* to 6, are in fact occupational categories. I Gall 
them groups' here only in a very general sense for the sake 
of brevity and conveneince. These groups also differ in their 
roles and attributes and in the degree of cohesion, if they 
can be said to have cohesion at all. Bor instance the 
Hirthan (4) do act corporately in specific situations, 
although they are not a descent group, while the Akhdam (5) 
and Subyan (6) do not act corporately. However in spite of 
this and other differences, these latter three groups are 
all occupational categories and in no sense are they descent 
groups, although each category is made up of small genealogi­
cally unconnected patronymic groups. It is clear that the 
six groups in Hureidah are not of the same type, and that 
their differences are related to the respective attributes 
and roles of the groups within the total framework of the 
stratification system.
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The social hierarchy of JJurei^ ah is extremely 
important and pervades almost every aspect of the social 
life of the village * The ranked order of the groups is 
ritually enacted twice a year. It is dramatised by a ceremony 
in the big Friday mosque, and is thus surrounded by the aura 
of religion* The ceremony emphasises the continuity and 
social significance of the hierarchy, with all its implica­
tions, The occasion for the ritual is during the Muslim 
festival of !Id, at the end of Ramadan, and during the Mecca 
pilgrimage, At the end of the prayers in one of the ceremonies, 
all the people in the mosque form into their descent groups.
The ’At^as (1), who occupy the most important part of the 
mosque, stand and form into two rows facing each other* The 
other groups then take their positions in a line in order to 
go and kiss the hands of the ’At^as, The line is headed by 
the Basahl (2), Each member of this group passes along the 
two rows of 'Aj^ as and kisses the hand of every man in it - 
old and young. When the Basahl have finished "paying their 
respects", they are followed by the Gaba’il (5) who repeat 
the same act* Then come the Hirthan (A), Akhdam (5) and 
Subyan (6) in that order, to kiss the hands of the V^Jj^ as, In 
1962-63 however, many non~fAt£as left the mosque as soon as 
the ceremony started* They said that they did not want to 
participate in this "outdated custom" (!ada qadrma).
The order of the groups in this ceremony is neverthe­
less very important. Ho one can join the ’Atrfas group unless
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he is horn a member of it0 It is at the apex of the hier­
archy 9 and members of the other groups acknowledge this by 
kissing the hands of its members* The Basahl come second in 
the hierarchy? and therefore take first place in the line.
The Gaba’il follow the Basahl and so on, down to the Subyan* 
The social hierarchy is thus enacted meticulously in this 
ceremony.
The social hierarchy is also manifested by the terms 
of address between the people of the different groups, and 
the behaviour implied by the use of such terms. In this 
society, the principle of seniority is very important. When 
a young man addresses an older man of his group, he uses the 
term for father (walid), or father’s brother (1 am). The latter 
term is also the term for father-in-law* However these terms 
are not used between people of different groups since they 
would contradict the rules of hypergamous marriage and the 
ranking of groups implied in them. Other terms are thus 
used which express not only the status of the respective 
groups, but the type of behaviour which is to be followed 
between them. A young !At£as can address elderly people of 
other groups by their first names, or, if he wishes to 
express respect, by using the term khal (mother’s brother). 
This is the rule even if the non-'AtJas is a father-in-law, 
who is normally addressed by the same term as father’s 
brother ( ’am). The terms used within the group to express
1. Bor a discussion of marriage and ranking, see next chapter*
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respect (walid or !am) are not applicable when used hy an 
'A'Jrfas to an old man of any other group, since non-1 A^as 
can never he father or fatherfs brother to 'Atjas, hut only 
mother's brother (khal)
A mother!s brother from outside a person's group is 
accorded less respect than a father or a father's brother.
On the other hand, non-'A^as address 'A^ -fas (young or old) 
as hablb (the beloved or honoured). Kinship terms cannot be 
used even when the non-'AJrfas is addressing an 'A'Jrfas son- 
in-law. Similarly Basahl and Ja'da refer to the lower groups 
(of the Masakin) by the term khal (mother's brother). But 
the Masakin groups address Basahl by the term Shaikh (Sg. 
for Mashayikh —  scholars), and the Ja'da by their lineage, 
clan or tribe's name. Within the Masakin groups, people 
address each other by their first names or by the normal 
terms of respect, iGe. walid or 'am.
The public ritual enactment of the social hierarchy 
and the daily use of the terms of address, emphasise and 
express the formalised structure of the hierarchy. This 
structure is partially upheld by the commonly accepted views 
on the ascriptive characteristics of each group. Thus the 
'A'jrfas, as Sadah i.e. of the first stratum, are believed to 
have the noblest ancestry, an inherent supernatural power 
(karama), are a missionary group and custodians of knowledge. 
The 'A-jrfas have these attributes because they are the 
"children of the Prophet". They are called "Saiyid" (Sg. for
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Sadah) —  lord or master, "because they are inherently 
superior. The Basahl, as Masliayikh, are also Believed to 
have a nohle ancestry, hut this is inferior to that of the 
rAt£as. They have supernatural powers, hut this is also less 
effective than that of the 'A’f'fas. They are religious and 
knowledgeable, hut once again to a lesser extent than the 
!A$tas. Basahl derive these attributes because they are the 
descendants of Sahl, who was a Sheikh —  a scholar. Their 
inferior religious attributes in relation to !At£as, is 
because the Basahl derive their attributes from an 'Ordinary1 
scholar, while the *AfJas derive their attributes ultimately 
from the Prophet himself. Members of the different Gaba'il 
groups are also believed to have a noble ancestry, equal to 
that of the Basahl Mashayikh since the two belong to the 
same stratum. They are believed to be brave warriors, 
honourable, primitive (beduw), and rather irreligious. They 
derive these attributes because they are the descendants of 
the epical ancestor of a specific tribe whose name they bear. 
They are called Gaba'il because they are tribesmen.
Members of the three Masakin (poor) groups, have the 
most inferior ancestry. The girthan (agriculturist), are 
engaged in agriculture, cultivating their own farms. This 
being the main occupation of groups 1 to 3, it is considered 
to be a dignified occupation. The girthan are also called 
Girwan (villagers) because they are the only indigenous 
group in gureigah. Because of this and because of their
4S>
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occupation, they have the highest status amongst the Masakin 
groups. The Akhdam (servants or workers) are engaged in 
hereditary occupations e.g. carpentry, smithery, masonry, 
and manual labour which involve the sale of services or 
their goods, within the framework of the economic organisa­
tion of gureigah. Such occupations are considered to be 
"undignified" and have a low status* Hence the low status 
of the Akhdam in relation to the girthan. The Subyan (cere­
monial servants) on the other hand, have the lowest status, 
because they are engaged in the most "undignified" occtipation 
—  namely ceremonial service. This occupation is hereditary 
for the Subyan and it is concerned with specific activities 
in marriage ceremonies, in funerals and in the various 
festivities and feasts. Only the Subyan performed certain 
specified activities in the ceremonies. But the activities 
and the Subyan are not considered impure or polluted in the 
religious sense as they would be in the Hindu caste system. 
The Subyan have a normal religious state, like most people, 
but the activities which they perform are considered 
"undignified" and therefore shameful for non-Subyan to 
perform.^
To sum up then, each group within the social hier­
archy of Hureidah has a number of ascriptive statuses and 
attributes, which are commonly accepted within the value 
system of gureidah. These are tabulated in Table B which 
follows.
1. Barth argues that the notion of ’Shame1 among Swat, corre­
sponds to the concept of pollution in Hindu society i.e. 
the two concepts have a similar function within a 'caste1 
system. Barth I960.
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I have so far shown (a) there is a social hierarchy, 
(h) that there are a number of frameworks which confer rank 
and status to the groups, and, as it is to be expected, (c) 
the groups at the various levels, have different attributes 
and roles within the total framework of the hierarchy. It 
is therefore necessary at this point to describe in some 
detail the various functions and attributes of the groups 
before I proceed (in the next chapter) to analyse their 
structural implications. The rest of this chapter will thus 
be concerned with a basic description of the roles of the 
groups.
The 1Attas.
All the *Attas in ]Jurei$ah, except for a small 
lineage, are the descendants of their nodal ancestor ‘Umar*
The small lineage descends from Agll, the brother of fUmar*
,MAtlas’1 is the nickname of !Umarfs grandfather* To all 
intents and purposes all the TA££as in ]Jurei<gLah (including 
the descendants of ’Agll) consider themselves as "’Umar's 
children”. Erom 'Umar, ’AJJas trace their descent back to 
Ahmad bin ’Isa, the ancestor of all the Ha<Jrami Sadah*
Ahmad bin 'Isa, known as al-Muhajir (the Emigrant)
came to lladramaut from Iraq about 952 A,D./34-0 A.H.^ Al-
P ~Muhagir, of the eighth generation from Eatimah (the Prophet's 
daughter) through her son Husein, is claimed to have come as
1* R.B.Sergeants* 1957* PP*8* 
2. Ibid., po8.
a missionary, reviving and spreading the teaching of the
1 -Sunnah according to the Shaft*i School. The 'A’Jrfas 
genealogy, through al-Muhajir, goes hack to Husein and 
through his mother, ultimately reaches the Prophet. However, 
the father of Husein and therefore the actual ultimate 
paternal ancestor of the 'Aortas, was !Ali ibn Abi Talib, the 
first cousin of the Prophet. But the ’Atjas explain this 
genealogical departure by quoting a number of hadlth —  
sayings of the Prophet. These gadiths say that the children 
of Patimah and 'Ali, were also "the children of the Prophet", 
Hence the descent of the 'Atfas goes back to the very 
source of Islam - the Prophet - and is sanctioned by what 
are claimed to be the Prophet's gadlth.
Starting from the Pnophet downwards to al-Muhajir, 
the Sadah have a noble and distinguished ancestry, whose 
primary function was to spread Islam, the noble and good 
tradition of the Prophet, and to be the custodian of 'Ilm 
(knowledge). In gajramaut, al-Muhajir and his descendants 
have continued this tradition right to the present day.
Thus the role and manifest dedication of the 'AJtas, as 
descendants of al-Muhajir, is to continue this long and 
"good tradition of our ancestors" Assalaf Assaleh.
1. Ibid. But Serjeant has doubts as to whether Al-Muhajir 
was actually engaged in teaching and spreading the 
Shafi1i sunnah.
2. "Hadith" is a valid source or "root" of the Laws of 
Islam. Levy, R., 1962, p.172.
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1
'Umar was born at Lisk in !g[si^L3?sima.,ix*b9 in the year 
992 AH/1584-AD. He became blind when he was still a child.
By his early twenties, he was already a "scholar”, 'alim and 
a Sufi (a mystic). His 1 Shaikh' —  religious teacher and
spiritual guardian —  told him to go to Wadi !Amd and preach 
to its "barbaric tribes". His donkey stopped at ^ureijah an(3- 
refused to go any further. ’Umar then decided to stay in 
IJureidah and use it as a base for his missionary activities 
in the Wadi. Within a few years, he became the religious 
leader of ljureldah and virtually its ruler. Before he died 
he declared the village !a bawtah —  (a holy enclave) which 
was under his protection. When he died his son took his 
place and continued his work. 'Umar's grandson - Muhsin - 
became the first 'chief1 (Hansab) of 5ure±3.ah. 'Umar's
1. The brief 'history1 that follows here was given to me by 
the Mansab of Hureidah. It is of course impossible to 
check its accuracy, i.e. whether the events did take 
place in the way described and at the period stated. In 
a situation like this it is difficult to state whether 
this is a "myth" or actual "history". If it Is any help 
at all, the Mansab has written this account in an unpub­
lished book on the "History of ;gurei§.ah". Similarly, !Ali 
bin Hasan, fourth generation from 'Umar, had written
the biography of 'Umar. Here I treat the 'history'
of the 'Aftas in the orthodox way, as a charter to their 
present situation. The 'truth1 or 'falsity1 of the facts 
is therefore not relevant.
2. Ihe term "Shaikh" is used to describe and address a 
distinguished scholar of any stratum. But it is also 
used to refer to members of a descent group; —  in the 
latter case, the descent group would be the descendants 
of a non-SacLah Shaikh. The first meaning implies an 
achieved scholarly status by an individual without the 
implication of his descent status. Hence It is also used 
for Sadah scholars. The second meaning however, refers 
to an ascriptive descent and religious status of a 
particular group. Hence it is used to refer to people of 
the Hashayikh group only, and never of the Sadah or 
other groups.
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descendants proliferated in the village and some of them 
moved to other villages in the region where they continued 
the 1 good tradition” of their ancestor* One such famous 
descendant was Ali tin gasan (4th generation from fUmar) who 
turned a robber*s haunt into a gawtah and called it Mashhad * 
His shrine is annually celebrated hy a ziara - a religious 
visit; —  the ziara will he analysed further down* Both ^mar 
and his grandson Mugsin, have a domed shrine in gureigah*
The people of gureigah and others from oustide make offer­
ings (nudhur) to hoth the two shrines* ^mar^ shrine stands 
as a symbol of the religious status of the *Af£as and a 
reminder to them of their duty and tradition which they 
must carry forward*
The 1 history1 of the *AJfas in gureigah their 
declared objective, their ethos in fact, is that of 
preachers of Islam and the noble tradition started by the 
Prophet himself* In their historical development in gureidah, 
the *Atfas have evolved a political oi‘gan±sation which 
turned them into a ruling group in addition to their function 
as missionaries* Their political authority (until gureigah 
was incorporated in the Qu'aiti State recently) was inevitably 
based on their religious power* Apart from their missionary 
activities, the basis of this religious power is derived from 
emphasising their link with the Prophet* This link implies 
that supernatural power and a large body of religious 
scholarship, has been transmitted from the Prophet down the
6 3
line of distinguished ancestors, to the fA$tas. Thus the
fact that the ^^as are religious leaders and custodians
of knowledge, is not because of any achievement on their
part, hut is because of an inheritance from their past. The
!A-jr£as therefore use what Emerys Petex's has called a
"cultural past" in order to justify their present politico-
religious status.
The very high religious status of the lA$]ia,a in
!gurei£ah haa always been maintained by their control of
education, the monopoly of religious leadership and the use
of religious ceremonies. As a result, the religious
attributes and status of the ■A'Jrfas have become part and
parcel of the "social pillars" which Islam prescribes and
sanctions in §urei$.ah. To question the religious status of
the !A*f^ as, is to question the authority of Islam —  the
Prophet and God.
Until a few years ago, !gurei£ah had a traditional
- 2boarding school, run and financed by the !A-t;£as. The school 
was primarily for !A£tas children, but it also had non-JA££as, 
mainly from other parts of the country« The school has now 
been taken over by the Government, but its two teachers are 
both fA£'J;as« The male ‘Ai^as heads of households, have a 
literacy figure of 81%. Those of the Bashal 80%. Amongst 
the other groups, the figure is between 31% and 45 #4-%. This
1* E.L* Peters 1963°
2. Preya Stark, describes the school in her book "A Winter 
in Arabia" (194*8 ed.) when she visited Hureijah in 1938.
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difference in the percentage of literate between the groups 
is primarily due to the fact that the rA£Jas controlled the 
traditional system of education. Many non-’A^fas have become 
literate in the course of their migration experience 
recently. However these figures do not tell us the qualita­
tive difference in the education of the various groups. 
Amongst the 6lite, there are five people who are
regarded as ” 'ulama1 " —  scholars, and whose reputation 
extends to the country at large and even abroad* The 
genealogy of the !A£Jas is full of information concerning 
past scholars who established wide reputation in their time 
and attracted students from other parts of the country.
This starts from !Umar, the ancestor, right down to Mansab 
Al^ mad bin IJasan (who died in 1916) ; one of the prominent
students of the latter was a "mufti” of Lahore and has
1written two volumes in praise of his teacher* The present 
scholars of §urei<Jah, all of whom are over fifty, are a 
product of the traditional educational system and are a 
continuation of the tradition of their ancestors0 This 
tradition has produced scholars who have written biographies 
and religious boohs, published and 'unpublished, and who 
have collected books and built up libraries. One library I 
saw contained more than five hundred printed books on a wide 
range of subjects within the curriculum of traditional
I. " !Ugud al-Almas". A Twahir.,. Singapore Vol*I, 194-9; 
Vol.II, 1950.
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Islamic studies. Another library, belonging to the Mansab
and which I did not see, is reputed to be one of the
1largest private libraries in the country. There is thus 
amongst the !A££as an elite of scholars of a high calibre.
By having friends in the various centres of learning in the 
country, they operate in a wider field beyond u^rei^ Lah.
What is important in the context of ^ureidah however, is 
that such scholars are accepted and regarded as religious 
leaders and experts on technical points of Islamic theology. 
Such people have always been the ”final authority” on 
religious practice in ^urei^ah. Since Islam prescribes rules 
for a wide area of social activities, their importance is 
thus obvious. Similarly their importance as custodian of 
knowledge, and its transmission through the formal educat­
ional system to their own group, is also obvious.
In ]Jurei£.ah in particular and the 3Ja<Jramaut 
general, secular education and knowledge outside the frame­
work of Islamic theology is, to say the least, very rarec 
Thus the control of the educational system and the monopoly
1® While I was writing the thesis, the Mansab with the 
large library wrote to me requesting that I send him 
copies of any publication I make on gurei^ Lah. He also 
wanted me to send him copies of all the books written in 
English on the IJadramaut, Although the Mansab does not 
read English, he wants these books for his library. His 
father had built the library by collecting books and 
manuscripts on ^ a^ Lramaut, from all over the country, The 
present Mansab is continuing this tradition although he 
has widened his field by collecting books from outside 
the Arab World and in a foreign language.
of scholars by the fA££as, is merely an aspect of their 
wider function as a missionary group. The elder of the two 
Mansabs of gur’eidah is accepted as the fofficial1 religious 
leader of gureigah, since he represents 'Umar and is con­
tinuing the latter!s work* Of the seven mosques in the 
village, six were built and are controlled by the lA*JrJ;as.
The Imam —  prayer leader —  of these mosques, and the 
preacher —  khatlb —  of the Friday mosque, are all -^Jrfas. 
The preacher is also the man who officiates at marriage 
ceremonies, in the village. In all other ceremonies, •Af'fas 
play the dominant role* This is not to say that non-fA$£as 
are explicitly excluded from any religious office. Theoret­
ically any pious and learned non-'A’f^as can for example 
become an Imam in a mosque, officiate at a marriage ceremony 
etc. But there are no learned non-1 A££as in gureigah of the 
same stature as the *A*££as. Secondly, these offices are 
accepted as prerogatives of the !A^as0 Thirdly, all the 
mosques (except that of the Basahl) are controlled by the 
!A££as and it is they who initiate most of the religious 
ceremonies. Because of all these reasons, 'Attas play a 
dominant role in the religious and other ceremonies in 
Hureidah.r d
The religious status and supernatural powers of the 
1 Ajp-J^Ss are however highlighted and dramatised by the type of 
religious ceremonies held in gureigah and the Mashhad ziara, 
Firstly there is an annual muwlid —  birthday celebration —
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of the Prophet (the ultimate ancestor of the !A£Jas), This 
is held at the shrine of 'Umar. A perfect association 
"between the ultimate ancestor (the Prophet) and the nodal 
ancestor ('Umar), is thus achieved* The continuity of the 
line of descent, and the transmission of spiritual power, 
"between the Prophet and the 'A$£as, is thereby emphasised 
and maintained* Secondly, after every 'Id prayer (there are 
two in a year), people march in a procession (led "by the 
Mansab) from the mosques to 'Umar's shrine. There people pay 
their respect to 'Umar, and a brief prayer is said asking 
him to intercede with God, so that the ills of 9ureig.ah are 
removed and good fortune bestowed on its people* Thirdly, an
annual muwlid is held to celebrate the birthday of 'Ali bin
-  1gasan 'A££as, the founder of the Mashhad haw tabu This
ceremony is held in the room where the man was born* Pourthly 
during the month of Ramadan, a regular hizb —  a mosque 
seminary —  is held every afternoon in one 'A£*j;as mosque,
Xn the seminary, the Mansab talks and extols the work and 
virtues of 'Umar* The talks are based on the manaqib 
(manuscript biographies), on the life of 'Umar, written by 
'Ali bin 1}asan* During the same period, a ceremony is held 
at all the mosques in ljureiguh, every alternate night 
starting from the thirteenth night of Ramadan* The ceremony 
is held in all the seven mosques as well as in 'Umar's shrine.
1* See below* p-6?.
In the ceremony, prayers are said and the Qur'an recited 
collectively, followed "by qagldah (praise of past 'saints1) 
and sermons in praise of the famous fA££as ancestors as well 
as1, other Sadah scholars* When the ceremony is held at !Umar! 
shrine, (normally it takes place two days before the end of 
Ramadan)> a special significance is attached to the ceremony 
Here a special prayer is said to a long list of *A££as 
ancestors, all of whom are named* The prayer asks for the 
blessing of 'Umar on the named ancestors; it ends by every­
one present reciting the Patiha (opening chapter of the 
Kur'an), for the named ancestors* All these religious 
ceremonies thus emphasise the deep involvement of the fA$fas 
with Islam, They emphasise the link between themselves and 
the Prophet with the implied transmission of spiritual power 
and knowledge from the very source of Islam down to the 
'A££as* Since in all these ceremonies, 'At^as make sermons 
entreating people to follow the good path of religion and 
not to be enticed by the temptation of Satan, they emphasise 
the declared function of the 'A^as as a missionary group 
carrying on the noble tradition of the Prophet. In this way, 
the 'Afinas have acquired what is called as sulufrat al- 
ruhiyyah —  spiritual power, over an extensive field of the 
day to day social relations. This is the basis of their 
ascriptive religious status and power.
But it Is at the Mashhad ziara where the different 
roles of the 'At^as are dramatised* The place where Mashhad
69
village stands today used to "be a favourite place for armed 
tribesmen to ambush and rob passing caravans and travellers* 
Because of this, the place acquired a very bad reputation* 
’Ali bin gasan, (4th generation from Omar), went to this 
place, preached amongst the tribesmen and ultimately 
pacified them* He turned the place into a hawtah and made 
the surrounding tribesmen guarantee its sanctity* He 
mediated in their feuds, and made them agree to a truce at 
certain periods of the year* When he died, people went to 
visit his shrine, give offerings and pray their wishes0 The 
ziara became a regular visit attended by people from far and 
wide* The place also became a Ttsuq!t —  a market —  during 
the ziara period*
The ziara has now become a very big annual event in 
this part of the country* In 1962-63? it was attended by 
more than 5?000 people, from the plateau as well as from 
villages and towns of the valleys* The ziara lasts for 
three to five days* It starts by the uentry" of $urei$ahfs 
Mansabs who are met by the Mansab of Mashhad * Then come the 
Gaba’il tribesmen —  each tribe forming into a group, and 
firing their rifles in the air as they enter the village* 
Then follows the muwlid ceremony in the shrine of !Ali bin 
£[asan* After this the Mashhad Mansab makes a public sermon 
to the large crowd gathered outside the shrine* The sermon 
reminds the people of the holiness of ’Ali bin !gasan, his 
noble work in the course of Islam, and the sanctity of the
T«p pictures Temporary stalls at tht 
market of a ziara*
Bottom picturoi Tho Mansab of Mashhad preaching to the crowd at the ziara.
place* Many people then enter the shrine to make individual 
prayers and offerings* Then the Mansab of Mashhad and that 
of gureidah go to a big public ground-tank full of water, 
and ceremonially open it for public use. After this, the 
people visit the numerous stalls which have filled every 
available space in the village. From this time on there is 
brisk trade till the end of the ziara. The mechanism and 
process of the market are complicated, but the important 
point here is that the market lasts for a number of days, 
and that the two broad categories of the larger society, 
that is the tribesmen and the townspeople, have intensive 
economic relations. The medium of exchange is money (East 
African Currency) although some barter does take place 
between individuals. The grounds where stalls are placed 
are rented and the proceeds goes to the Mansab. Similarly 
offerings to the shrine in money and in kind go to him.
This is the main source of income for the Mansab and his 
close agnates, who make up the small population of Mashhad.
The village of Mashhad is in a barren and arid 
place far from the course of floods (seil) and therefore 
has no agriculture to support it. One well (450 feet deep) 
is its only source of water. There are twenty houses (all 
inhabitants are ’A'Jrfas) and for most of the year, its male 
population is away working as migrant labour* Xet its ziara 
has always been and still is important, attracting people 
from a very wide area. Its suq is very large and famous. The
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Mashhad ziara obviously plays a very important function* 
During the traditional period, when fe\ids were endemic and 
travelling dangerous, the ziara provided a safe period and 
place where feuding tribes as well as unarmed people from 
villages and towns, could meet and trade* It was also the 
place from which the Mansab went out to stop feuds and 
settle disputes* It was a place where fugitives from feuds 
could hide, vows be taken, and prayers and offerings made*
The 'Atrfas village of Mashhad therefore had an important 
political,religious and economic functions in the traditional 
social system of the wider field* Today it still performs 
an important religious and economic function. But the 
Mashhad (and five other 'AJJas .^awfahs in the country), were 
until recently under the religious and political authority 
of the Mansabs of §ureijah. The latter was the spiritual and 
political capital of all ?A££as wherever they were, ^urei^ah 
has no ziara, because 'Umar specifically prohibited it* The 
importance of ^ureidnh and the specific political and 
religious roles of the 'AJJas In It, can therefore only be 
understood properly by showing their significance in the 
wider field* Thus the religious role of the *A£tas within 
E^ureijah Is strengthened and is an aspect of their 
significant role In the wider field*
I have described in some detail, the religious~ 
political role of the TA£Jas in ]Jureid.ah and the wider field, 
in the present and immediate past* The *A$£as see themselves
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as a "chosen" group , dedicated to a missionary (civilising) 
function, with, supernatural powers inherited from the 
Prophet thzmigh a noble tradition which was started by him. 
They see themselves as performing a "good’1 function in the 
society. This, in general, is the image, or ethos, of the 
!A££as, which the other groups have always accepted but are 
now beginning to question.
I have so far described the religious role of the 
fA££as in the wider field and within §urei£ah* It is import­
ant at this point to describe their internal organisation 
of the House and its political function. The House is 
divided into nine lineages (Sg. Par). These lineages are not 
of equivalent order genealogically (see genealogical chart 
All !A££as lineages are descendants of 1 Abdul-Ragman. Yet it 
is *XImar who is regarded as the "father1 of lA££as in
§urei$Lah, primarily because he provides the ritual and
historical focal point for them. Furthermore this explains 
the equality of status (except for lineage four) between 
the lineages which are genealogically unequal. Lineage 4 is 
the lineage of the Mansabs. The tA^as thus have a nodal
ancestor and a genealogical framework which unites all Its
groups. This is extremely important because it does regulate 
relationships within the House, and between it and other 
groups. It is important also because it contrasts with the 
genealogical framework of other groups in ]Jurei£ah.
The cohesion and unity of the !AjrJ;as House is one
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of its most important features in contrast with the other 
groups. This is partly due to the very high rate of in-group 
marriage* The pattern of 'Af'fas marriage, 26% within a 
lineage and 60% within the House as a whole, means that the 
descent framework is reinforced by an intricate network of 
affinal, matrilateral and bilateral relationships making all 
the •A'Jrfas as "one large family". Such a family1 has of 
course internal cleavages and inherent areas of conflict, 
especially in Inheritance disputes over property. However 
internal oonflict of the !A£-J;as are channelled to their 
political organisation where they are settled. Even now 
’Atrfas disputes tend to be settled internally, bypassing 
the courts as an alternative judicial system.
The historical development of the political organisa* 
tion of the ’A^fas, has two important and significant steps. 
The first step was when the office of the Mansab was divided 
and held jointly by two brothers. Ever since, the lineage 
of the Mansab has had two sections each with a Mansab. The 
second stage was when the ■A’Jrfcas collectively set down and 
wrote a "Constitution" describing and formalising- the 
structure and functions of the political organisation which 
had developed by that time (1239 A.H./7 823 A.D.)0 The 
constitution formalised the distinct status of the Mansab*s 
lineage, set out the functions of the Mansabs, created a 
Council and set out the procedures to be followed In 
resolving conflicts and in maintaining the unity of the
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House. The Mansabs presided over the Council, and their 
lineage had two representatives (one from each sub-lineage) 
in the Council. The other lineages, each had one represen­
tative in the Council. Their equality of status was thus 
formalised.
The political organisation of the tA^as provided a 
focal point for their political unity, which emphasised 
their genealogical unity and at the same time counteracted 
the segmentary process inherent in the genealogical structurec 
The organisation still acts as the highest political authority, 
by operating informally, in spite of the existence of an 
alternative political organisation of the State (the only
p
legitimate authority). Thus the political unity of the 
TA££as is still very strong, especially in situations of 
conflicts with other groups when the dominating position of 
the !A££as in the hierarchy is vigorously questioned.
Because of the political development of the country 
during the last two decades i.e. the establishment of the 
Qu'aiti State, the fA££as have controlled the Village 
Council since its establishment in 1949♦ Since then internal 
changes within the !A££as have shifted the centre of politi­
cal power i.e. the control of the Village Council, from the
1. I have documents to show that the Council legislated a 
number of prohibitions on the 'Attas, settled conflicts 
between •A'fjas outside gureidah, * and set up a new Mansa- 
bate (in the early thirties) in a distant village. The 
Council discussed and approved all these measures.
2. In 1962, the Qu!aiti §ultan visited Hureijah. Before his 
arrival, the 1Attas leaders met informally to discuss 
arrangements and share responsibilities in entertaining 
the §ultan and his large entourage.
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Mansab and his lineage, to another person belonging to 
another lineage* This change will he described later, but 
the result has turned the Mansabs into formal religious 
leaders and heads of the *A*jr£as House without any actual 
political power within the new political structure. On the 
other hand, the courts, the police and district administra­
tion in gureidah are Central Government institutions which 
are controlled by non-1 A£*J;as officials from other parts of 
the country^ However the new leader of the ’AJJas in gureidah 
operates and has contacts and influence within the wider 
political field* Thus the 'AJfas control the Council and at 
the same time have influence over the Central Government 
institutions in gureidah. They therefore Tmonopolise 1 
political power in gureidah and their dominance1 over the 
other groups is pervasive.
To sum up then, the *At£as use their 1 cultural past! 
to validate their religious status and supernatural powers. 
Through this they have always controlled religious institu­
tions and leadership as well as the educational system.
Their historical development and their genealogical frame­
work, has provided them with a political organisation which 
has made them a highly cohesive and united group, controlling 
political power of gureigah, both in the past and in the 
present.
2. THE BASAHL.
The Basahl take second place in the hierarchy of 
gureidah* They have a religious status. Their "spiritual 
influence" extends over two specific groups —  a patronymic 
group of the Subyan in gureidah and a lineage of the Ja*da 
trihe about ten miles away from gureidah* This 1 influence* 
was pronounced and important in the immediate past but is 
now waning and is being questioned because of the general 
Ghanges taking place in the society* The 1 influence* meant 
that the Basahl settled the disputes of these two groups, 
that the leaders of the Basahl were regularly visited and 
provided with gifts, that their religious power —  barakah 
—  blessing, was sought and their curse —  hatf —  was 
feared. The relationship was essentially a superordinate/ 
subordinate type, within the framework of spiritual 
influence. This relationship is still recognised by visits 
to the Basahl at specific occasions* It is also ersspressed 
in the reverence the two groups show towards the Basahl 
(kissing their hands and calling them gabxb, the beloved), 
while other groups do not show the same reverence towards 
Basahl•
The Basahl, as Mashayikh, have religious status 
because of their claim to be descendants of Sahl who was a 
Shaikh (a scholar and religious leader) of gureigah at his 
time. According to the Mansab and the Basahl themselves, 
when *Umar came to Hureidah, Sahl voluntarily gave up
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his post as the Shaikh of the village at the time* This was 
done in recognition of ’Umar’s superior status. At the time* 
there was, only one mosque in ]Jurei<Jah —  that of the Basahl 
—  and !Umar used to preach and lead prayers in it, Ever 
since, a special relationship has existed Between the ’A^as 
and Basahl, The mythical abdication of Basahl provides a 
charter for the inferior religious status of the Basahl in 
relation to the 1Attas, On the other hand Sahl was recognised 
by ’Umar as a Shaikh and the religious status of his descen­
dants as Hashayikh has been accepted and emphasised ever 
since, Thus every year the last religious ceremony of 
Ramadan, takes place in the Basahl mosque —  after the same 
ceremony has taken place in * Umar’s shrine, The ceremony at 
Basahl’s mosque is important because it ends the holy month 
of Ramadan and heralds the ’Id festival. But most important, 
the ceremony re-affirms the religious status of both the 
’Ajrfas and Basahl, by invoking the memories of their res­
pective ancestors, The status of Basahl is also recognised 
by the fact that the ’A££as ’officially" visit them during 
the ’Id, to "pay their respects". This is important because 
all other groups visit the ’At£as at this occasion, without 
the latter reciprocating. The Basahl are thus an exception 
and the ’Af^as visit is a recognition of their religious 
status which the other groups do net have.
The Basahl, as I have pointed out earlier, are a 
small corporate group with an informal political leader.
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They are a stock group with a nodal ancestor and a genealogi­
cal framework which regulates their marriage and conceptual­
ises their unity and cohesion* But unlike the ‘A'ffas, the 
Basahl have a significantly large percentage of marriage 
with a neighbouring lineage of the <Ja!da tribe. The reasons 
for this are:- (a) the Basahl as Mashayikh and the Jafda as 
Gabadil, belong to the same stratum and can therefore inter­
marry; (b) the Basahl as a small, numerically weak group, 
intermarry with the powerful tribal lineage in order to 
consolidate their position within 3Jurei§.ah* This was import­
ant in the traditional political system because the tribes 
monopolised the use of rifles * (c) A number of Basahl owned 
pieces of land in the area of the lineage; recognition of 
ownership and protection of the land, was only possible with 
the Gonsent and good will of the lineage concerned.
The Basahl are mostly farmers relying heavily on 
migration and remittances* Their leader is the leading shop­
keeper of the village* He is a member of the Village Council, 
but cannot do much because of the !AJ;£as control of the 
Council* But as an important man in the village, he uses his 
position to extend his leadership over other groups in the 
village* The political role of the Basahl leader is important 
for two reasons:- (a) the Basahl have lost their religious 
influence, and their leader is now trying to reinforce their 
position by extending his political influence; (b) in the 
present political context of Hurei^ah, non-1 A£t;as do form
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into a wider political *block1 in specific situations, and 
the Basahl leader is attempting to become the leader of this 
new block* This will be discussed in the chapter on the 
political systemo
3. THE GABl!IL (JA'DA AND OTHERS).
Of the four Gaba!il settlements in gureidah, two 
are lineages in the segmentary structure of the Ja'da tribe 
which occupies the area just outside gureidah. The other 
two settlements are isolated lineages with distant connect­
ions to two separate tribes in other parts of the country*
It will be obvious that these four units form a category and 
not one corporate group* In fact each settlement is a 
corporate group and in the past was a separate political 
xmit* The two Ja'da lineages are drawn into the larger 
genealogical framework of the tribe and in the past this was 
important in regulating their political and kinship relations* 
Each of the other two lineages has its own genealogical 
framework which identifies it as a separate stock group and 
regulates its marriage and political relations*
The political and ideological system in which members 
of the Gaba!il groups had specific roles, has now become 
extinct* The traditional role and attributes of the Gabalil 
which have already been described, has become dysfunction- 
alised under the new political system and the encroaching 
ideology of nationalism* The G-aba'il welcome the fact that
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they no longer fear the religious powers of the 1Attas and 
Basahl as they did in the past, hut at the same time hemoan 
their loss of political power and complain that they have 
become unarmed and as "weak" (da1 If) as the Masakln. Unlike 
the 1 Attas who have gained control of the new instruments 
of political power, the Gaba*il have lost their traditional 
power, without acquiring any new power in the present system* 
Similarly they have not acquired a new distinct economic or 
religious role* As a result, they have now become a collec­
tion of lineages without distinguishing characteristics 
apart from their descent connections.
The four units no longer have headmen to settle 
their internal disputes, but rely on the courts to do this. 
They have no influence on the Central Government institutions 
and although come under the jurisdiction of the Village 
Council, have no representatives on it. Because of this and 
because the four settlements are separate entities, the 
Gaba*il are politically weak and have not formed into one 
group with a strong leader.
The genealogical framework of each of the settlements 
gives each of the units cohesion and unity and at the same 
time regulates its marriages,, The larger framework of the 
Ja*da tribe is important only to the extent that marriage 
outside the two Ja*da lineages is preferred within the 
tribe. Thus because there is no larger genealogical frame­
work to include the four settlements, the division between
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the units is more pronounced and expressed in the spacial 
separation* Given this inherent cleavage amongst the Gabadil 
and the lack of political power, it is difficult to see how 
they can form into one larger corporate group* But it is 
possible for the Gaba!il to he part of a wider political 
alignment *—  a block —  within gureidah as I will demonstrate 
later*
d* THE SIRTH5N (OB THE MASAKlN).
Of the three Masakin occupational groups, the 
Sirthan (agriculturists), are the only people engaged in 
the dignified occupation of agrioulture and the only 
indigenous people of gureidah* They are considered as the 
"professional” agriculturists —  the experts on the detailed 
problems of agriculture and the involved customs pertaining 
to the rights and duties in the distribution of water by the 
complicated canal system* They are also considered to be the 
original owners of a large part of Hureidah's building land 
and cultivated plots* Because of these attributes they have 
a higher rank amongst the Masakln occupational groups* The 
Pittas refer to them as "ahl al-bilad" (the people of the 
town) in contrast to the Akhdam and Subyan* This is a recog­
nition of the fact that they are autocthonous and are there­
fore accorded some respect*
The girthan ai'e made up of 13 patronymic groups 
varying in size from 4- people to 67 people* The patronymic
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groups are genealogically unconnected and therefore have no 
framework to conceptualise their unity. Nevertheless, the 
girthan have a strong preference for marrying within and 
between their patronymic groups* In general they do not allow 
their women to be married by Akhdam and Subyan, primarily 
because they consider the latter two groups have a lower 
status! Since girthan patronymic groups are stable and have 
been in gureidah for a long time, intermarriage between 
their patronymic groups has strengthened the ties between 
them and compensated for the absence of a genealogical 
framework. This explains why in certain political situations, 
this occupational category acts corporately and has an 
informal leader..
When the first Village Council was set up in 194-9? 
the !At£as recommended a girthan member to be appointed in 
the Council. Ever since, the girthan have had an informal
l
leader and in one memorable crisis, they acted corporately 
against the !A£Jas. Their leader then resigned and has 
remained outside the Council to the present. He has now 
patched up his quarrel by becoming an informal clerk to the 
'At-fas President of the Council® In this way he has kept 
himself near to the centre of power and is thereby able to 
discharge his function as leader of the girthan and to look 
after their interests.
1. See case history, pp. 2$$r Chapter VII.
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Host of the girthan are still farmers and like other 
people supplement their income by migration* However, there 
are a few girthan who now take up manual labouring during the 
drought periodo
5* THE AimiDlH (OF THE HASAKIN)
They are made up of a large number of patronymic 
groups (46) varying in size from a single elementary family, 
to a group with 46 people. A number of the larger groups 
have been in §/urei$Lah for a !long time1, but the rest have 
moved in from other parts of the country within the last 
forty years P They came to in search of “peace and
work" (aman wa shughul)•
The older patronymic groups of the Akhdam are 
engaged in the traditional hereditary occupations such as 
carpentry, smithing, auctioneering, masonry, lime making etc. 
These occupations are hereditary to particular groups and are 
handed down from father to son. But since the economy was 
(and still is) small and could not support a proliferation 
of these occupations, the people from such patronymic groups 
migrated to other villages as the groups became larger. 
Another process is that the group would break up, with one 
part continuing the occupation and the other becoming 
labourers and water drawers, and ultimately migrate. In this 
way the size of these groups and occupations was confined. 
However it is amongst the manual labourers (agricultural and
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building), water carriers and servants in the houses, that 
mobility was high® Such people migrated to the main port on 
the coast as porters during the drought period. It is also 
as labourers that new migrants came to gureidah* This is 
correlated with the hey days of India and Indonesia, between 
the two World Wars, when a number of ‘A'Jrfas families became 
rich in those countries and sent to gureidah a lot of money* 
Huge houses and mosques were built, agriculture was intensi­
fied and a lot of food and luxury goods imported* Hence a 
large labour force was required and many Akhdam came to 
gureigah at this time* A number of *At£as families actually 
imported servants from India at the time. After the setting 
up of the Qu'aiti State in 1940, some freed slaves joined 
this group —  a few were from gureidah itself* but most of 
them came from other villages.
The Akhdam are thus made up of a large number of 
separate individual families and small patronymic groups0 
75% of these are recent migrants while the remainder belong 
to older groups engaged in crafts occupations* However the 
most important feature of this group is that they are all 
engaged in the sale of service which is considered to be 
undignified. They perform a specialised but important function 
in the economy and In the past were extremely dependent on 
the higher groups for their livelihood.
Since the end of the War, one of the most Important 
economic changes has been the migration of people to nearby
85
Arab countries* By migi'ating and sending back remittances, 
many Akhdam have been able to buy plots of farms and build 
houses, The traditional attribute of the Akhdam that they 
did not o m  farms but specialised in working for others has 
thus been breaking down. But most important the Akhdam are 
no longer absolutely dependent on the higher groups for their 
livelihood, since they can now easily migrate for alternative 
sources of employment,
Ihe Akhdam are the third largest group in terms of 
numbers. But because, (a) they have no genealogical framework 
to conceptualise their unity, (b) they are not and cannot 
be organised as an economic corporate group, and (c) they 
are highly mobile —  because of these factors, they are not 
a corporate group in any sense, furthermore, because of 
their structure, the marriage pattern has a different effect 
on them than, for instance, the !A££as who are one stock 
group. This problem is discussed in the next chapter.
When the first Village Council was set up, a member 
of the old patronymic groups was appointed to the Council,
But it is obvious that the member was in no sense a deader* 
of the Akhdam since they are a category with no cohesion or 
any sense of corporateness. The 'AJ'fas President realises 
the importance of this and has handpicked two members from 
the Akhdam. Since they do not represent any group, they are 
more likely to fall under his control than for instance the 
girthan member. However, the Akhdam as a low ranking 1 group1
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and at the lower end of the economic ladder, are more
receptive to Nationalist ideas and can participate in wider
1and new political alignments within the village. For 
instance in the conflict between the girthan and the ,A$,tas 
some of the Akhdam joined the girthan (the rest of the 
Akhdam morally supported them)* Thus although the Akhdam 
are not a corporate group, there were situations in 1962-63, 
when they and the Subyan (as well as other non~fA$Jas) 
became opposed, as one ‘block1, to the *A$r$;as*
S. THE SUBYlN (OF THE M S M S N ) .
The Subyan are also a collection of patronymic 
groups (6) of varying sizes (6 to 70 people) some having 
been earlier in gureidah than others* As an occupational 
category performing "ceremonial services" they have the 
lowest position in the hierarchy# Besides the ceremonial 
services, they are also occupied in many menial tasks, —  as 
labourers, water carriers, transporters of sand and stone by 
donkeys etc* Like other groups they also migrate to supple­
ment their incomes and are therefore no longer economically 
dependent on higher groups0 In fact some have taken to shop­
keeping as a regular occupation, and a few young men now 
refuse to carry out ceremonial services for anyone 0
Like the Akhdam, they are not a corporate group and 
have no genealogical framework to conceptualise their unity.
w  : '
1* See chapterion Political Organisation for a fuller 
discussion of this problem.
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But unlike the Akhdam, none of the Subyan is a member of 
the Village Council* Because of this their small number, and 
their very low rank in the hierarchy, the Subyan have no 
political power at all in the village0
I have so far shown that (a) there is a social 
hierarchy in jgurei^ Lah; (b) there are a number of frameworks 
which confer rank and status on the groups, and (c) that 
political, economic and ideological changes in the last two 
decades have altered some of the basic attributes of the 
groups and have created a discrepancy between the idealised 
picture of the social hierarchy and the actual reality of 
1962-65* It is important therefore to recapitulate, in 
general terms, (b) and (c) since later chapters analyse them 
in greater detail.
In igurei^ Lah, and in ^a^ramaut at large, people are 
placed into three basic strata within a framework ancestry. 
The !A££as, as descendants of the Prophet, belong to the 
Sadah stratum. Because of their ancestry, they have the 
highest descent status. The Basahl and Ja’da groups belong 
to the second stratum of Mashayite.-G-aba1 il* Because the 
Basahl and Ja’da are the descendants of specific apical - 
ancestors (Shaikh for the Basahl, and Ja'edy, the ancestor 
of the tribe for the Ja'da) and ultimately the "children of 
Qahtan", their ancestry is less noble than that of the line 
of the Prophet* Hence their descent status is second to that
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of the !At£as* The girthan, Akhdam and Subyan on the other 
hand, are neither the descendants of the first nor of the 
second line of ancestry* Because of this, they are, (in 
terms of ancestry) a residual category with "no ancestry" 
and therefore no "descent status". Hence their stratum (the 
Masakln) has the lowest status*
There is also a religious framework which confers 
status on groups. Within this framework, ascriptive status 
is. conferred on two groups only —  the descendants of the 
Prophet, and those of past and reputed Mashayikh* One is 
higher than the other in line with their respective descent 
status. The rest of the groups have no religious status, 
although individuals may achieve recognition because of 
their piety.
Political power was another framewox^ k which 
ascribed status to groups® In the wider context of gadramaut, 
Sadah, Mashayikh and Gabafil groups, all held political 
power in their respective villages® Thus only the Masakln 
groups were Du1fa (Sg* ga'If -- weak) politically. Nowhere 
in the country did they hold political power. In the context 
of gureigah, only the !A*f£as and Jafda held political power 
in the traditional political system. Today only the 'A f^as 
control the Village Council*
Pinally there is the economic framework which 
divided economic activities into "dignified" and "undigni­
fied" categories. Within gureidah1s economic activities,
farming one’s own plot and doing one’s own odd job or helping 
someone else —  these were considered to be "dignified" 
occupations * On the other hand, activities involving the 
sale of service and production of non-edible goods for sale, 
these were "undignified" occupations* The latter were 
entirely done by the Akhdam and Subyan* The evaluation of 
occupations is also the basis for ranking the Masakln 
occupational categories, since they have no descent status 
and cannot be ranked by the descent framework* Most important 
however, this broad division of’ labour eliminated competition 
and made co-operation between the higher and lower groups 
necessary* This made the lower groups economically dependent 
on the higher groups*
These main features of the stratification system 
means that there is a "clustering of statuses"^ * or summation 
of roles within each group of the social hierarchy. Whether 
this is a caste system or not is irrelevant at this stage, 
but it is important to realise that these features pertain 
to an idealised picture of the social hierarchy which has 
undergone significant changes,
firstly, the descent framework is being vigorously 
questioned by a vocal group of young men* Nationalism, which 
is an important force in the country at present, specifically 
preaches against such ranking and some people in ljureidah
1* Frederick Barth uses this phrase to describe the system 
of social stratification in Swat* See Leach I960*
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publicly disavow the importance and ranging of ancestry*
The slogan of "equality" is specifically used to disapprove 
of ranking*
Secondly the encroaching ideology of Nationalism, 
the experience of the migrants (to nearby and distant 
countries) and the increase in education and the secular 
tendency of the Qu*aiti State, has tended to reduce the 
importance of "religious and spiritual influence" of the 
JAJ|;as and Basahl. People now question the very concept of 
ascriptive religious status (and the power inherent in it)* 
This is not to say that people are questioning Islam as a 
religion* It means that people have become more Secular1 in 
their attitudes and that many of them no longer regard any 
!A££as or any Basahl as possessors of barakah or hatf. It 
means that now there is a different interpretation of 
certain aspects of Islam0 This is inherent in the spread of
Nationalism in which many important aspects of Islam are
1
given a new interpretation. This tendency to secular 
attitudes, is shown in the protest made by some people in not 
participating in the ritual enactment of the social hierarchy 
at the mosque (see pp* 5*3 )*
Thirdly, recent political changes have introduced a 
new system of judicial and administrative structures to 
supersede the old political system which vested political
1. See H«Z. Nuseibeh, "The Ideas of Arab Nationalism", 1956?
pp.165-173 *
power on the 'Attas and Gaba'il* This change has given the 
'A'ffas a new form of political power locally, whilst the 
Gnba'il have become powerless. At the same time the new 
system has created new avenues of power in which all can 
participate, with the inherent assumption that all have a 
legal equality.
Fourthly, some economic changes and the large scale 
migration have removed the structural dependence of the 
lower groups« Migration to nearby countries is being 
Increasingly used as an alternative source of employment, 
not only by the lower groups, but by all* This and some of 
the economic changes in ljureijah -^as begun to change the 
evaluation and categorisation of occupations^ The following 
table illustrates this clearly:-
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Ideological and structural politico-economic changes 
have thus affected gureidah’s hierarchy. fhis will "be 
discussed in some detail later# But Before discussing change, 
it is necessary first to analyse various aspects of inter­
group relationship, mobility and the deeper structural 
differences between the groups in the system of stratifica­
tion#
CHAPTER IV 
ANCESTRY, MARRIAGE AND STRATIFICATION
I have so far described various aspects of the social 
hierarchy in gureicLah, emphasising the different attributes 
ascribed to each group. In this chapter, I shall analyse the 
various aspects of the descent framework —  the importance 
of ancestry as a criterion of ranking, the role of the 
genealogical framework and the function of the marriage 
pattern. I shall also discuss the question of mobility, and 
conclude the chapter by restating the main features of the 
stratification system which have been implicitly or explicitly 
indicated in these last two chapters*
1* The Descent Framework.
Ancestry, nasab, is used here to mean both the apical 
and the ultimate ancestor of a corporate descent group. The 
'Atfas for instance are a corporate descent group with ’Umar 
as their apical ancestor and the Prophet as their ultimate 
ancestor. The girthan on the other hand, are not a corporate 
descent group. As an occupational category (although I refer 
to them as a group in a general sense of the word) they do 
not have a genealogical fx^ amework and can therefoi’e have 
neither an apical nor an ultimate ancestor* In this sense, 
the Hirthan have no ’ancestry1 and are a residual category.
In general then, the people of the Hagramaut are 
divided Into two broad categories —  those who have an
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ancestry i.e. those in the first and second strata, and those 
who do not —  i.e. the residual category in the third stratum. 
Those who do have an ancestry are divided, at the highest 
level, into the children of !Adnan (the ancestor of the
Northern Arahs), and the children of Qagtan (the ancestor of
1 — Southern Arabs). The Prophet is the descendant of lAdnan,
and his descendants in gagramaut —  the Sadah —  are there­
fore Northern Arabs. Qag*£an is the ancestor of Southern Arabs 
who inhabit the Yemen and the whole of Southern Arabia. In 
gagramaut, the different Gaba'il tribes and Mashayikh Houses 
are vaguely considered to be the descendants of Qagfan. The 
Sadah trace their descent through various stages to the 
Prophet and through him to ’Adnan. This genealogical ^ree1, 
shitjrat-al-nasab, is carefully recorded by genealogical 
experts. Each Saiyid House in gagramaut traces its recorded 
genealogy first to its apical ancestor, then to the ancestor 
of all gadrami Sadah (al-Muhajir, the Emigrant) and later to 
lAdnan through various links. Similarly, the Mashayikh and 
Gabafil trace their descent through various links to their 
ultimate ancestor Qagjan. But unlike the Sadah, the genealo­
gies of the Mashayikh and Gaba!il (especially the latter) 
are not well recorded, and at best each can trace its descent 
to its apical ancestor —  the founder Shaikh of a House or the
1. All the Arabs are ultimately divided into these two
branches*. See R^A. Nicholson, p.xviii, 1962. In gadramaut 
this geographical and historical division is not as 
important as the sociological differences between the 
representatives of the two branches.
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ancestor of a tribe, Between this level and Qalr^ an very
little is known* The difference betx^ een the Sadah and the
Mashayikh-Gaba’ il, is partly due to historical factors, but
it is important here because of its sociological significance#
The Sadah in Ijtadramaut always stress the Prophet as
their ultimate ancestor* Occasionally they trace their
descent beyond the Prophet to ’Adrian and even further back:
to Adam and Eve. But it is the Prophet who is the ultimate
focus of their ancestry. The choice of emphasising the
or
Prophet and not !Adnan(/Adam and Eve for that matter) is 
important and is done for obvious reasons* Eirstly, the 
Prophet has a unique spiritual status in that he was chosen 
by God before Creation* (See ChXI). Secondly the Prophet is 
the fountain of Islam. Thirdly his descendants are limited 
to two lines only (those of his grandsons Hassan and Husein) 
while the descendants of ’Adnan are inclusive of all the 
Northern Arabs.
When the ancestor of the Hadrami Sadah —  Ahmad blno
’Isa —  came to a^gLramaut f^om Basra (in Iraq) in 952 A„D.^, 
his claim to be the descendant of the Prophet was not at 
first recognised* It was necessary in fact for his claim to 
be attested in Basra in front of ija<jrami witnesses* But 
according to al-Bakary even after the claim had been 
attested, some leading IJadrami scholars at the time did not
1. Sergeant, R.B. 1957*
2. Ibid,
3. Al-Bakary S. Vol*I, 1956 (3rd edition).
accept the claim. Since then the Sadah. have meticulously
recorded their genealogies. Ibis has made mobility into or 
out of their stratum very difficult*
The status of Hashayikh and Gaba’il depends primarily 
on tracing their descent to their apical ancestors. The 
Hashayikh trace their descent up to the founding Shaikh of 
the particular Hashayikh House* In general, Hashayikh 
Houses, especially the ruling family of each House, keep 
recorded genealogies of their ancestry back to the eponymous 
Shaikh. Beyond this point records are not kept* Hashayikh 
Houses also have scholars, but this limited recording of 
their genealogies is an expression of their inferior status 
in relation to the Sadah. However such records validate 
their status as descendants of particular Shaikh»
The Gabalil also have status by virtue of being 
descendants of particular ancestors. But the Gaba!ilfs status 
is not so much validated by producing 1recorded genealogies1 
as by being members of recognised tribes with a segmentary 
structures. Until recently tribes were independent political 
entities monopolising the use of firearms. By being a member 
of such tribal entity however recruited — - a man is 
automatically the descendant of the tribal ancestor and is 
fitted within its segmentary structure. Briefly then, the 
genealogy of a tribesman follows a segmentary structure to 
the ancestor of the tribe. From this stage upward, there is 
a vague connection with past groupings of tribes such as 
Kindah, IJimyar, and then ultimately with Qa^tan. As tribesmen
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are in general considered to be 'primitive', their genealo­
gies are not recorded. The status of a GabaTil is therefore 
validated by political power i0e, by being members of a 
tribal political entity.
In the context of ^ureidah, these different aspects 
of ancestry have important structural implications* One of 
the Mansabs of 3Jurei$ah is the local historian and the 
expert on nasab —  ancestry. He has written an unpublished 
history of IJureiJah and his father wrote an essay on the 
ancestry of the various groups of people of Hadramaut. The 
Mansab keeps a book in which an elaborate genealogy of all 
the 'A££as is kept (those who have gone overseas and settled 
there are also partially recorded)* The Masakxn have no 
"ancestry" but when you press for their genealogy, they 
refer you to the "books" in the Mansab's library. Similarly 
the Gaba'il groups who do not belong to the nearby Ja'da 
tribe refer you to the Hansab for proof that they belong to 
the larger tribes away from IJureicLah. Thus the ' ilm (know­
ledge) and expertise of the Hansab is used to validate the 
claim to status of the 'A^as as^  well as that of other 
groups in HureicLah*
The Basahl ax^ e a very small groxip in IJureidah, In 
the recent past they have not prodxiced any outstanding 
scholars to support their religious status; they themselves 
acknowledge that this is so. In addition their genealogy is 
unwritten and a few steps nearer their ancestor are unknown*
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Yet they have maintained their status as Mashayihh (which 
confers both religious and descent status). The reason for 
this is that the !A££as have recognised this status by (a) 
including it in the local ’history1, and (b) emphasising it 
in the various local rituals. The Gaba’il groups on the 
other hand, have maintained their status primarily by 
remaining as separate political entities, and enforcing 
their 1 tribal status" by political power. The two groups who 
belong to the da1da tribe are recognised as being parts of 
its segmentary structure; the other two groups have to 
explain their separateness by historical "proof" (from the 
Mansab) that they are part of a tribal segmentary structure 
which is geographically removed from gurei<Jafcu
Outside this descent framework are the Masakin. The 
three ’groups1 in this stratum are, as I have pointed out, 
occupational groups. Their ranking is primarily based on the 
evaluation scale of their ascriptive occupations. However, 
the girthan —  the top group —  tend to equate this ranking 
with differences in "descent status" between the Masakln.
On this basis they would not allow their daughters to be 
married by Akhdam and Subyan* On the other hand between the 
latter two groups there is intermarriage both ways although 
their respective occupations have different status. When a 
few years ago the Akhdam tried to stop giving their daughters 
to the Subyan, on the grounds that the latter were "inferior 
in ancestry", there was a big outcry in gurei^ah especially
from the Subyan* The attempt failed for various reasons* But 
the important point here is that amongst the Masakin in 
general, occupation is the only criterion for ranking since 
they have no "ancestry"* The higher status of the girthan 
is derived from their length of stay, their corporateness 
and their occupation and not from any "descent status" in 
spite of their claim* The three groups do not have descent 
status, since they are (a) a residual category outside the 
accepted general framework of ancestry and (b) they are 
occupational groups and in no sense are they descent groups*
2. The Role of the Genealogical fframework.
The differences in the various aspects of ancestry 
between the groups in the first and second strata i.e. those 
groups who have an ancestry, and between them and the Masakin 
groups in the third stratum i*e* those who do not have an 
ancestry, is primarily an egression of the different roles 
of the groups within the system of stratification. This is 
shown clearly in the different forms of genealogical frame­
works in the first and second strata, and in the absence of 
such a framework amongst the Masakin*
The ’Attas are a stock group with ’Umar as their 
nodal ancestor* As such, the ’AJ^as have a genealogical 
framework with which they conceptualise their unity and which 
regulates their marriage as well as providing a framework 
for their political organisation. Although the ! Attas House
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is divided into a number of lineages, all trace their 
descent hack to 'Umar, through individual ancestors* Since 
the whole genealogy has heen carefully recorded from 'Umar: 
downwards, the links in the genealogy between a household of 
today and 'Umar, are those of actual individuals* Such links 
need not be points of bifurcation, dividing and joining 
groups, although in some cases they are (see diagrams 1,2,3)* 
The "genealogical tree" of the 'Alrfas is in fact an "ideal" 
genealogy, in which even those people who have not borne any 
children are recorded, although children who die young and 
women tend to be ignored* This is not to say that the TA1^as
"tree" has recorded all 'At£as who have been born in gureidah
since 'Umar, or that it is a true historical statement* This 
problem is not relevant here* What is important here is that 
the given 'A'Jrfas 'tree" i.e* the genealogical framework, is 
in the form in which people trace their descent through 
ancestors who in many cases are not points of bifurcation* 
Prom 'Umar upwards, the "tree" has the same form* There is a
long single line of names of ancestors going back to the
ultimate ancestor —  the Prophet. These ancestors may or may 
not form points of bifurcation in the larger group of gagrami 
Sadah o£ of the still larger group, of all the descendants 
of the Prophet. But for the purpose of this discussion it is 
the features of the lower "tree" i*e. from 'Umar downwards 
which are important*
The "tree" (see Diagram 4) of the Basahl exhibits
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the same features , namely that people trace their descent 
through ancestors who may or may not he meeting points for 
other groups of the Basahl. The Basahl are divided into two 
lineages, one of which contains only one household while the 
rest of the living Basahl belong to the other lineage* But 
before these two lineages meet in the "tree11, they trace 
their descent through ancestors who are not meeting points 
for other groups. Brom where the two lineages meet to the 
nodal ancestor —  Sahl —  the linking ancestors are not 
points of bifurcation* About two to three steps before Sahl, 
the names of the ancestors have been forgotten which suggest 
that (a) the Basahl have not produced any scholars since 
Sahl to record their genealogy, and (b) the genealogy as a 
whole is more elastic than that of the lA£tas* Nevertheless, 
the "trees" of both the ‘A^as and Basahl have the same 
basic features and form ■ Din-garea.)*
The genealogy of the Gaba1!! groups, especially 
that of the JaTda, has a different structure* Birstly, every 
group is a part of the segmentary structure of the tribe as 
a whole and secondly, even within the local territorial 
unit, siich as the two groups in Hurei^ Lah, their genealogies 
follow a markedly segmented pattern* The tree of the Gaba!il 
groups, has the *nesting! feature of a characteristic 
segmentary structure, in contrast to the lineal feature of 
Basahl and ’Ai^as 1 trees1.
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The three groups of the Masakin are, as has "been 
stated before? in no way descent groups and therefore are 
not enclosed in a genealogical framework* Each category is 
made up of a number of unconnected patronymic groups with a 
separate name* G-enerally the patronymic groups have very 
shallow generational depth, correlated with their length of 
stay in g/ureidah* Some such patronymic groups especially 
those of the girthan, have segmented into smaller segments 
and in most such cases, the connecting genealogical link 
between them have been forgotten and only the common name 
remains* The number of patronymic groups in any Masakin sub­
stratum, can increase or decrease in response to the economic 
conditions of igureigLah at any given point of time* Because 
these are open categories, especially the Akhdam and Subyan, 
new groups can come into the village and attach themselves 
to these categories* Recently some freed slaves from other 
parts of the country came into /^ureitjah a11^- attached them­
selves to the Akhdam category* Thus none of the three Masakin 
categories has a genealogical framework because by definition 
categories cannot have such frameworks and because of the 
functional necessity for open categories at this level of 
the social hierarchy* The patronymic groups within the 
categories vary in size and generational depth as a necessary 
corollary to this (see Table Aj[*
The differences in the structure of genealogical 
frameworks of the fA£tas and Basahl on the one hand and the 
G-aba’il groups on the other, is an expression of the differ­
ent roles of the groups in the stratification system* 
Similarly the absence of such a framework amongst the Masakin 
groups, is related to their specific role within the system. 
Both the ’AJ^as and Basahl are missionary groups, localised 
in one village and their status (religious and descent) 
depends very much on their claim to be descendants of 
particular ancestors. The 1Attas in particular, being the 
ruling group, the custodian of knowledge and religious 
tradition, need a genealogical and political fi^ amework which 
would maintain cohesion within the 'Ai^as House, and which 
could override any segmentary tendencies inherent in their 
House because of the strong patrilineal kinship system of 
the society. Thus although their House is divided into 
lineages at the third generation from !Umar, no formal 
recognition is given to the segmentation below that level, 
except when the Mansab!s office was divided in one of the 
lineages. Even the main lineage divisions are glossed over 
by the emphasis which people put on following a lineal chain 
of ancestors to ’Umar and ignoring the lineage framework.
This is not to say that the lineage cleavage is not import­
ant. In fact it is specifically recognised in the traditional 
!At£as Council by having a representative from each lineage. 
But precisely because the major lineages are recognised and
1
TABLE A: GENERATIONAL DEPTH AML GENEALOGICAL LIKES Off
MASAKlN PATRONYMIC GROUPS
Name
No • of 
Patro­
nymic 
Groups
Generat­
ional
Depth.1
Segments 
of Patro­
nymic 
Group
Genealo­
gical 
link be­
tween 
segments
Genealogical 
link between 
segments and 
the ancestor 
of a Patro-p 
nymic group
Hirthan 1
1
1
1
7
1
1
Tota! 13
10
10
7
7
5
5
4
2
3
2
Unknown
Known
Unknown
Unknown
Known
Unknown
Known
Unknown
Known
Unknown
Akhdam 1
1
1
1
1
3 
1 
2
4 
1 
1
10
12
2
Total 43
Subyan
Total
1
1
1
2
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
5
5
4
4
4
3
4
2
3
5
Unknown
ft
t!
tl
tr
Known
1 Known
1 Unknown
2 Known
2 Unknown 
Known 
Unknown
1 Known
2 Unknown 
Known 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Known 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Known 
Unknown 
Known
7 4
7 —
6 2
5 2
5
Unknown 1 Known 3 Unknown 
Known 
1 Known 
1 Unknown 
1 Known 
1 Unknown 
Known
1* The known ascending and descending generations from Ego 
2* Many segments of patronymic groups cannot trace their 
descent to the ancestor of the group.
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their names fixed, this minimises the recognition of groups 
of smaller order i0e* genealogical subdivision are not 
politically recognised0 The basic feature of the 'A^ ’fas 
tree and that of the Basahl, is a function of maintaining 
political unity and ignoring the segmentary nature of the 
kinship system. Secondly the lineal nature of the trees’, 
emphasises the link between a person and the ancestor of the 
whole stock group. The rituals that sutrroimd the nodal 
ancestor because of his historical and religious role, also 
emphasise the unity of the group and ignore its segmentary 
process. Thirdly, at the lowest level, the genealogies 
function to validate claims to property and inheritance, as 
well as regulating relationships between individuals i.e. 
they are 1working genealogies1.
The Gaba'il genealogical framework on the other hand 
is a typical segmentary structure encompassing all the groups 
of the tribe* Thus the Ja*da groups in gureigah are part of 
the structure of the whole tribe (see diagram Similarly 
the two non~Ja!da groups insist in linking themselves to 
distant segments of their respective tribes. One of these 
tribes is on the caravan routes to the coast. The group in 
gureigah linked to it used to pass its territory without 
paying any toll and without fear of attack as a recognition 
of their common descent. As a result, the particular Gaba*il 
group in gureidah was heavily engaged in caravan transporta­
tion between the coast and Wadi lAmd. Thus the wider
Ill
genealogical framework of the Gaba*il regulates relations 
hetween group which are widely dispersed in place and time* 
The genealogy within the local territorial unit, such as the 
four groups in gureidah, function mainly to link the smaller 
segments within it* The ancestors within the genealogy are 
mainly points of bifurcation linking together groups of 
different orders* Only at the lowest level i«e* between Ego 
and the third or fourth generation, does the genealogy trace 
the actual descent of an individual, primarily for the 
purpose of inheritance. Thus the Gaba'il genealogy functions 
mainly to regulate political relations between groups of 
different orders* Within the localised unit, it regulates 
relations between its smaller segments and at a still lower 
level, it becomes a forking genealogy1 which prescribes 
behaviour between individuals and validates claims to 
inheritance and property. Unlike the genealogies of the 
'A'f'fas and Basahl that of the Gaba'il emphasises political 
division as well as ultimate unity. This is of course 
inherent in the segmentary nature of the genealogy and formed 
the basis of Gaba'il political organisation* Since the 
imposition of the Qu’aity Government however, the political 
aspect of the genealogy has lost its function, and the 
binding force inherent in this has been lost; (this is why 
the four Gaba'il units have become incorporated within the 
social unit of Hureidah)* But the genealogical framework of 
the Ja'da is still important in regulating marriage between
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its groups as well as within the groups* Similarly the 
genealogies of the other two G-aba’il groups still continue 
to regulate their marriages and to function as working 
genealogies a
None of the three Masakin groups has a genealogi­
cal framework, hut each of the patronymic groups within 
its occupational category, has a genealogy of its own what­
ever its size, which varies in generational depth from 
three to ten generations (see Table A)* Patronymic groups 
have working genealogies, which are essential for any 
group* However the absence of an encompassing genealogical 
framework for each of the occupational categories as well 
as for the Masakin stratum as a whole, is an important 
correlation to the structural position and role of this 
stratum within the stratification system* It means that 
(a) since the Masakin are not made of large corporate 
descent groups, they are excluded from the descent frame­
work and thereby have no descent status; (b) their necessary 
lack of cohesion and unity implies their political weakness 
in the stratification system; (c) the specific economic 
role of the Masakin groups, especially of the Akhdam and 
Subyan, necessitates their political weakness in order 
to maintain their dependence on the higher groups, and 
secondly such an economic role requires an open category 
which will increase and decrease in response to the economic 
conditions of the village; (d) given the traditional political 
system prevailing in ]Jureidah, it is difficult to see how
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three cohesive and united Masakin groups could have lived 
without competing for political power and refusing to per­
form the undignified economic tasks* Because of the position 
of the Masakin groups in the stratification system and 
because of their specific economic role, they could not 
functionally he united into cohesive descent groups with 
genealogical framework to conceptualise their unity. However 
working genealogies are necessary for any group larger than 
an elementary family* Each of the Masakin patronymic group 
has such a genealogy.
So far then we have a descent framework which con­
fers ranked status on the different groups which have 
"ancestry”* The Masakin who are outside this framework are 
in a residual category and do not have descent status. 
Secondly the descent status of the higher groups are vali­
dated by claiming descent from particular ancestors (fA££as 
and Basahl) as well as by maintaining political independence 
of a tribal group (Ja!da). The former, especially the 'A^ fas, 
keep meticulous record of their genealogies in order to 
validate their claim to higher status. The latter on the 
other hand, control the use of physical force in order to 
maintain their political independence and tribal1 status. 
Thirdly, the different roles of the groups is expressed by 
the different structures of their genealogical frameworks 
as well as by the lack of such a framework. The genealogies 
of TA£tas and Basahl have predominantly lineal appearance In
order to emphasise cohesion and political -unity appropriate 
to their respective roles in the society ~  as the ruling 
group of ljureidah in one case, and as missionary groups in 
both* The lineage structure of the Gaba!il is a highly 
segmentary one whose main function is to regulate 
political relation between groups* On the other hand, the 
fact that the three Masakin categories do not have encom­
passing genealogical frameworks is a corollary of their lower 
status in the stratification system and their specific 
economic roles. We therefore have a stratification system 
in which different groups have ascribed roles and statuses 
which imply deeper structural differences between the groups 
than would appear at first.
One of the most important functions of the marriage 
pattern of gurei^ah is to maintain and emphasise these 
differences between the groups and ultimately to maintain 
the social hierarchy* Gdven the variations of the genealogies, 
a uniform marriage pattern applied to all the groups would 
have different effects at various levels of the social hier­
archy. kor this and other reasons, it is necessary at this 
point to discuss the marriage pattern of Hureidah and its 
relation to the system of stratification.
3- Marriage Pattern and Stratification.
Although the Hadrami are Sunni of the Shafi'I School, 
their marriage rules do not follow closely the religious 
prescription on this aspect of social activity. In general
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marriage rules express the functional pre-requisites of the 
social structure, and social stratification is one of the 
most important aspects of this. In some cases religious 
arguments are used to support aspects of the marriage system, 
hut in general the marriage system is regulated hy other 
values and is outside the rules prescribed hy the Sh5.fi* i 
School. Here however we are not concerned with the marriage 
system as a whole hut with that aspect of it which is related 
to the social stratification.
Marriage in IJurei^ ah is polygamous, hut in accordance 
with religious teachings a man cannot marry more than four 
wives at the same time. In 1962-65 there was no man with 
four wives, hut there were a handful of men with two or 
three wives each. These were mostly rich men who could 
afford to maintain more than one wife. The two Mansahs for 
instance each had three wives all living in the same house­
hold. But there are also a large number of men who marry 
more than one wife consecutively. A man may marry another 
wife when his wife dies or when he divorces her. Of 512 
heads of households in the main village, 42*6% had married 
more than once and some as many as six times. On the other 
hand, of the total marriages of the 512 heads of households,
4-1.5% ended in divorce. Thus polygamy and a high rate of 
divorce are two important features of the marriage system. 
Divorce severs some of the existing affinal ties, while 
polygamy creates new ones* These two features of the marriage
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system indicate that in general affinal ties are weak and 
divorce is easy.
In theory marriage is the responsibility of the 
fathers of the two prospective spouses* A father arranges 
for his son's first marriage and should pay for everything* 
The prospective spouses generally have very little say in 
their marriage. The bride is 'captured1 when the ceremony of 
her marriage is half way through. She is then told of her 
marriage for the first time* The groom is sometimes consulted 
(as to the choice between two sisters for instance)0 But even 
after the marriage the father still maintains his responsi­
bility for, and some authority over, his married son who 
remains in his father's house. The newly arrived wife also 
falls under the general responsibility of her husband's 
father since she becomes "his daughter".
A first marriage in general is an expensive business 
in which brideprice (jihaz) has to be paid, prestigious 
ceremonies and feasts made (wallmali), and ceremonial 
servants (§abiy) paid. Ceremonies and feasts are made by 
both the groom's and bride's families. The paying and 
receiving of the brideprice is limited to the two families; 
no wider groups are involved on either side* The brideprice
1. At present most young men who migrate to work outside 
]Ja<Jr amaut, pay their own bridewealth when they return to 
marry. The fathers however share the expenses of the 
marriage itself.
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is thus a transaction between the two families of the pros­
pective spouses, and symbolises the transference of certain 
rights (b.ak) over the bride from one family to another. 
However it is important to note that although the bride 
acquires new rights from her marital status she still 
retains some rights in her natal family. As a wife she 
acquires a new status and becomes a member of her husbandfs 
family. She also acquires the right to inherit a share of 
his property. The husband on the other hand has exclusive 
sexual rights over his wife. The children belong to the 
husband*s group and in case of divorce, the mother has 
partial responsibility and rights over the children until 
they reach the age of seven, when the father takes over 
completely. On the other hand, even as a wife she is still a 
member of her natal family. She inherits from her father and 
she can go back to her family at any time* Her father has 
certain authority over her in case of a dispute with her 
husband. He also has the responsibility of defending her 
against her husband in a dispute. The wife (zawjah) is thus 
at a point of overlapping responsibilities between her own 
family and that of her husband®
The bride nearly always goes to her husband’s house 
to live, although there are rare exceptions of the reverse 
happening. If the husband comes from another village, contact 
between the two families is maintained at regular intervals 
by reciprocal visits. If the spouses are from the same town,
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which is generally the case in 3Jurei<Jah, contact between the 
two families is highly informal hut with reciprocal visits 
being obligatory at specific occasions in the year* The 
husband thinks of his affines (a’mam) as being mainly members 
of the nuclear family of his wife, but affinal relations are 
sometimes extended to a wider group of relatives* They are 
most intense between the two families however and they are 
expressed by the terms wa(jib (obligation), and sharaf 
(honour)* The fulfilment of obligations and the maintenance 
of honour is a duty of both sides* Affinal relationships 
encompass a wide range of activities such as mutual help, 
hospitality, and attendance at each others ceremonies, 
feasts and funerals. They also involve visiting (ziara) on 
specific occasions in the year, the giving of symbolic gifts 
etc. Fulfilment of these obligations satisfies honour.
Evasion of obligations is shameful to one party and an insult 
to the other and therefore a cause of strain in the affinal 
tie. But the most important cause of straining these ties 
revolves around the wife - either in the treatment she gets 
from her husband and his family, or in her failure to perform 
her duties and play her proper role. All important grounds 
for divorce centre on these questions.
Beyond the families of the two spouses, agnates of 
each are vaguely considered to be affines in a general 
sense (garabah); from such affines hospitality is expected 
and the rest is left to the individuals concerned. Because
11
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affinal ties are focussed on the families of the two spouses 
and do not involve the wider group in a general sense, 
marriage is essentially a contract between two families 
rather than between two wider kin groups. As a way of 
strengthening ties between groups or within a group, 
individual marriages are insignificant * Only a high percen­
tage of such marriages can bring this about.
In exogamous marriage, all members of a group are 
prohibited as spouses and therefore the question of defining 
who can or cannot marry presents no problems. But where in­
group marriage is preferred this is a problem and a precise 
definition of prohibited spouses is required* In the case of 
gadrami society this is provided by the Shaft1i School# The 
prohibited persons whom Ego cannot marry comprise a very 
narrow range of kin (see Diagram 6, p.lH)* Given any sizeable 
descent group, it should not be difficult for Ego to find 
spouses within the descent group. The number of prohibited 
spouses appear to be minimised precisely in order to 
encourage marriages within the group#
Outside the House, the lineage or patronymic group, 
the preference for in-group marriage involves more and more 
inclusive groups from the level of one kin group to the next 
until it reaches the limit of the widest kin group. In other 
words, outside the lineage, preference is for marriage within 
the maximal lineage, then within the clan, and ultimately 
within the tribe* In the case of the fAt£as and Basahl, the
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widest unit is the House, For the Gaba’il it is the tribe 
and for the Masakin it is the patronymic group. Beyond this 
point marriage is preferred within the stratum —  "between 
Sadah Houses, "between Hashayikh Houses, "between Gaba’il 
tribes and between Masakin patronymic groups. Thus endogamy 
moves outwards in circles to the widest point —  the stratum. 
Beyond this point, they are inter-strata marriages.
In-group marriage, i„e0 marriage within the House, 
the lineage or patronymic group, is strongly preferred by 
all the groups. With the ’A'JrJras the limit of the unit with 
first preference is the whole House in igiurei^ Lah, Brideprice 
is uniformly set at the low rate of Shs, 70, For the fAf£as 
outside gurei^ Lah, brideprice is between Shs.200 and Shs.300, 
and for other Sadah Houses, the last preference within the 
stratum, it is anything up to Shs.1,000, Within the Basahl 
House, the first unit of preference, brideprice is between 
Shs,200 and Shs.300; between them and other Hashayikh Houses, 
it rises to about Shs.500, and marriage with Gaba’il tribes, 
(the last preference within the stratum), the brideprice is 
about Shs01,000* Amongst the Gaba’il, first preference is 
within the lineage (the local political unit) and the bride­
price is between Shs,200 and Shs.4-00; within the clan it 
rises up to Shsa600 and within the tribe, it is about Shs. 
1,000* Marriage with another tribe or Mashayikh House (the 
last preference within the stratum) is slightly more expen­
sive, the brideprice rising to Shs.1,500* The Masakin demand
a brideprice of "between Shsfi200 to Shs*500 within the patro­
nymic group —  the first unit of preference* Between one 
such group and another (the last unit of preference within 
the stratum —  generally within the occupation category) 
the brideprice is about Shs *1,000. Thus loxf brideprice is 
related to the preference for in-group marriage at different 
levels —  the lowest brideprice being for the most preferred 
marriages.
It is clear that the strong preference for in-group 
marriage (the order of preference varies with the order of 
the group) and the brideprice system are correlated with the 
structure of the genealogy of the group* Both the !A££as 
and Basahl have uniform brideprice for their respective 
Houses which are considered as units for first preference. 
This means that internal cleavages within the units are not 
recognised and marriage is regulated specifically to cut 
across such cleavages. This is in line with the lineal 
character of the structures of their two genealogies in 
which total unity is emphasised, On the other hand prefer­
ences within the Ja'da tribe, differentiate between groups 
of different orders and thus emphasising unity within the 
small political unit, and the divisions between such groups. 
Primary unity of the lineage (the independent political 
unit), ultimate political unity of the tribe, and the seg­
mentary divisions within it, are all recognised by the 
different orders of preference and their corresponding bride-
123
prices* Unlike the 'A'fjas and Basahl, the Ja’da pattern of 
marriage is in line with the strongly segmentary structure 
of their genealogical framework.
But amongst the Masakln, there is no encompassing 
genealogical framework —  apart from that of the patronymic 
group —  which regulates marriage* Preference, as expressed 
hy the hrideprice, is only within the patronymic group* 
Outside this group, there is no other unit within which 
marriage is preferred and recognised hy a fixed hrideprice. 
The widest limit of marriages amongst the Masakln is the 
stratum* Within the stratum, there is a tendency for 
marriages to follow the occupational categories —  especially 
amongst the ^irthan* Biit there is no explicit kinship rule 
which prescribes this, nor is there a descent framework and 
hrideprice which recognises this tendency and regulates it 
on this line * The patronymic group is the only unit which 
regulates marriage amongst the Mas akin.
It is clear that the principle of preferred endoga- 
mous marriage is strong in the society, and that its uniform 
application in the social hierarchy will produce different 
effects at the various levels of the hierarchy. The signifi­
cant factor here is the structure of the genealogical frame­
work or the absence of such a framework* Thus amongst the 
!At£as and Basahl, first preference covers the entire Houses 
and thus functions to cement the cohesion of the stock group 
and minimise internal divisions* The fA£fas especially, as a
ruling missionary group, necessarily need the cohesion and 
unity which in-group marriage provides * On the other hand, 
the Gabaiil segmentary political organisation necessitates 
cohesion and division at different levels within the wider 
unit of the tribe. Hence the different units of preference 
within the tribe* Within the Masakxn, preference is only 
within one small unit, the only unit with a genealogical 
framework* Endogamy here will emphasise the total division 
amongst the Masakln as a reflection of the absence of an 
encompassing genealogical framework and the lack of larger 
descent groups which imply political weakness of the Masakln 
aa a whole. The overall result of the marriage pattern is to 
strengthen the cohesion of the and Basahl Houses, to
emphasise the segmentary divisions of the Ja!da tribe, and 
to maintain the total division of the Masakln above the 
patronymic group level.
In discussing a similar situation in a Muslim 
Lebanese village, Emerys Peters'^  emphasised the significant 
role of a genealogical framework in the regulation of 
marriage, and the relation of the pattern of marriage pro­
duced with the movement of land. The difference between the 
Lebanese situation and ljureidah is that here women have only 
one source of acquiring property, namely inheritance. In
1* E.L.Peters, 1963.
In the Lebanese village, land was given to women on their 
marriage * Prom this and other sources, women acquired 
ownership over land* In marriage women moved from one 
group to another taking their ownership right with them. 
Hence the marriage pattern indicated the movement of 
property.
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JureiJah no land or money is given to tTie women at marriage * 
The hrideprice is generally small for in-group marriage and 
in all cases this is expended hy the hride's father on the 
marriage ceremonies. The hride gets gifts in jewellery etc. 
from her husband and her parents , hut all this does not 
amount to much in terms of cash. Nevertheless a woman does 
inherit palm dates, land, a house or a part of it and other 
property, from both her hushand and her father. Hence move­
ment of women hy marriage does represent a movement of 
property, however small in value or quantity. Hence the 
importance of the marriage pattern of IJureiJah descrihed 
ahove.
It is obvious that *A££as women cannot he a source 
of property moving to other groups, since they do not marry 
outside the House. The result is a very high percentage of 
in-group marriage within the House, which means that IA£'J;as 
property in general remains within the group The same can 
he said of the Basahl, since a very small percentage of their 
women marry outside the group. Similarly, a very high 
percentage of in-group marriage within the minimal political 
unit of the G-aha’il, has the same implication. In any case, 
until recently, the Gubafil specifically disinherited their 
women so that in case of women marrying outside the unit, 
property can remain within it. But with the Masakln, the 
marriage pattern is different and so this affects the move­
ment of property. Since many of the patronymic groups here
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are small, they are in many oases forced to marry outside 
such groups* Thus a patronymic group receives in and sends 
out women to other patronymic groups* Property moves in and 
out of a given group corresponding to the movements of women 
it receives and gives out* Unlike the !A££as whose property 
remains within one large group, Masakln property moves 
between a large number of small groups (see diagram 7)* 
very high brideprice between two patronymic groups may be 
taken to represent a compensation for the potential loss of 
property which a woman carries with her from one group to 
another. On the other hand, the very low and uniform bride­
price amongst the ^'fjas may be taken as an indication that 
the 'AJ^as view property in terms of group ownership (vis a 
vis other groups) and therefore its movement within the 
House needs no compensation, since ultimate group control 
is maintained. But to what extent does property move (through 
marriage) across the different levels of the hierarchy? This 
brings us to the question of hypergamous marriage which I 
will now discuss and its relation to the movement of property 
as well as its other aspects.
As I have pointed out earlier, endogamous marriages
move outwards from a given descent group to the widest point 
—  the limit of the stratum. Beyond this point they become 
inter-strata marriages, which in ItacLramaut are hypergamous, 
Such hypergamous marriages are based on the principle of
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kafa1 ah —  "equality of descent status"*1 Ideally the con­
cept of kafa*ah applies to a marriage "between spouses who 
descend from the same apical or ultimate ancestor* This is 
appropriate in endogamous marriages either within a descent 
group or within the same stratum. The spouses in such 
marriages have equality of descent status —  all Sadah are 
the 1 children1 of the !Prophet, Mashayikh and Gaba!il are the 
ultimate descendants of Qalytan, while the Mas akin have the 
same descent status as a residual category outside the 
descent framework. But the principle of kafaT ah also covers 
marriages in which a man!s descent status is superior to 
that of the women. In hyper gamous marriages then, kaf a f ah 
egresses explicitly the superior status of a man and the 
inferior status of a woman. Hypo gamy in this situation is 
not possible, precisely because it contradicts the principle 
kafa1 ah. Through kafa* ah then, inter-strata marriages 
express status differentiation and ultimately symbolises the 
whole system of stratification.
The brideprice for hypergamous marriages is very 
high compared with that for endogamous marriages. It varies 
between Shs.1,000 to Shs*3,000. The percentage of hypergamous
p.W)'
marriages is however very small (see table Bj^ * There are a 
number of reasons for this. Firstly such marriages are
1* This is an Important principle in Islamic rules of
marriage. I have translated it here on the basis of local 
interpretation and usage. See Chapter I for a discussion 
of this principle.
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considered socially undesirable, The children of such a 
marriage have inferior maternal relatives, akhwal, and the 
implication is that they inherit some of the inferior 
qualities of the mother}s group, especially if the mother 
is from the Masakln stratum. Secondly, in general, there is 
no economic advantage to *be gained for marrying downwards 
(apart from individual exceptions). The Gaba'il disinherit 
their women and the Masakln are the poorest section of the 
society. Thus the acquisition of property cannot he said to 
he a significant motive for such marriages, Furthermore, 
hyper gamous marriages have a high hrideprice as compensation 
for any such potential advantage that a man may gain*
Thirdly the very strong preference for endogamous marriages 
(the reasons for such preference have already heen explained) 
necessarily means a low percentage of inter-strata marriages. 
This low percentage of hypergamous marriages means that the 
existing ratio of group control over economic resources is 
not disturbed.
In general then, the pattern of marriage in gureidah 
has two aspects <—  endogamy and hypergamy. These aspects 
can he looked at as a continuum In whose scale there are 
points of preferences starting with marriages within a 
specific descent group (the most preferred) and ending up 
with Inter-strata marriages (the least preferred). This 
continuum in the marriage system, generally divided into the 
two hroad categories mentioned ahove, has a number of
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functions. At one end of the scale i,efl endogamy, it affects 
the various groups differently and serves to maintain the 
structural differences between them* At the other end of the 
continuum i.e. hypergamy, it serves to express the descent 
statuses of the different groups into a hierarchy. Ihe 
marriage pattern as a whole then functions to maintain the 
stratification system.
So far in this chapter I have shown that people are 
ranked on the basis of the general descent framework. From 
this I proceeded to show how the differences in the struc­
tures of the genealogical frameworks and the absence of 
such a framework are a reflection of the specific roles of 
the various groups in the hierarchy. Finally I have discussed 
the different effects of the uniform marriage pattern on the 
various groups and have suggested that its ultimate function 
is to maintain the local hierarchy and symbolise the system 
of stratification. Given this deeper structural differentia­
tion of the groups in the stratification system, and the 
implicit rigidity as a corollary, the logical question that 
arises from this is whether mobility is possible in the 
systema It is therefore necessary at this point to discuss 
the questions relevant to mobility«
d. Nobility
Ihe movement of a group from one position to another 
within the social hierarchy implies a change in its status
and role in the total framework» There are two types of 
movement possible for a group:
(i) Nobility within the stratum, and
(ii) Nobility across the strata.
Both types of mobility are difficult, but the latter is more 
difficult since it implies a more important change in the 
scheme of stratification.
Nobility within a stratum is possible only within 
the Nashayikh-GabaTil and the Nasakln strata. This is because 
these two strata are internally ranked, while that of the 
Sadah is not. Nobility within the second stratum - the 
Nashayikh-Gaba1il - means that a Gaba’il group could become 
Nashayikh or the reverse. The process is based on a Gaba’il 
group acquiring a religious status through time, or a
Nashayikh House losing its religious status through time*
This is possible if a Gaba’il group produces reputed scholars 
and religious leaders through a number of generations. At 
first it is only the family of the scholars which acquires 
the status of Nashayikh, but if many scholars are produced, 
proportionate to the size of the group, the status becomes 
ascriptive for all members of the group through time. The 
higher the reputation of the scholars, the quicker is the 
process. However, since the Gaba’il are generally large 
tribes, and mostly bedu - i.e. ’primitive1, this possibility 
is reduced to individual families, and even then the process 
takes a long time. In any case scholarship and reputation is
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acquired by living in towns where centres of learning are to 
be found. Hence G-abalil acquii*ing the status of Nashayikh 
are generally individual families who have lived in such 
places cut off from the segmentary structure of their tribes. 
Only their descendants become Nashayikh. On the other hand, 
if a religious status has been established, especially if 
only by a small group, and if it is not maintained by the 
rise of new scholars within the group, then the group loses 
its status and may become Gaba'il* But a small descent group 
cannot become a "tribe”, especially if the group resides in 
a town, since to become a rtribe’ requires a territory, and 
a segmentary and political organization to maintain political 
independence. Thus small Nashayikh groups tend to move 
straight to the Nasakln stratum in their downward mobility. 
Some of the Nashayikh Houses existing in Ha<Jramaut today 
are large, well-established and reputed groups with specific 
areas under their spiritual influence, and hawtalis of their 
own (like that of the rAJ'fas in Hureidah). Such Houses are 
unlikely to lose their status* But the possibility of this 
happening to a small and uninfluential group like the Basahl, 
is real enough* However the status of the Basahl was recog­
nised by the !Al7fas and ritually re-stated every year.
Hence the maintenance of its status without having produced 
any scholars. But one patronymic group in IJurei^ ah which was 
once a Nashayikh did not maintain its status and has moved 
down to the Nasakln stratum (see Case II). However the
important point here is that there is this possible movement 
of groups within the stratum, with the essential proviso 
that it is a long process, furthermore this type of mobility 
is less difficult than that across the strata, and the 
process quicker with small groups than with large ones.
Movement between the ranked groups within a stratum 
may also take place within the Masakln category. As I have 
indicated earlier in this chapter, the criteria for ranking 
the different categories is occupational, and it is possible 
for two segments of one patronymic group to be in different 
categories in different localities* Mobility between these 
categories can thus be achieved within the life-span of an 
individual if he moves from one area to another and changes 
his occupation* Unlike mobility within the second stratum, 
in which a religious status (an important status) is involved, 
mobility within the Masakln stratum does not imply an 
important change in status. It is true that the status of 
the girthan is generally considered to be higher than that 
of the Akhdam or the Subyan, precisely because the girthan 
are agriculturalists and mostly the indigenous people of a 
locality, and it is therefore difficult to move into their 
section by changing one's occupation or by acquiring farm 
holdings. However, mobility betx^ een the Masakln sections 
in different areas is, in general, relatively easy, partly 
because the mobility is of small patronymic groups, mostly 
nuclear families, and partly because such mobility does not
imply a substantial change of status* Neither mobility 
between the Gaba'il and the Nashayikh, or between different 
sections of the Mas akin, requires any adjustment in the 
principle of grading of ancestry*
Mobility across the strata however essentially means 
changing the descent status of the individual or group, 
since this is the criterion for ranking the strata. It also 
implies a basic change in the role of the individual or 
group. Hence mobility across the strata is very difficult 
precisely because it is fundamental. Moving up to the Sadah 
stratum or down from it is probably Impossible* As far as I 
know there are no cases of this having taken place. The 
status of the Sadah Houses depends entirely on their genea­
logical link with the Prophet, and every Saiyid House keeps 
meticulous records of its genealogies. Furthermore, there 
are genealogical experts amongst the Sadah whose function 
it is to prevent non-Sadah from claiming the exclusive 
descent of the Prophet. On the other hand Sadah Houses are 
unlikely to go through a process, long or short, of moving 
downwards from a privileged and superior strata. Hence 
moving into or out of the Sadah stratum is, to say the least, 
extremely unlikely to occur.
Inter-stratum mobility, when it does take place, Is 
between the Nashayikh-Gab a1II and the Masakln strata. Move­
ment can be upwards or downwards between these two strata.
The process is based on changing the ascribed role of the
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individual or group 3 and not by changing the status of 
ancestry* In fact the latter is recognised only when the 
former has heen achieved0 Isolated Nashayikh families who 
have ceased to produce reputed scholars may lose their 
reputation and thus he come Masakln, When such families stop 
playing a religious role for any considerable length of time 
they become undifferentiated from Jirthan of the Masakln 
stratum, I know of a number of small descent groups in Wadi 
*Amd who claim to have been Mashayikh in the past, but who 
are now classified as Masakln, fhis process in fact generally 
occurs in the case of small Mashayikh descent groups.
A G-aba'il family, living in a distant town and cut 
off from the tribe, (which is generally rare) can assume an 
economic role such as being a servant or a labourer, and 
thereby in time become recognised as a Masakln family. In 
such a situation, the descendants of the G-abalil family 
would have lost all contact with the original tribe. On the 
other hand, on the rare occasion of a Masakln family produc­
ing a reputed scholar who in his life-time acquires the 
title of Shaikh (religious leader), the title may then 
become ascriptive to all the members of the family and later 
to the descent group, if in succeeding generations this 
status is maintained, either by gaining institutional 
recognition of it, or by producing more scholars in each 
generation. Maintenance of the religious role by the family 
is the necessary condition for keeping the status of Mashayikh.
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Mobility by the Masakln to the Gabaf il group is 
much more difficult than to the Nashayikh because, in the 
past at least, the changing of roles entailed more than the 
acquiring of particular qualities. To become a Gaba'il, it 
was necessary first to be part of a large group which could 
establish political independence and a territorial unit.
This meant that the Nasakln must have a village of their 
own, be powerful enough to remove the political domination 
of a particular group, and get the necessary recognition of 
the surrounding Gaba*il tribes* There are very few villages 
entirely occupied by Nasakln, and there were still fewer 
with the necessary unity and power to establish political 
independence* Individual or small patronymic groups could 
not go through the process of becoming Gaba'il, since the 
armed power of the Gaba!il could easily stop the attempt.
As far as I know, there has only been one attempt by a 
Nasakln village to become Gaba'il and this was largely due 
to the intervention of external factors in favour of such 
an attempt - in this case money and organisation from 
Indonesiao In general, mobility of the Nasakln to the Gaba!il 
section was extremely difficult because of the organisation 
and armed power of the Gabaiil, who would use force to 
thwart such attempts 0
The following case histories will illustrate the 
various aspects of mobility.
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Gas.e I
Time: 1962-3
gusn,^ a man of the al~gusn tribe, came to gureidah 
about thirty years ago from the Wadi gagramaut, a densely 
populated area, where some Gaba’il tribesmen live in large 
towns. In gureigah he married an Akhdam woman who later 
became a village dancer* gusn in due course became the 
servant of one of the ’AJrJjas Mansabs - an occupation normally 
undertaken by the Masakln only. He had two daughters, and 
just before he died a few years ago, he built a small house. 
One of the daughters was married to an ’Attas, but was 
divorced within two years* The elder daughter did not get 
married. gusn’s wife died in 1962. The two daughters are 
now left with the small house and nothing else. The unmarried
daughter, who is a prostitute, is now the bread winner of
the house.
gureigah is a long distance from the al-Husn 
territory and when gusn came and established a family there 
he lost all connection with his tribe, although he was 
accepted in gureigali as a Gaba’il, His occupation was 
unusual for a Gaba’il, and with a Khadim wife he established 
his isolated and cut off family in gureigah. The occupation, 
apart from its status, gave him no scope to make money,
gusn’s family thus had all the conditions suitable for a
downgrading in the hierarchy, Husn's daughters are now 
ready to marry anyone - including a Respectable1 Masakln. 
gureigah people are divided over the status of the family. 
Some people consider them to be Gaba’il, whilst others 
classify them as Masakln* However, their only relations in 
Hureidah are Masakln - that is maternal kin. Economically
1. All personal names used in case studies are fictitious.
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the two women cannot "be choosy about a husband, and if one 
of them marries a Masakln, that would be the irrevocable 
step in her establishment as Nasakln*
Gase II
Time: From about 1580-1963
Place: gureidah
fAbdul-Rahim? the head of the Bakhamls descent group,
was a well-known scholar at the time of 'Umar, the ancestor
of the 'A££as. The two people it is said, were close friends,
and 'Abdul-Rahlm was recognised as a Shaikh* He even taught
the children of the !A$£as and during the Id festivals the
'At-fas used to visit him* Thus the Bakhamls was a recognised
Mashayikh descent group* When 'Abdul-Rahlm died, the
Bakhamls did not have another scholar to maintain their
status and ever since their status has been slowly changing.
By the l^Os the group was considered to be Masakln and in
the girthan category. At this time, one Bakhamls wanted to
marry a Basahl woman, but the Basahl refused, on the grounds
that he was a Masakln. So the man eloped with the Basahl
woman and got married to her in another town without her
parents1 permission. The couple did not return to gurei^ah.
During the 'Id festival of that year, a brother of the
runaway Bakhamls attempted to join the Basahl House in the
—  1ceremony of 'paying respect1 to the !A££as* He claimed that 
his descent group was Mashayikh and that the proof of the 
Mashayikh status was the fact that his brother had just 
married a Basahl woman* The man was told by the 'A^as to 
take his 'proper1 place amongst the Masakln* This attempt 
at ritual recognition of the Bakhamls1 previous status 
failed. The Bakhamls in the previous two generations have 
been intermarrying within the Masakln stratum, which is an 
expression of their inferior descent status in the hierarchy.
1* Bee p. 5 3 ,
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Case III
Time: 1935-40
Place: Garia in Wadi 1 Amcl
Garia is a village occupied entirely by girthan of 
the Masakln stratum* During the traditional period, the 
village was under the political dominance of a large 
Mashayikh House in Wadi Doan, which extends its influence 
to this village. But this political dependence, apart from 
costing the people of Garia a share of their harvest, did 
not protect them from the surrounding Gaba'il tribes* A 
number of people from the village had emigrated to Indonesia, 
where they started their own Association. The Association 
decided to change the status of the village, and some of 
its members returned home with money and arns. They organised 
and armed the whole village to resist the dominance of the 
Mashayikh House. The Mashayikh punishment for such a
rebellion was to ask some of the Gaba'il tribes under its
spiritual influence to attack the village and rob it of its 
harvest. The villagers were prepared for this, and incidents 
of robbery and shooting had begun, when, in 1938-40 the 
Qu'aity Government sent its soldiers to Wadi !Amd and dis­
armed both the Gaba'il tribes and the villagers as part of 
the wider process of establishing its authority over the 
whole country. The attempt of the Masakln to become Gaba'il 
was thus frozen. The Masakln of Garia are now derided as
the people who wanted to become Gaba'il.
These case histories illustrate three general points* 
Firstly that mobility from one stratum to another is an 
historical process in which a group's status changes over a 
span of generations, rather than being a sudden change. 
Secondly this change is primarily a change of roles, and
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once the role is established, recognition of an appropriate 
ancestry is accorded and the new status is expressed hy 
inter-marriages suited to it* Thirdly, mobility is usually 
easiest for small descent groups. The move is made by one 
individual or one family, and later the new status becomes 
ascriptive to the whole descent group. With the Gaba'il on 
the other hand it required in the past a large group with a 
maximum physical force, since a monopoly over the use of 
power was an essential feature in the role of the Gaba'il,
5« Conclusion.
In the changed conditions of Hureidah the traditional 
roles of the different strata are losing their ascriptive 
force, and some have disappeared. New alternatives are now 
open and new roles have been created. The 'A££as are no 
longer the only ruling group of 5ureijah« Even if they 
dominate the Local Council, they still have to share power 
with Central Government officials, most of whom are not 
Sadah, The Basahl no longer conform to their traditional
religious role, and they are more busy farming their holdings
v
than preaching to the Gaba'il, The Gaba'il tribes no longer 
have their segmentary political organisation, nor do they 
carry arms* At the same time, some Masakln have stopped 
playing the ascriptive roles of Subyan or Akhdam, and have 
made money by shopkeeping or by working abroad, Some 'AJ'fas, 
Mashayikh and Gaba'il have taken tip Masakln occupations. In
general then, the ascribed roles of the groups have been 
thrown open0 At the same time, individuals can voluntarily 
change their ascribed economic roles0 But this change is not 
statistically significant at present.
Outside Hureijah, the political and economic system 
of §a£ramaut is open in that anyone can climb up the admini­
strative machinery of the Government, or become wealthy 
through business without being hindered by his descent 
status. In other words, achievement is becoming more and 
more recognised as a criterion of rank in the political and 
economic sphere* At the same time the increasingly effective 
and widespread ideology of Arab Nationalism is undermining 
the traditional justification for the social stratification. 
In the large towns especially, the questioning of the system 
is widespread and many people are ignoring its ascriptive 
statuses.
In this and the last chapter, I have given a 
descriptive analysis of the system of stratification operat­
ing in ^ ureijah. In some cases I have had to discuss some 
general aspects of the system as it functions throughout the 
country, but in the main I have concentrated on the social 
hierarchy as it operates in Hurei^ah* In the last chapter I 
described the social hierarchy and the main features and 
different roles of the various groups. I have also pointed 
out the significant changes that have taken place in the 
last two decades and have indicated the trends of their
effects on the various status-ascribing frameworks* In this 
chapter however, I have described the deeper structural 
differences between the groups, the general function of the 
marriage system in maintaining stratification and the 
question of mobility. These two chapters then have been con­
cerned with a general description of the stratification system 
as a necessary preliminary to a more detailed analysis of 
changes in the system which will follow in the rest of the 
thesis. It is therefore important at this point to conclude 
by restating the main features of the stratification system.
(a) There are three general and universal ranked strata, 
two of which are internally differentiated.
(b) The strata are inclusive and their recruitment is by 
birth.
(c) Summation of roles is an important principle of the 
system. Relations between groups tend to be organised 
on the basis of this principle„
(d) Relations between groups is characterised by co­
operation rather than competition, especially in the 
political system.
(e) Mobility is possible but difficult.
These main features of the system are in fact almost 
identical to Baileyfs definition of a caste system, or what 
he calls a closed social stratification. Hacjrami stratifica­
tion is certainly closed. But whether it is a caste system
1. Bailey, F.G-. 1963.
or not is another problem. The changes that have taken 
place in the last two decades have certainly made the system 
more "open1 iseQ it is being vigorously questioned by a new 
ideology and the trends are towards ignoring ascription as 
a basic principle of ranking and status conferring* In 
order to substantiate this general statement, it will be 
necessary to analyse the politico-economic and ideological 
changes in ljureidah in some detail* This I will do in the 
following chapters.
CHAPTER Y 
ECONOMIC ORGANISATION
!• Economy and Stratification: The Past.
There is enough evidence to show that in the past, 
that is to say, before the incorporation of §urei£ah into 
the Qu'aity State, stratification in ;Hurei£ah was intimately 
linked with economic organisation* The proportion of re­
sources controlled by each group could be correlated with 
its position in the hierarchy - the Sadah tAf^ as being the 
wealthiest and the Masakln the poorest* But since 1940, 
political changes in IJaJramaut as a whole have resulted in 
economic change. The question then is, has economic change 
affected social stratification as I have described it? If 
for instance the Masakln have become the wealthiest stratum 
in gureidah, this would be likely to affect stratification 
considerably* Hy contention in this and the following 
chapter is that although there has been some economic change, 
the differential control of wealth which is correlated with 
the social hierarchy has not been radically affected* In 
this chapter I propose to examine two points: firstly, the 
close correlation between social stratification and economy 
in the past, and secondly, how economic factors in ^urei^ah 
today necessitate large-scale labour migration. In the 
following chapter I .shall discuss the effects of labour 
migration on the control of.resources and the social 
hierarchy.
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Since I propose to relate economic changes to
stratification, it will be necessary first of all to have
a general picture of the relation between the two in the
1
traditional period* Only then can we say that there has been 
radical change in the relationship, only a minor change, or 
no change at all* Without a general picture of the inter­
relation between stratification and economics in the past, 
it would be presumptuous to state that the relation between 
the two is now either different or the same* For this 
reason I propose to briefly reconstruct the general picture 
of the relation between economy and social stratification 
in the traditional period, using all the available evidence*
A Reconstruction: Differential Control of Resources*
Reconstruction of the past, even if it is the very 
recent past, is usually difficult. It is even more difficult 
in the IJaqLramaut, where even at present there is no system­
atic recording of statistical data* However what I want to 
reconstruct is not a detailed and exact picture, but a broad 
and general one. My assertion is that the social stratifica­
tion of Hurei^ Lah coincided with an economic stratification 
in terms of which the Sadah were at the top, the Masakin at 
the bottom, and the Mashayikh-Gaba*il in between* From this 
assumption we can analyse in detail the relative economic
1, This phrase refers to the period Just before the incor­
poration of Hurei§.ah into the Qu'aity State around 1940,
positions of the strata today, and thereby discover if the 
control over resources by the strata has changed hands or 
not.
This attempt at reconstruction is based on the 
availability of some evidence, which in my opinion is sub­
stantial enough for us to draw general conclusions as to the 
respective economic positions of the groups in the social 
hierarchy. The evidence is of two types:
(i) From the economic resources in gureigah today, I 
deduced a number of basic facts concerning the 
economic resources of the past.
(ii) I have figures from which the labour migration of
this period can be calculated - some from genealogies 
and some from living household heads.
This evidence can give us some idea of the income coming
into gureigah from outside* The evidence from these two
sources give us a reasonable picture of the respective
wealth of the different strata.
f _
f gureigah in the past depended almost entirely on its 
cultivated fields for its supply of food* Only a few 
families (most of whom were *A££as) were rich enough to 
import some sugar, tea, coffee, etcc for personal consump­
tion* Local agricultural produce was thus the main source 
of the food supply0 The cultivated land in gureigah is
l
irrigated by a canal system which is very old* The canal 
system regulates the amount of water (which comes during the
1. For a description of the ancient irrigation systems in 
Wadi TAmd, see Caton-Thompson and Gardner 1959*
floods - sell) for all the farms in the area* The canal 
system itself is fixed and cannot he altered in any way - 
either by increasing the width or depth of the channels, or 
by making new channels* This is very important because the 
cultivated farms are also fixed in size in terms of the 
canal system* Land which is outside the canal system cannot 
be irrigated and therefore cannot be cultivated* Thus the 
total area of the cultivated fields of gureigah is fixed and 
has been fixed for a considerable time in the past* Agricul­
tural resources cannot therefore have been improved by 
increasing the size of the cultivated area* If the acreage 
of land cannot be increased, then a group can increase the 
amount of land it owns only at the expense of other groups. 
Thus if the !A-j;£as owned more land in the past than they do 
now - in relation to the other groups - then its loss would 
be a gain to the other groups. If we can show that the fA££as 
had sources of income from overseas, while the Masakln 
categories did not, it would then be reasonable to assume 
that the !A£t;as were wealthier than the Masakln, and that 
because of this they would buy and own more land and houses 
per household than the Masakln, The fixed area of cultivated 
land is thus one given factor in our process of 
re construetion«
But if the size of the cultivated area is fixed, it 
could be argued that its uotput could have been increased 
by the introduction of new methods of cultivation. From the
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data I have, it is certain that no new methods have been 
introduced* It is impossible to use tractors here because 
of the intersecting canals, the small size of the farm plots 
and the interspersed enclosures of date palms* No chemical 
fertilisers are used - the same animal fertilisers are used 
as in the past* No new mechanical tools have been introduced* 
Locally made tools, like the hoe, are used, along with cows 
and camels* Methods of cultivation are the same as those in 
the past* Similarly water resources - that is flood irriga­
tion by means of the canal system - must be assumed to be 
constant within the cycle of variation, since no dramatic 
change in the climate has taken place• From this we can 
assume that output per acre has not increased* In fact one 
might argue that if anything it has decreased, because the 
farms are constantly being fragmented by the inheritance 
system*
In general then, we can reasonably assume that the 
size of the cultivated area and the output of agricultural 
produce has not increased and is likely to have remained 
constant* From the last chapter, we know that there is a 
very high percentage of in-group marriage, and that the 
pattern of marriage together with the inheritance system 
which transmits property from the father to both male and 
female children means that the wealth of a group will remain 
largely within the group over a number of generations. (The 
implication is that the status quo could not be affected by
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changes in the internal economic organisation, hut could he
upset hy an external factor such as the inflow of money into
§ureidah from overseas, In 1934-6, just before the coming
of the government* Mr* Ingrams reported that money from
overseas migration was an important phenomenon. He estimated
that between 20 and 30 per cent of the estimated population
of the £[a<Jramaut lived in the East Indies, East Africa or
Egypt and the countries bordering the Red Sea*1 Money from
2
overseas migrants was an important source of income. Erom 
gureidah we have similar evidence „ Migration at the time 
was. an important phenomenon, and people migrated mainly 
because they wanted to send money back home* Migration was 
mainly to India and Indonesia. Journeys to these countries 
were expensive and people went there because they expected 
high rewards. But because of the expense involved in the 
journey we must assume that the poorer people would not be 
able to afford these long journeys and therefore stayed at 
home* Thus those who migrated were not only those who were 
initially wealthy enough to afford the journey, but we can 
also assume that they became wealthier as a result of these 
journeys* Hence the group that had the highest percentage of 
migrants at the time can probably be assumed to have been 
the wealthiest. The following table will give us an idea of
1. Ingrams, W.H* 1936, p. 141.
2. Remittances were estimated to total £630,000 per annum 
in 1936 (Ingrams: 1936, p.142).
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the extent of migration in gureidah during the traditional
period and the degree to which different groups had links
with overseas# Migration to India and Indonesia was brought
1
to a sudden halt at the beginning of the Second World War. 
fable A : Pre-1939 Migration to India and Indonesia
Groups No.
Males
Travel Abroad A
...—.-... ---- - -
Born Abroad B
Ind­
ia
Indo­
nesia
Total % Ind­
ia
Indo­
nesia
Total %
1.'Atfas 310 7 50 57 18.3 2 42 /!,/[,11 14
2#Basahl 53 1 12 13 24.5 - 12 12 23.9
3*Ja!da 299 5 18 24 8 — 8 ^ 8 11.6
4-.Mas akin 
Groups ' 359 5 18 23 6*4
.
— 13 13 3.3
This table is based on a survey carried out in 1962- 
3# It is as well to point out that because of this it does 
not reflect the exact figures of emigration at the time. In 
particular, some people who returned to gurei^ah during, or 
after the War have since died, and are therefore not 
included in the figures# Similarly, many immigrants opted 
to stay overseas and never returned to !gurei£ah# I think
1* "The Saiyids in Hadramaut [i#e# the Sadah] were aware of 
the dangers of their dependence on Java, and a writer in 
the early thirties prophetically points out the effect a 
world war might have on their wealth there11.
(Serjeant, B.B. 1957 5 p.25).
2# The figures for those who have travelled abroad are 
inclusive of those born abroad# _
3# These figures (in column B) are from one GabaJil settle­
ment only. It has a population of 67 males.
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that this explains the higher proportion of migrants in the 
Basahl group as opposed to the ’A'ff.as, 'A^ Jas genealogies 
show that their emigration to the Far East goes hack at 
least two to three generations, whilst those of the Basahl 
suggest that their emigration goes hack only one generation 
from living middle-aged men* According to the 'Affeis Hansah, 
there were 1,500 tApfas in Indonesia before World War II.
His figures were hased on a census taken thirty years ago.
If the number is correct, 1A££as emigration must have been 
going on for a considerable period. No figures are available 
for the Basahl, but their genealogies, and the size of their 
group, make it unlikely that the number of Basahl migrants 
was in fact proportionately higher than that of the !AJJas.
In view of these figures, it seems likely that many of the 
,A’f'J;as opted not to return to u^reicjlah the en *^ of War*
In the case of the Basahl, most of those born abroad returned 
to ]Jurei$ah, and this has inflated the figures of their 
migrants. As a small group, the return of their members to 
reinforce their position was perhaps to be expected. With 
the !A££as this was not necessary* Thus the difference 
between the percentage of migrants of the lA££as and Basahl 
groups does not exactly reflect the emigration realities 
of the past. In fact all other evidence points to the fact 
that the fAt£as had the largest proportion of migrants, and 
were therefore likely to have earned more income from abroad* 
The low figures of G-aba*il migrants may also be explained
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partly by the fact that under the traditional system man­
power was important for feuding, and this may have dis­
couraged people from emigrating0 Broadly speaking then, we 
have a general picture of the ‘A'J'fas and Mashayikh as having 
had the highest proportion of migrants and the Gaba*il and 
Masakln the least. If we can assume then that the fact of 
migration is an indication of the wealth of a group, the 
table gives us a general picture of the respective wealth 
of the three strata, which, as is to be expected backs, in 
general, the ordering of the social stratification. Further­
more we have circumstantial evidence to show that this 
general picture is not just guesswork, a shot in the dark.
In the traditional period, political conditions were such 
that only the Sadah and the Mashayikh-Gaba1il strata could 
travel safely to the coast, and from there to the East. The 
Masakln could only travel to the coast if they were pro­
tected by the Gaba'il or the other groups, otherwise they 
were liable to be killed. Thus, under the traditional 
political system, the Masakln were discouraged from migrat­
ing. In fact most of their patronymic groups came to 
gurei^ah in this period in search of !peacef and protection. 
About 72 per cent of the Masakln patronymic groups moved 
into JJurei^ ah within the two decades before the coming of 
the Government. They came into Hureidah from Gaba1!! areas, 
and most of them state that they were escaping from Gaba!il 
1 oppression1 . If nearly three-quarters of the Masakln were
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new settlers in gureidah, we may assume that they would not 
have heen able to meet the initial expenses required to 
migrate to distant countries * This is especially so if the 
general description of the Masakln as people who owned few 
farms and who specialised mostly in working for the other 
strata is reasonably accurate *
All this is of course circumstantial evidence, but 
it all points to a picture of a social structure which 
militated against the Masakln being a wealthy stratum. On 
the other hand, all the impressionistic evidence points to 
the Sadah as having been the wealthiest stratum. All the 
largest and best houses of gureidah were built during the 
traditional period and all of them are owned by ‘A'ftas, 
Secondly, most of the rich families in ^ urei^ah today are 
fA££as, and all informed me that their money came from 
India and Indonesia, Some of these families were rich enough 
to bring architects and builders from India in order to 
build a mosque in gureidah. They also imported the first 
car into the region at a time when there were no roads 
suitable for motor traffic* Nearly all ‘Aftas now complain 
that since World War II, when money from India and the Far
East was stopped, they have become much poorer than they
1 -were before. The Mashayikh and Gaba*il have the same
1, "The age of Java Is now past and the cutting off of
Javanese remittances has reduced some Saiyid families to 
poverty,,mjLu (Serjeant 1957? p*26), Serjeant points out 
that the Sadah have been in Indonesia longer than the 
Dutch.
156
complaints. In general then we have a broad picture of the 
traditional period with the Sadah at the apex of the 
economic ladder, the Masakln at the bottom, and the 
Mashayikh-Gaba * il in between.
(The outbreak of World War II reduced migration to a 
trickle, and later completely halted it. Money from India 
and the Far East stopped at the beginning of the war. When 
India and Indonesia both became independent countries and 
imposed monetary restrictions in 1947-9 it completely 
stopped9 Many gagrami migrants in India and some of those in 
Indonesia returned to the gadramaut, The effect of all this 
is generally accepted to have been an economic catastrophe 
for the gagramaut especially since it was accompanied by a 
prolonged drought between 1934 and 1944* In 1937 Britain 
intervened in ga<^ Lramaut and established the authority of 
the Qu'aity and Kathiri Sultanates over the whole area, 
gureigah thus became part of the Qu'aity State0 The changed 
political conditions and the imposition of a rudimentary 
form of administration brought 'peace1 to the country. 
Motorised transport began in the early fifties. A new wave 
of migration also began, but this time it was to Saudi 
Arabia, 'Aden, and the Arabian Gulf. By 1962-3  ^Hadramaut 
had become part of the internal market served by the growing 
port of Aden, and these changed economic conditions had 
their effect on gureigah*
Having shown that in the past, social stratification
15?
was closely correlated with, economic stratification, it is 
important now to show how economic-political changes of the 
past 15 years have, if at all, affected the correlation 
that has "been shown to have existed* Is the social hierarchy 
in igurei^ ah today hacked by the differential control of 
wealth by the different groups? If so why is this the case?
Since the end of the War, there has been an 
intensive and widespread labour migration from ga^ramaut to 
the nearby Arab countries. This has been a major agent of 
economic change in the country* Thus in order to analyse the 
relation between economics and the social hierarchy of 
gurei^ah, it will be necessary to discuss two things; (i) 
the economic organisation of 3Jurei$ah today and why labour 
migration is an important part of it* This will be discussed 
in the rest of this chapter, (ii) The effects of labour 
migration, especially on the differential control of 
resources by the different groups* This will be discussed 
in the next chapter.
1
II• Economic Organisation : The Present *
The basic economic unit in 5urei§.ah is the household 
which varies from a small Nuclear Family of two people, to 
a large Extended Family of fifteen people. Statistically 
however, the average household consists of 4.4 people. Each 
household has its own house, but a few live in rented
1. The phrase refers to the time of the field work i.e. 
July 1962 to June 1963.
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houses. Houses vary considerably in size, hut all must at 
least have a ground and upper floor Cctoo (Thnp.-f-)- The 
building of such a house requires considerable capital and 
is therefore a major drain on the income of a household. 
Households derive food and cash income from agriculture, the 
traditional non-agricultural occupations and shopkeeping —  
the three main spheres of economic activities. But since the 
existing economic resources in JJurei<Jah barely brovide enough
i
food for the people, the major source of cash income is the 
flow of remittances from labour migrants.
Farming is the most important economic activity since 
until recently, the village depended almost entirely on its 
produce. Every household head calls himself a 'farmer1 
because nearly everyone owns or cultivates farm plots and 
date palms. All other economic activities are supplementary 
to agriculture. A smith for instance, stops his work and 
goes to the fields to cultivate his farm when floods come. 
Preparation for cultivation is taken seriously by all whether 
they are labourers, farmers or shopkeepers. Agriculture is 
thus the most important economic activity. But since culti­
vation depends entirely on floods which come irregularly 
because of the climatic conditions of the area, there is no 
regularity in economic activities. During the drought periods 
those who are entirely dependent on farming become 'unem­
ployed' until the floods arrive. Similarly, those engaged in
1. This statement is substantiated later in the chapter. 
See pp. j'T-f - l$<j.
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non-agri cult-oral activities are adversely affected "by 
drought.
Dates and millet are the main agricultural products 
of gureidah, with Deans and simsim as supplementary crops* 
These form the basic diet of the people, together with some 
wheat which is occasionally imported from other areas in 
the aonntry. After picking, Doth the dates and millet go 
through a number of stages after which they are stored in 
the houses against the exigencies of the frequent droughts. 
Each household has a number of goats which provide milk as 
well as being a source of meat for special occasions. Some 
sheep are also kept for this purpose. Neat has a very high 
value, but the slaughtering of a sheep or a goat for a 
guest is a matter of honour* Similarly, important occasions 
- feasts, marriages, funerals, annual festivals, the birth 
of a child - all require the slaughter of goats or sheep. 
Hence these animals are in great demand and have a high 
monetary value* Every household keeps a flock, not only 
because of the milk provided by the goats, and for killing 
on special occasions, but also as investments for sale when 
money is short* But feeding the animals is a big problem - 
sometimes as big a problem as feeding the people. The main 
source of their food is the millet stalks which are stored 
like the dates and the millet* During the drought, millet 
stalks are sold and fetch exorbitant prices* The cultivated 
area does not have much grass for the animals to eat because
of the constant weeding* Furthermore, most of the time the 
animals are kept out of the fields*
Today the daily diet of IJureidah has been augmented 
by imported foodQ Tea is drunk in large quantities* Curry 
has become part of the daily diet —  this requires tinned 
tomatoes, the various ingredients, and at least a tin of 
tuna fish. Wealthy families have rice daily with tinned 
fruit, but the poor have such meals only occasionally. This 
is an important change in the pattern of family expenditure 
which must be reflected in economic organisation as a whole0 
I will discuss this problem presently.
Besides agriculture there are traditional non- 
agricultural occupations such as pottery, smithing, carpentry 
and silver smithing —  all of which are hereditary occupa­
tions held by particular families. There are also a number 
of families who are masons and housebuilders. Building a 
house requires a large labour force for making mud bricks 
with sand and water from the wells, transporting the stones 
for the foundations, and actually building the house. Manual 
labourers in IJurei^ lah are mostly engaged in work associated 
with housebuilding, but also in drawing water for use in 
households, and, during cultivation, in agricultural labour?. 
All these are traditional occupations, using material 
entirely from local resources.
Shopkeeping is of course a different kind of economic 
activity* Shops have begun to open in ]Jurei<jLah during the
A GAfML 6KANCH
Mote *. Letters refer to explanation
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last ten years* There are now eleven shops owned by people 
from all the strata0 All the shops sell imported.,foods and 
light manufactured goods* Since agriculture does hot; produce
M I ' ’
enough to bring purchasing power to the people and so TNis^ ain 
the traditional occupations and the shops, the latter depend 
for their existence on money flowing into Hureijah from the 
outside* These shops and the money from the outside world 
are the only tangible aspects of economic change in ]Jurei<Jah. 
Their role in the economy will be discussed later*
This is a brief description of the broad spheres of 
economic activity in ^ ureidah today. Let us now examine them 
in some detail.
Agriculture and the Oanal System.
As I have pointed out, the cultivated land in 
^ureidah is fixed in terms of the canal system, and cannot 
be increased in area, since cultivation depends on flood 
irrigation* The whole of the cultivated area is divided into 
three sections, each being irrigated by a separate canal 
system* Two of these systems are flooded from the same 
source —  the secondary Wadi Nsinu The third (the Tadjrub 
canal system) receives floods from the main Wadi lAmd, and 
I shall describe this one briefly in order to show how the 
canal system operates.
The Tadjrub canal system (see d i a g r a m p .  IHJ, 
diverts water from the main course of floods coming down
Top picture* A port of o branch 
canal*
Bottom picture* A part of the m Todjrub canal system*
/C
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e
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from Wadi 'Amd. A diversion is created "by a small dam, which 
has been built to a particular height so that it can divert 
just enough water to irrigate the cultivated area covered 
by this canal system* The assumption is, that given one 
'normal* flood, the dam sbmild divert just enough water into 
the canal system* Prom the diversion, the water reaches 
ljureidah through a main canal which, at a certain point, is 
divided into four tributary canalso The size of each of 
these branch canals is measured on the basis of the area 
they must irrigate. Hence branch canals may be of unequal 
size. Each branch canal is then sub-divided, into two or 
three channels - the size of each depending on the total 
area of land it is to irrigate. Each of these branches has 
off-shoots at specific points where they enter an enclosed 
area of land with either farms or date palms. The size of 
the channel - that is, the amount of water it will carry, 
depends on the number and size of farms and palm enclosures 
it irrigates. The channel cannot be enlarged in order to 
bring in more water, since this would mean that the amount 
of water going to other off-shoots further down would be 
reduced. If the channel cannot be altered, then the farms 
and palm enclosures it irrigates cannot be increased in size. 
Given an enclosure of date palms, if it is fully planted, 
the number of palms cannot be increased, Only the replacement 
of dead palms Is possible.
A basic principle of the canal system is that water
flows from the main canal downwards and along its branches, 
and finally reaches the farms and palm enclosures. This 
means that the whole canal system slopes slowly downwards. 
The canals must be kept in this state all the time. The mud 
from the canals and main branches is put on either side. 
Similarly, when an off-shoot enters a palm enclosure, the 
side furthest from the entrance must be lower, and since 
the floods deposit silt every time they come, this becomes 
a major problem. Silt has thus to be consistently removed 
from the canals and enclosures so that water can flow with­
out interruption. As a result there are huge mounds of sandy 
soil on both banks of the whole network of canals. The 
cultivated areas are thus enclosures because of the huge 
mounds of soil surrounding them. Since this system has been 
In use for as long as the people can remember, the soil 
mounds are considerable in size and height. They take up a 
considerable part of the total area. This is a serious dis­
advantage to the canal system, since cultivable land in the 
narrow valleys is scarce in the first place.
Secondly, the distribution of water by the canal 
system has certain drawbacks. The amount of water brought 
by the floods that come down the main wadi is not always 
the same because of the variations in rainfall. Thus, the 
amount of water diverted into the canal system depends on 
the size of the flood. Sometimes only a small amount of 
water reaches the canal system, and in such situations the
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water is used by the places at the beginning of the canal 
system. Very often this is the case and the canal system 
irrigates only parts of the cultivated area,
Thirdly, the passage of the floods through the canal 
system creates certain consequences. They bring branches, 
weeds and small trees which obstruct the flow of water, 
especially at the points of divisions between the canals* 
Obstructions can reduce the amount of water flowing into a 
particular canal, and areas irrigated by it are then likely 
to suffer. Hence, the clearing of the canals as soon as the 
flood arrives is a major job that demands constant attention. 
Furthermore, if the flood is big enough, the force of the 
water always causes damage at different points in the canal 
system. Both these problems necessitate the repairing and 
cleaning of the canals, and the organisation of men to carry 
this out. It also involves the rights and responsibilities 
of each farmer in relation to the canal system.
Of the three canal systems in IJurei^ Lah, each has an 
overseer - kheyyil,who is responsible for the main canal 
which diverts the water from the flood course in the main 
valley. Since damage at any point to this main canal will 
affect all the farms irrigated by the system, all the 
farmers are responsible for repairing it. They pay either in 
cash or in labour for such repairs, and the contribution 
of any individual farmer is based on the size of his farm.
The overseer of the canal is responsible for organising the
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work? collecting the contribution, etc. In return for his 
services, he can plant palms on the side of the canal. When 
the main canal divides, each major branch has an overseer, 
and all the farmers whose farms are irrigated "by the particu­
lar canals are responsible for repairing any damage to it. 
Similarly each of the sub-branches of the major canals has 
its overseer with responsibilities over the canal. The off­
shoots are looked after by the owners of the farms irrigated 
by them. Thus a breakdown at point K (see diagram^ is the 
responsibility of overseer A, and all the farmers contribute 
to the repair. Damage at point L will be the responsibility 
of overseer D and only farmers along canal D will contribute 
to the repairo Head Cl is responsible for the branch of 
canal C, and point M will be repaired by 02, 03, 04, and 05* 
At point P on the other hand, only 02 and the people owning 
farms in the enclosure are responsible. Responsibility is 
thus divided on the same principle as that of the canal 
layout itself.
Given this irrigation system, there are a number of 
logical consequences which are of considerable economic and 
political importance. Firstly, since the area of cultivation 
cannot be increased-, and since the methods of production have 
not been improved, an increase in population would have a 
serious effect on food supplies. Secondly, land is scarce 
and the value of cultivable land is very high. Thirdly, the 
inheritance system has, through successive generations,
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fragmented the farms into smaller and smaller units* This 
suggests that the population has risen over a period* It 
also means that ownership of land is defined with great 
precision, and is therefore a likely source of conflict*
A canal system like this, which imposes collective responsi­
bility at different points, as well as creating individual 
vested interests, is a potential source of conflict between 
different groups* The organisation which is responsible for 
the canal system of §urei$ah - the Local Council - thus 
acquires considerable political importance* These implica­
tions, which result from the specific nature of 3Jurei<Jah!s 
agricultural system, will be discussed later*
Property Ownership*
"Ownership” of property in gureijah means in general, 
individual ownership, uncomplicated by a multiplicity of 
rights held by different groups in the same property* When 
a person (a man or a woman) owns something, it means that 
that person has exclusive rights over the object and can 
dispose of it in any way he or she likes. If a man and his 
adult sons work on a farm, the father has legal rights over 
it, unless this right has been formally transferred to his 
sons* Children do not have any right over their father*s 
property until he dies, in which case all his inheritors 
have a collective interest in the property* When the property 
is divided between them according to the inheritance rules,
then each assumes exclusive rights over the share allotted
to him or her* However, there are exceptions to the general
principle of individual ownership* Since property can remain
■undivided, if desired, for a long time, it is not uncommon
for siblings to own their father!s wealth collectively until
they decide to divide it* In Hureidah the only people who
claim collective ownership over land are the Basahl and
G-aba'il* The Basahl claim that the ridge they reside on and
the few plots surrounding it are owned by all the Basahl*
Similarly, the four Gaba'il settlements also have collective
ownership over the building sites of their settlements* Part
1of the Sagra clan, which resides in settlements A is part 
of the Ja*da tribal structure and has collective rights over 
its clan territory outside gureigah* In this area, neither 
members of other Gabafil tribes nor people from the town 
can build a house or dig wells, without the permission of 
the whole clan* Apart from these exceptions however, all 
property is owned on an individual basis*
Collective ownership is thus reduced to the minimum 
and is restricted to the residential area only* Other forms 
of property are owned on an individual basis, and even after 
the death of the owner an undivided inheritance is shared 
amongst the inheritors* Property in Hureidah means agricul­
tural land, palm trees, building plots, houses, domestic 
animals and personal belongings ranging from house utensils,
1* See genealogy, Diag. $ p*/06 Ch.Y^,
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radios and clothes, to manuscripts* If a man dies leaving a 
wife, a son and a daughter, his property would then he 
divided in the following way* One-eighth of the property 
would go to the wife and seven-eighths to the children* Of 
the seven-eighths, a son!s share is twice that of a daughter, 
This ratio of division is fixed by the gur’an, but what is 
important here is the method of division. If the man owned 
thirty palms of different types and sizes (they might be 
dispersed throughout the cultivated area) then the palms 
would be categorized on the basis of their monetary value 
into a number of lots. If one lot included, let us say three 
palms, then these would be divided first between the wife 
and children. Then the childrenls share would be divided on 
the basis of two shares to the boy, one share to the girl.
If the second lot were twenty palms, they would be divided 
similarly, and the remaining seven of the thirty palms would 
be divided on the same basis. The same principle is used for 
farm strips. If the man had two strips of land of unequal 
value, in areas served by different canal systems, then 
each strip would be divided between the mother and the 
children, each taking his or her appropriate share. Houses, 
building plots and other forms of property are similarly 
divided. This brief description is a highly simplified 
version of the complex method of inheritance. But the main 
point here is to indicate how the inheritance system 
fragments property in general, and farms in particular, in
minute and uneconomic units. Furthermore, it disperses a 
person’s agricultural property over different parts of the 
cultivated area* It is possible for instance, for five 
people to have different shares in one date palm. One person 
may own the land on which the palm has been planted (even 
the indentation in the soil in which the palm grows could 
be owned by more than one person), and therefore have a half 
share in the palm. The other half would be owned by the man 
who had planted the palm, or, if he is dead, his share 
could be divided amongst his inheritors, each taking a 
different proportion of the proceeds. Similarly a small plot 
of land could be fragmented to the same extent. This consid­
erable fragmentation is not only uneconomical but necessi­
tates a high degree of precision in defining the position 
of a person’s palms or strips of farm within an enclosure. 
This is a field of unlimited possibilities for disputes, 
especially since the methods of establishing ownership 
introduced by the government courts encourage such disputes. 
This is of course a political problem, but given a combina­
tion of these factors - a fixed area of cultivable land and 
therefore a scarcity of land, giving it a high value, 
together with a high degree of fragmentation - it is safe 
to assert that disputes are likely to result.
Cultivation and hand Holding.
The cultivated land of ]Jurei<J.ah is divided into two
types:-
Tap and battara pictures: Different stages ef preparing farm anclasures
befare planting seeds.
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(i) There are enclosures which are planted with date 
palms and nothing else*
(ii) There are farm enclosures in which millet is the 
main crop*
Dispersed between the millet stalks are heans and simsim.
i
: The two types of farms present different problems
and requirements. The palm tree needs watering seasonally 
until it reaches a certain stage, after which it can stand 
up to four successive years of drought. No preparation is 
required apart from pollinating the tree and making sure 
that the ground is clear so that water can reach the tree 
and sink into the earth* During the harvest period, the 
palms require constant attention to protect them from 
birds and thieves.
Millet cultivation on the other hand requires 
considerable preparation at all stages - from one harvest 
to the next. Millet is grown in the same plots, year in and 
year out for a long time. Hence the yield of the soil is 
very low. Considerable preparation is necessary even for a 
1normal* yield. Deep tilling and fertilising before and 
after the floods, and constant weeding while the millet is 
growing are the minimum requirements. When the millet forms 
on the stalk, a minute by minute watch is necessary to 
protect the crop from the swarms of hungry birds, which if 
not driven away can wipe out the millet crop of a sizeable 
enclosure in two days*
There is a tendency for the two types of enclosures
172
(i.e. the palm and the millet enclosures) to concentrate in 
certain areas* But there are however some areas where the 
two intermingle* Both types of enclosures are highly frag­
mented i.e. many people own strips of farms or palm dates in
each enclosure* This is shown clearly by the diagrams below*
Diagram A represents an actual farm 
enclosure of millet about one and a 
quarter acres in size (160 matlrah)*
It is divided into sixteen pieces
owned by different people* Strips 3 
and 8 are owned by one man, another 
owns strips 1 and 2, and another 14 
and 15* Strips 6, 7 and 11 are 
separately owned by three brothers. 
The rest of the strips are owned by 
one person each. A farm enclosure
of 160 matlrah divided into sixteen 
pieces gives an average of 10 
matlrah to each (3*240 sq.ft.) The 
size of a farm enclosure (djarb) varies from between 70 and 
80 matlrah to 1,500 matlrah (the largest). However most of 
the enclosures are between 100 and 200 matlrah and are owned 
by an average of four to six people. A person will own an 
average of between 20 to 50 matlrah in one farm enclosure. 
Since the overall average ownership of land is 1.2 acres
A
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Diagram A: A farm
enclosure *
\
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(about 150 matlrah.) 3 it is reasonable to assume that a 
household will have its farm strips scattered in at least 
three farm enclosuresQ
Diagram B represents an actual palm encloaure (about 
180 matlrah) * It contains 90 palm trees divided between ten 
owners. The palm trees are referred to as Ijufrah (the 
indentation on which the tree grows)* In the diagram, the 
alphabets represent the owners and the encircled numerical 
figure represent the number of palm trees each owns. Thus 
owner b has 9 palm trees and so on. Within the enclosure, 
the palms of one owner are not always concentrated in one 
part*, sometimes they are dispersed throughout the enclosure.
Both diagrams A and B show the high degree of 
fragmentation in the two types of enclosures0 There are some 
enclosures (of both types) which belong to one owner 
entirely. But this is uncommon and the above diagrams 
characterise the prevalent pattern of ownership* The 
dispersal of holdings and their continuous fragmentation is 
thus an important aspect of the land tenure system.
Traditional Non-Agricultural Occupations
   —  11    ■ - -- ■  . ■ *■■<, I  !)-)■!-[-! r ■■ r --r-r-TT niT-^iM! «I.I1
Although gurei^ah!s economy is largely based on 
agriculture, there are a number of economic activities 
outside this sphere which involve an elementary division of 
labour. Specialisation is mainly in craft occupations - 
carpentry, pottery making, silver and iron smithing and
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mason’s work* The occupations are carried out by particular 
families, with the skills handed on from father to son. 
Secondly, there are many people who are engaged as labourers, 
especially in the different stages or work necessary for 
house-building and for agriculture* Included among these 
labourers are water carriers and servants * Thirdly, there 
are ceremonial servants, who get paid for their specific 
roles in ceremonies0 It must be emphasised that nearly all 
these people engaged in paid non-agricultural activities 
are small-scale farmers either with their own holdings or 
cultivate other people’s farms on a share basis* The paid 
occupations are supplementary activities which they perform 
off-season or when there is a drought*
Craft occupations are on a very small scale, 
generally occupying only one family, or occasionally two*
The iron and silver used by the smiths comes from outside 
§ureidLah, but the clay for pottery, the timber for carpentry 
and all the materials used in housebuilding are from local 
sources* The ‘jib tree is the only source of timber for 
building houses, and because these trees are scarce, their 
value is high, and is determined by the usefulness of a stem 
or branches for building purposes0 In building a house, the 
timber is used for supports, or for doors and windows* The 
rest is built on stone foundations, and then constructed 
from mud slabs mixed with wheat straw* Lime powder for 
white-washing and the sand used in cement are both found
Top pictures A large and pre-war 'Attaa house. 
Bettem picture: A foundation for a new house.
locally, The process of 'building a house necessitates a 
large labour force for cutting and transporting stones, 
making and carrying mud slabs, and the actual brick-laying* 
House-building thus employs a sizeable part of the manual 
labour force. Similarly, agricultural work takes a large 
part of the labour force for preparing the farms before and 
during the floods, Rich people with large holdings employ 
labour on their farms0 It is usually the case that those who 
construct houses are also, at different periods, agricultural 
labourers. Agriculture is, however, given priority*
Ceremonial services are performed by the §ubyan 
only. Each §ubyan family serves a number of non-§ubyan 
families in particular ceremonies. They get paid for such 
services, and in addition every family has a number of 
obligations to its gabiy - ceremonial servants. Besides the 
payment for service, a person must give his sabiy gifts of 
food and clothes during the fId festivals, or when he 
returns from a journey* He must give him a gift from the 
harvest, and left-overs from all the feasts held in the 
house* These extra payments constitute a substantial part 
of the gabiyT s family budget*
In periods of drought these non-agricultural 
activities fall to a very loxtf level, since the total income 
of the people is then reduced to a minimum* In the past, 
those Masakin who were out of work used to leave for the 
coast at this period until the drought was over. At present
Top picture: Transportation within Hureidah. 
Bottom picturo: A 1imo-furnaco in Huroidfch.
however there is a constant flow of money in gurei<J.ah from 
its migrants abroad, and this money stimulates non-agricul~ 
tural activitiese During the year 1962-3, at the height of 
a three year drought, two new houses were huilt and three 
old ones extensively repaired, This provided a continuous 
source of income for the builders, the carpenters and the 
labourers, and indirectly, the shopkeepers. Hence these 
activities are dependent on the maintenance of a high level 
of purchasing power created by remittances from labour 
migrantso This brings me to a description of the relation 
between local economic resources and the 'needs1 and size of 
gureidah's population.
Production and Subsistence
Let us now examine gureidah's economy as a whole. 
Prom this it will be clear that the internal economy cannot 
maintain the population, even at a 'subsistence level1* It 
will also be clear that partly as a result of the wider 
political and economic changes in the gadramaut, the basic 
'necessities' of a family in gureidah have changed, and as 
a result Hureidah's economy has become part of a wider 
economic system. The result is a high percentage of labour 
migration which to some extent bridges the gap between 
gureijah's local resources, and its inhabitants' newly 
acquired 'needs'*
gureidah's agriculture must be seen in the context
of the regional climate because this is an important factor. 
During my field work in 1962-3 there was no harvest because 
there had been no floods for three successive years. At the 
end of my stay, floods came to gureidah without any rain 
having fallen in the village* In fact the floods exceeded 
expectations and caused widespread damage to the canal system 
- damage which may cost some of the farmers more to repair 
than they will receive in income from their harvest* Further­
more, in the last three decades there have been three major 
droughts - one of seven years and two of three years each - 
apart from the usual alternation between one year of drought 
in two or three full or partial irrigation* Hence the 
uncertainties of the floods and the frequent droughts are 
major factors to be taken into consideration when assessing 
the productive capacity of gureidah's agriculture.
With this in mind, I will try to give an approximate 
estimation of gureidah's agricultural productive capacity*
The cultivated area is being constantly measured in order to 
assess the amount a farmer has to pay in contributions 
towards repairing damaged canals. The overseer (kheyyil) of 
each canal system keeps a record of the area of all the 
farms irrigated by the canals. Palm enclosures are measured 
in terms of the number of holes in which the palms are 
planted. Each palm counts for two units. The unit of measure 
used for measuring the size of the millet farms and the 
number of palms is the same - the mafrlrah (134,4- matlrah =
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1 acre). The total area of the cultivated land is ahout
532.7 acres (71>600 matlrah)» After an intensive discussion
2with a group of local agricultural experts, we came to the 
conclusion that ahout 30,000 matlrah of the total is planted 
with date palms, and since the local system of measurement 
gives two matlrah for each palm tree, the number of palms 
will be approximately 15,000. Thus of the total area of 
71,600 matlrah, only about 41,600 (309*5 acres) is used for 
millet farms.
Assessing the number of palms and the total area of 
millet farms of gurei^ah is easy enough because records 
exist. Records of the size of each holding are very necessary 
in an area where cultivated land is scarce and where the 
inheritance system demands precise sub-division of property. 
But to calculate the amount of dates and millet produced is 
very difficult, since no records are available and no attempt 
had been made before to make such calculations. Furthermore, 
there are inherent difficulties that make any attempt to 
arrive at an exact figure almost impossible. Firstly, the 
millet farms produce different amounts per matlrah because 
of variations in the preparation of the land. Secondly, 
each palm may have a number of stems from the root and some 
of these stems are as good as a single palm. The number of
1 matxrah = 324 sq,4 feet.
2. MacLe up of four people - the three overseers of the
canals, and the fourth a farmer with experience of arbi­
trating in agricultural disputes. He also knows in great 
detail the layout of farms and palms in gureidah.
stems varies from two to twenty for one tree* The size and 
weight of the fruit stem varies from 10 lbs. to 50 lbs. 
Thirdly, not all the palm trees are producing dates since 
there are many which are still too young to produce dates. 
Fourthly5 as I have pointed out earlier, the harvest is not 
seasonal due to frequent droughts, and it is not always a 
full harvest. It will be necessary in our calculations to 
assume an "average palm tree", as well as the average produce 
°£ a matlrah in a millet farm. Nevertheless the margin of 
error in these calculations is minimised by the knowledge 
of the group of local experts who have suggested the follow­
ing figures for a full harvest
An average palm tree with five branches
will produce... 150 lbs of dates
(-J- bahar)
An average matlrah planted with millet
will produce... 7*2 lbs of millet
(•£ gahawil)
Ibe bahar is the bag of dates weighing 500 lbs; the gahawil
the bag of millet weighing 15 lbs. Calculation of the
productive capacity of IJurei^ ah's agriculture will be based
on these figures, which in turn are based on the assessment
of the local experts and on my own observations* It is the
only method of arriving at an approximate figure of the
total production.
If we assume a full harvest, JureiJah's total
production for one season will be as follows
Dates  ....   7)500 Bahar = 1,004 tons 9 cwt.
Millet ........  20,800 Gahawil = 139 tons 5o7 cwt s.
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In addition there are the heans and the simsim, but since 
these are grown between the stalks of millet on a very small 
scale they are Impossible to measure. We can neglect them 
without increasing very much the margin of error in the 
total figures. In fact they are more than offset by the fact 
that nearly half of the weight of any date is made up of its 
stone, and therefore the total weight of the edible part of 
the dates Is considerably less than the figure given here.
The amount of produce given above must now be related to the 
total population of §urei<Jah. The figures are:- 
No. of Households No. of People 
426 1,912
The 426 households have an average of 4*4 persons 
each. If we relate the total agricultural production of 
IJureigLah in a full harvest year to Its population, we have 
the following figures
Dates  ..... 17*5 Bahar (5,250 lbs) per household.
Millet 48 Gahawil ( 360 lbs) per household.
If we take a different method, we arrive at approx­
imately the same results:-
The total cultivated area is ...... 532*7 acres
This is an average of  .......  1,2 acres per household
If the average household farm of 1,2 acres is divided
between 0,7 acres for millet and 0,5 for date palms, then
the production in a full harvest year will be:-
Dates  ...... ...........16*75 Bahar
Millet  ............ 47#1 Gahawil
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Wh.icb.ever set of figures we take, the total agricul­
tural produce of the household will he used to feed an 
average of 4C4 people from one harvest to the next - assuming 
that this is ahout one year. In fact, of course it is usually 
more. Since agriculture is the sole source of income from 
internal sources, it must cover all other expenses - for 
clothes, the house, feeding the animals and for other 
contingencies* If the head of the household were to sell 
half the amount of his dates at the 1962 prices, he wo\ild 
get ahout 400 shillings - that is £20„ But most households 
do not sell their dates since dates constitute the main 
source of food; millet similarly cannot he spared for sale* 
Hence the dates and millet of an average household cannot 
provide money to meet the other necessary requirements of 
the household* Since agriculture is the hasis of gureidah's 
local economy and the major source of its income, we must 
assume that it cannot provide for or sustain the hasic needs 
of the present day population of Hureidah. These hasic needs 
must he provided for hy an income from sources outside 
u^rei^ Lah. But what are the hasic needs of an average house­
hold in IJurei^ ah today?
Since the establishment of the authority of the 
Qu’aity and Kathlri Sultanates over the whole of 3Ja<3ramaut, 
’peace’ has prevailed over the country. With the establish­
ment of ’ authority1, the British Government introduced a 
single currency throughout the South Arabian Protectorate
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which, includes 'Aden* Since 1945 UJadramaut kas "been drawn 
into a wider economic system that encompasses the whole of 
South Arabia and, through 'Aden, it has become part of an 
international economic system,. From the early fifties trans­
port has been motorised and the port of Mukalla is regularly 
visited by cargo boats from East Africa and *Aden0 About 
five years ago, air transport between gadramaut and 'Aden 
was introduced and now there are regular twice-weekly 
flights between the two arease Today imported goods come 
regularly by air and sea to Mukalla, and from there are 
dispersed by motor transport to the remote villages of the 
interior. The introduction of this wider and complex economic 
system into ga<Jramaut has: not been accompanied by any 
increase in economic productivity in the country such as the 
introduction of light or heavy industry, or the bringing of 
new land under cultivation, or by improving methods of 
cultivation* In fact gureid.ah could be taken as typical of 
the whole country in the sense that its local economy has 
remained static, but it is now absorbing a flood of imported 
foods and light manufactured goods from the far flung 
corners of the world - Japanese, Indian, Hongkong, British, 
Egyptian and German goods are all displayed on the shelves 
of its little shopso The introduction of a wider economic 
system into IJurei^ ah has changed the needs and tastes of the 
people, but has not at the same time provided a new internal 
source of income for purchasing these new needs* There are
of course no figures to show that this is true for the whole 
country, hut it is certainly the case in ljureidah and our 
brief examination of occupations and family budgets will 
illustrate this.
The following are new occupations introduced into 
]Jureid.ah within the last ten years, and which do not depend 
on local economic resources
TABLE B
Occupation Bo* of Persons
Employed
1* Shopkeeping...... ............ , 11
2. Post Office Staff......... *.......  2
3, School Teachers...................  2
4* 'Secretaries' (Central Government).,. 2
5* President of Local Council (unpaid.),, 1
6* Grinding Machine Operator . . 1
Total....................   19 or 0*98%
   of total
population.
The introduction of these new occupations into 
gureigLah has not brought in a substantial new source of 
income. Those without the new occupations must depend on 
local sources for their income - in other words primarily 
on agriculture,, But the wider economic system has brought 
eleven small shops, all of which compete to sell their 
goods. It is significant that all the goods sold in these 
shops are imported. Not a single item produced in Hureidah 
or in other parts of the Hajramaut is sold in the shops. 
Thus apart from providing an income for the owners, the 
shops are not even an indirect source of income to the rest
of the people in gureidah. Yet they exist because people buy 
from them. What sort of things does the average household 
buy from these shops? From a random sample of eight people's 
shopping lists for a whole month, the following are the main 
items bought*
A* Food Other Items
1* Tea, sugar, tinned milk 1* Cigarettes and tobacco
2* Cooking oil, ghee 2. Kerosene
3* Tinned tomatoes and fish: 3* Cash
curry ingredients
4. Rice, wheat 
5o Dried fish 
6. Sweets
The lists were taken at random from a shopkeeper's 
book. These things were bought daily from the shop by the 
household mainly on credit. Payment was intermittent and 
depended on the availability of work for the household heads 
involved* The shopkeepers were unanimous that the above 
items are those they sell most frequently. Other items are 
sold only rarely. If we compare this list with another one 
made by different customers of the same shops we will find 
a close similarity. The second list was drawn up by three 
heads of households. I asked each separately to write down 
the essential things he boiight for one month for his house­
hold. The lists of the three men had the same items but 
varied in the quantity of each because the size of the three 
households was different. There was one exception however 
and this was the item of meat. Two did not include it in 
their list because they thought it too expensive. The third
person bought it twice a month* However they were all
agreed that the rest of the items were essential and a 
Tminimum requirement1 for living* The list is as follows
3* Tinned tomatoes and fish: 
curry ingredients including 
onions and salt*
4. Rice and millet
5. Dried fish, meat
6* Dates
7* Rood for the animals 
(camels or donkeys)
The similarity between the two lists is very close,
but there are slight differences. Firstly, millet, dates and 
the food for animals would not usually be bought, because 
each household gets these from its farms. This happened to 
be at the height of a drought in which there had been no 
flood for three successive years* Thus most of the stocks 
of agricultural produce, millet, dates and millet stalks, 
had run out and people had to buy these from the shops. 
Secondly, in this list we see an addition of such items as 
matches, coal and soap which do not appear in the other list. 
This can be explained by the item Tcash! in the first list* 
Cash is borrowed from shopkeepers and may be used to buy 
these particular items from other shops if that shop does
1. Meat is scarce in IJurei^ Lah* If one wants meat one tries 
to find another person or persons to share the cost of 
slaughtering an animal* A pound of meat by this method 
would cost about 6 sh* To slaughter a whole goat or sheep 
costs between 40 sh. and 100 sh.
A* Rood B * Other Items
1. Tea, sugar 
2* Cooking oil
1* Kerosene, charcoal 
2. Soap
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not sell them* The "borrowing of cash (50 cents to 5 shillings) 
is significant* It means that the households had no cash at 
all and had to borrow it in order to buy things from other 
shops* In fact 1borrowing* is a great problem about which 
the shopkeepers continually complain* People take things 
from the shop, but some do not pay back simply because they 
have no money* When I asked the shopkeepers why they gave 
goods to the people on credit terms, they gave two reasons:
(i) People do not normally have a regular source of
cash, but pay back the money when they get some cash*
(ii) Some people would starve if they did not ’lend1 them 
the basic things they required*
I should also add perhaps that if one shopkeeper does not
lend the money, another one will, and since these shop-
keepers are competing with one another they cannot afford to
turn down potential customers* One shop in fact had to close
down when it was no longer able to meet the demands of its
customers for loans* Nevertheless the implication of all
this is that many households have a constant acute shortage
of cash, and this will become clear when we consider the
total amount spent on the month’s shopping*
I do not claim that the lists given above are 
exhaustive of what all the people of ljureidah buy* I know as 
a fact that at least four of the wealthy people of u^reidlah 
import their food in bulk, directly from the big towns and 
have a very wide range of items in their diet* Such families
rarely eat millet and dates as a main meal but try to buy 
the latest in packed and tinned foods* However the lists do 
represent the type of items bought regularly by most of the 
households* There are two important things to note from the 
lists:
(1) All the items are bought from the shops and therefore 
require money or the loan of money*
(ii) There are many items in the shops which are occassion- 
ally bought by the people which are not included in 
the lists - medicines, transistor batteries, clothes, 
toys, lamps, cooking utensils, tinned fruit, etc*
What is left out of the list is important in that it
emphasises that the items given in the lists are
considered to be ’necessities1.
As 1 have said, money is necessary for acquiring 
these goods from the shops* This money must come from out­
side gureijah - how much of it is required, I shall discuss 
shortly* If the lists indicate that the goods bought are 
considered to be basic necessities, it also shows graphically 
that the ’needs1 of ordinary people have changed, since all 
the items are imported and many have only been introduced in
the last fifteen years. It shows that the agricultural
produce of gureidah itself is now only one element in the 
family budget based on changing tastes* Hence the little 
that gureijah can produce is inadequate for what the people 
actually eat and use, and what they expect to have, ^ureidah's 
local resources can no longer meet the demands of the people, 
which are now only satisfied by a wider economic system.
How much is required to satisfy the basic demands of the 
sample households?
The eight households, whose shopping lists were 
taken from the shopkeeper’s accounts, had an average of four 
people* The average of the total cost of the shopping for 
one month is 121 sh* 3 cts* This works out to ahout 30 sh* 
per person per month* On the other hand the average of the 
total cost of the goods in the other three lists came to 
218 sh* 12 cts. The households had an average of six people, 
and this works out to an average of 36 sh* 33 cts0 per person. 
Thus any person in a household spends between 30 sh* to 36 
sh* 33 cts* per month on ’basic necessities1* Luxuries, 
such as clothes, meat, medicine, fruit, vegetables or radios, 
could be sacrificed* Since the average number of people per 
household in gurei^ah is 4*4, we can take the monthly figure 
of the first sample to be a better approximation for house­
hold spending* Each household therefore spends approximately 
121 sh. 3 ets* per month on basic necessities. This in my 
view is a conservative estimate*
Migration: An Economic Necessity*
Earlier in this discussion 1 attempted to calculate 
approximately the agricultural production of a household in 
a good harvest year* We found out that each household can 
expect 5? 250 lbs of dates and 360 lbs of millet* For an 
average household of four people, this amount of dates 
could be sufficient for a year’s supply of food and therefore 
a little of it could be sold in order to obtain cash for 
other things. But the amount of millet is certainly
insufficient for a year’s supply and therefore cannot he 
sold without risk* Secondly because of the uncertainties 
of the harvest, many households store their produce against 
drought0 Hence agricultural produce cannot be a source of 
income for buying other requirements. Similarly the 
traditional occupations depend partly on agriculture, and 
partly on indirect income from outside. They cannot be a 
source of income for satisfying newly acquired needs. The 
only other source that could provide a money income is the 
new occupations that have come about as a result of the 
wider economic system. But as we have seen, these provide 
income to only 0*98 P©3? cent of the total population and 
therefore cannot have much economic effect.
Apart from the basic needs which require a regular 
income, there are other requirements which demand more, if 
not regular money* These are for household furniture ranging 
from cooking utensils to mats and lamps. There are also 
marriage expenses, capital for building a house and 
repairing it, and clothes. All these require lump sums of 
money, which the local economic resources cannot provide to 
every household.
If an average household in gureidah requires 
approximately 121 shillings per month to pay for basic 
necessities, as well as an occasional lump sum of money for 
other equally necessary ’needs’, then we must ask from what 
source is this income derived? I have shown that the local
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economic resources cannot be the source for such income, 
nor can the new occupations brought into being by the wider 
economic system. But since the migration of labour is an 
extremely important phenomenon in Ifureic^ ah, we must 
conclude that this is the source whereby the new needs are 
satisfied* The reason for the migration of 5ureidahrs 311611 
then, is economic necessity.
In the next chapter I shall discuss the economic 
role of migration and relate it ultimately to the main 
theme of change and social stratification.
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CHAPTER VI
LABOUR MIGRATION AKD STRATIEICATION
I ended the last chapter saying that migration from 
]Jureidah is an economic necessity* I also mentioned in 
passing that migration is one of the major agents of social 
change. This will become clear when I show the extent of 
migration and discuss its effectse It is therefore necessary 
at this stage to discuss the whole question of the relation 
between migration and the social hierarchy of jgureidah*
It is as well to point out from the outset that 
migration (and emigration) from ]Jureidah, has a long history, 
as was indicated in the last chapter and in Chapter II* 
Furthermore a migration phenomenon, especially if it is as 
extensive and of such long standing as it is in gadramaut, 
is highly complex and its effects permeate widely in the 
matrix of the society* Thus I will of necessity omit many 
interesting aspects of this phenomenon and confine myself 
entirely to those aspects of migration related to the theme 
of change and stratification in IJureidah*
Since labour migration has a long history, I will 
deal with the post-war wave only* The war did make a major 
break in the migration process. Pre-war migration (and 
emigration) was mainly to distant countries such as India, 
the Far East and East Africa* It also took place during the 
traditional period when there was no established State in
the country and no motorised transport. On the other hand, 
the post-war wave is entirely a migration of labour and 
mainly to the neighbouring Arab countries* During the war 
and since, two States have been established in the country 
and motorised as well as air transport introduced<, Post-war 
labour migration is thus a continuing process in the present 
and is affecting the social and economic organisation of 
]Jurei<3.ah and the country as a whole. It therefore makes 
good sense empirically and analytically to treat the post­
war wave as a separate phenomenon and limit my discussion to 
it* In this discussion I propose to show that labour migra­
tion has had a considerable effect on the social hierarchy 
of gureidah, but that the order of the differential control 
of economic resources has not as yet been changed*
In gurei^ah today, 66*7% of the adult male population 
(that is, men over the age of fifteen years) have migrated 
to one or more countries at one time or another of their 
lives. At the time of the survey (1962-63) v 37*4-% of the 
adult males were away working in various countries, while 
29ol% were in gureigLah but have been abroad before* Only 
33.3% of the adult males had never migrated before. Thus 
labour migration is an extensive phenomenon in gureidah.
The main reason for migration, as was pointed out 
in the last chapter, is economic necessity. Economic necess­
ity, as a "pushing" force, is a general cause in all 
situations of extensive labour migration* Similarly attraction
The latest aeana of tranaperting aigrnata* Thio air-atrip 
is only fifteen ail os from Hareidoh*
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to the urban life (from the discomforts and subsistence of 
rural life) is accepted as a "pulling" factor, a general and 
contributory cause of migration® However over and above 
these general "push and pull" forces in migration, there are
in IJadramaut specific factors which have increased the scale
and frequency of labour migration, as well as accommodating 
it as a permanent feature of the society*
There had been a dramatic improvement ip. the trans­
portation system within the last fifteen years® Until the 
late forties, migration necessitated travelling on a camel, 
a donkey or on foot from the interior of IJa^ Lramaut 
coast. From there, migrants sailed on dhows to the Arabian 
G-ulf, 'Aden or East Africa* Both parts of the journeys were 
thus long, arduous and risky. However since the early fifties 
motor transport has been introduced within the country. 
Similarly a route has been opened across the Empty Quarter 
desert to Saudi Arabia, where most of the migrants go®
Secondly, regular cargo steam ships now visit Mukalla
enabling people to travel to 'Aden, the Arabian Gulf or East 
Africa, Thirdly, there are now weekly flights between 
Hadramaut and 'Aden. The last fifteen years have therefore 
dramatically transformed the transportation system between 
IJadramaut and the surrounding countries. This period 
corresponds to the rapid development and expansion of the 
oil economies of Saiidi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf, as well 
as the expansion of the free port of 'Aden* Extensive
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migration in gadramaut is thus related to the changing 
transportation system and the expanding economies ol' the 
surrounding countries.
Secondly, economic insecurity in gureidah is a major 
factor in making people migrate repeatedly. The Mambwe of 
Central Africa migrate because of "economic necessity", hut 
find their economic security in the land of their -villages. 
Their migration has been described as "raiding the cash 
economy for g o o d s B u t  unlike the Mambwe, the people of 
gureidah have to migrate continuously, not only because of 
economic necessity, but also because of the uncertainty of 
the floods even for those people who can depend on the 
scarce land. Furthermore because of the fixed nature of the 
irrigation system, the recent tendency for the population 
to increase has added pressure on food production and 
inevitably increased economic insecurity in gureigah. I 
have no comparative figures to show that the population has
p
m  fact increased. But since increase in the population has 
been a general trend during the last few years in this part 
of the world, I assume this to be the case in gureigah. 
Furthermore many emigrants who have been living in distant
1. W.Watson, "Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy", 1958.
2. Ingrams (1936) estimated the population of gagramaut to 
be 260,000 in 193^-35° The Governments estimate in 1962- 
63 was 310,000 people. Wo proper surveys have been carried 
out and in my opinion both these figures underestimate 
the populationc For one thing they do not take into 
account the large number of migrants.
countries for a long time, have recently been returning to 
gadramaut because of the unsettled political conditions 
abroad. Thus during the field work, three families with 
children born in East Africa returned to gureigah because of 
political insecurity there* Thus besides the limited economic 
resources, climatic conditions and increasing population are 
factors which make for a general economic insecurity.
Thirdly, the Family in gureidah is predominantly 
organised in order to accommodate continuous migration as a 
lasting feature in the society. Within the family, men and 
women play different roles and the division of labour between 
them is rigid. Firstly according to religious beliefs a 
woman must be veiled, and her face is not to be seen by any 
adult male who can legally marry her. Secondly, a woman!s 
role is strictly limited to housework, the care of children 
and some minor work outside the house - such as weeding the 
farms and picking firewood. She can engage in sewing and 
other 1 housework? to earn money if she has no one to support 
her. Flail time work for payment outside the house is never 
permitted and migration to work is impossible* Thus only male 
members of the family can migrate. Boys are not generally 
allowed to migrate. Given this restriction of migration, and 
the limited role of women, migration necessitates certain 
organisational adjustments in the structure of the family 
which are reflected in the preponderance of particular types 
of family in gureidah.
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A nuclear family, consisting of a man, his wife and 
small children, cannot afford the loss of any of its members 
*by migration^ unless it can depend on a wider group of 
relatives* If the head of the family wants to go to Saudi 
Arabia and work for a year or two, he must have either a 
brother to look after his wife and children, or he must 
arrange for them to live with his wife*s parents,, It is even 
more difficult if the man!s mother is alive and living with 
him* On the other hand, a nuclear family with a grown-up 
son or two, can cope with the loss of the two sons as labour 
migrants *
An extended family, in which there are grown-up and 
married sons, is ideally organised for migration* Either the 
head of the family or the sons could migrate, leaving the 
others behind* If there are two or three grown-up sons they 
may all travel at one time, or at different times. The 
important point Is that one man should remain behind to look 
after the family and carry on with the farming. Another ideal 
'type of family organisation which can easily accommodate 
migration is the patrilineal joint family, in which two 
brothers, their wives and children - grown-up or young - 
live together as one family, often with their property 
undivided. With such a family one of the brothers and some 
of the grown-up sons could migrate.
In other societies it is usually the case that the 
patrilineal joint family is the last stage of the family
cycle, since families normally break up at this point,^ In
theory then, there should he very few such families in
gureidah, especially since the family property is generally
divided as soon as the father, as head of the family, dies,
The families in IJureidah fall roughly into three
stages of a family cycle, hut, as is to he expected, there
is wide variety within the ideal types of the cycle. What is
significant is that there is a preponderance of families
that can accommodate migration as a permanent feature, The
nuclear family, which can only accommodate migration if it
contains adult sons, constitutes 43*7% of the families in 
2I£ureig.ah* The extended family and the patrilineal joint 
family - the most suitable organisational types for 
migration - make up 31*7 cent and 24*6 per cent of the 
total respectively. These two, taken together, make up the 
dominant percentage of family types in gureidah. There are 
two significant points to note here:
(i) 51*5 cent of the extended families have
relatives from outside the family living with them 
on a semi-permanent or permanent basis. Such 
relatives are limited to the range of wifeTs mother, 
daughter and her children, brotherls wife, sister 
and her children. This is an indication of an 
important organisational feature of the family, 
whereby kin can be taken in to live for a consider­
able time, This feature facilitates the migration 
of those heads of nuclear families which have no 
grown-up male members to leave behind. Such heads 
of families can leave their wives and children with 
another family to be looked after while they are 
away.
1. Fortes, M* 1958.
2. Figures are based on the main village and one of the 
Gabadil settlements.
(ii) Many patrilineal joint families in gureidah break 
up as soon as the head dies because of the strong 
pressure to divide the inheritance. Nevertheless 
this type of family constitutes 24.6 per cent of 
the total families. This high percentage can perhaps 
be explained by the fact that this kind of family
is ideally structured to cope with migration. In
fact it can even be argued that because many of its 
male members are most of the time involved in the 
process of migration, the chances of it breaking up 
are minimised.
The advantage that the extended or patrilineal joint 
family has over other types of family in connection with 
migration, is clear* With these types of families, the 
chances are that more than two men will be available in the 
family. Since only one man is required to look after the 
family and the farm, the rest of the manpower is available
for labour migration* One of the principle weaknesses of
only one man migrating is the necessity for him to interrupt 
his work and go home at intervals. Two men on the other hand 
can migrate alternately, and thus keep a continuity in their 
work abroad. This Is sometimes necessary If the labour 
migrant owns a shop abroad. The difference between the two 
groups of migrants Is indicated by these figures,, 16*7 per 
cent of households have the head of the house away, whilst 
40,3 per cent of households have other male members of the 
family away, such as a son or a brother. This generally 
means that nuclear families with no other men in the family 
are forced to send the head of the family, while the other 
two types of family can send other men who are also members 
of the family. In most cases this means that two to three
men are sent from families of these two types. Hence the 
more men there are in a family, the better are the chances 
of maintaining a regular Income from abroad. This need not 
be to the detriment of maintaining the farms at home, as is 
generally the case where there is only one man migrant in 
the family* Thus in general, the predominance of particular 
family types, encourage men to migrate.
It is clear that over and above economic necessity, 
there are other important factors which have contributed to 
the large scale and intensive migration. Migration Is 
intensive because people make frequent journeys between 
gureidah and the employment centres in the surrounding 
countries* Of the heads of households who have migrated at 
one time or another of their lives, 37% have been to two or 
more countries ~  in some cases as many as six* The majority 
of those who go to Saudi Arabia and ’Aden make between 2 to 
3 journeys to the same country. Migration is thus a contin­
uous process in which gureidah is at one end and numerous 
urban centres at the other, with men moving to and fro, 
with a high rate of mobility* This intensity of migration 
has important Implications which will be discussed later.
From gureidah, then,migration has been intensive and 
extensive. But since labour migration is a major agent of 
wider economic changes, it is necessary first to show in 
which area of gureigah’s economy have these changes taken 
place. Only then can we discuss the relation between the 
economic changes and stratification.
General Changes in gureidah's Economy.
1. The Significance of Remittances.
Migrants leave gureidah in order to find work, earn 
money and send it hack home* There are a few people who go 
on pilgrimage to Mecca and also there are some who visit 
rich people asking for charity. Apart from the pilgrims, 
the rest have the same ultimate aim - to acquire money. This 
money is sent hack to gureidah as remittances of two types - 
as cash or as kind. The cash is remitted in two ways; either 
by regular or occasional Instalments of sums of money through 
the Post Office or the local gadrami bank, or, every time the 
migrant returns to gureidah he takes with him the bulk of 
the money he has earned* Goods are also sent in two ways, 
either by each migrant sending home bulk food and other 
piece goods occasionally, when a friend Is returning home, 
or by ordering a local shop in gureidah to supply his family 
with specific amounts of food. Alternatively, when a migrant 
returns home he brings with him food and piece goods to 
increase the comforts of his housea The range of both foods 
and piece goods is limited to particular items which satisfy 
particular needs0 Food is limited to rice, ghee, some tinned 
foods and dried fish. The piece goods are mostly personal 
clothes, pressure lamps, transistor radios, rugs, mattresses, 
cooking utensils etc. All these items can be bought locally 
and those who do not travel buy them from local shops. 
However, the migrants bring these items because It is cheaper
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than buying them locally* Most people consider these to be 
essential items for an average household*
It is very difficult to calculate the extent of 
remittances coming into §urei§.ah, partly because the people 
do not like to talk about their incomes, and partly because 
the remittances are not sent regularly* However, we can get 
an idea of their extent if we know the percentage of house­
holds receiving remittances* At the time of the survey,
1 —1962-63, there were 49#3 per cent of gureidah*s households
receiving remittances from migrants abroad. Since migration
involves 66*7 cent of the adult male population, and
55*4 per cent of the heads of households have been migrants
at one time or another of their lives, the figures on
remittance-receivers do not reflect the true extent of the
flow of money into gureidah. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, at the time of the survey, some migrants were in
gureidah, resting before making another journey. Hence some
households were not receiving any remittances at the time*
Secondly, some migrants do not send anything while they are
away, but bring all the money, food and piece goods with
them when they return. Such households also technically do
not receive remittances whilst the migrant is away and are
therefore not represented in the figures. However, it is
safe to assume that not only all households with migrants
receive an income, regular or irregular from outside, but
1* Figures are based on the main village and one G-aba'il 
settlement.
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that every migrant is a source of such income. Hence the 
flow of money from migrant sources is quite extensive.
II• Expenditure Pattern:
Let us now examine the pattern of expenditure of 
this extensive outside source of income. This can he 
illustrated hy a few case studies,
Case I,
Place: Hurei&ah
Time: 194-9-6:?«
Mahmud, a Gahalil tribesman, has four grown-up sons, 
two of^whom were horn in gureigah, In 194-9? Mahmud returned 
to gureigah from Indonesia, after twenty years* stay, with 
his two sons, hut with no money, to join his other two sons 
in gureidah. Between then and 1962, three of his sons (Said, 
Ali and !Uthman) migrated a number of times from gureigah 
to a number of countries0 In 1962 Said and Ali had just 
returned from Saudi Arabia, while 1 Uthman was in Kuwait, 
Mahmud,being an^old man by now, approaching eighty, kept the 
fourth son (!Abud) with him in gureidah all the time. Said 
and Ali brought with them 17,000 shillings, most of which 
was earned by Said, the^more skilled and educated of the 
two. They stayed in gureidah for six months.
During the six months, the three brothers in 
gureidah got married, and although the marriage ceremonies 
were planned to take place at the same time in order to cut 
down expenses, it did not work out that way. Altogether the 
marriage cost 4-,000 shs. in bridewealth and ceremonies.
The marriages took place in the first two months after the 
arrival of Said and Ali from Saudi Arabia, The rest of the 
time was spent preparing and making arrangements for 
building a new house near the existing one. This involved 
buying, cutting, and transporting some trees to the site of 
the house, It also entailed buying and transporting sand to 
the site for making the mud bricks„ This cost 6,000 shs. 
Meanwhile the whole family was spending at the rate of 770 
shs, per month for food and feeding the animals. Since there 
had been no harvest, due to drought, in the previous two 
years, most of their food had to be bought from the shops, 
Purthermore the drought had killed seven of their date palms 
valued at 1,500 shs. Thus, by the end of the six months, 
their money was running out, and the preparations for
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■building the house had to stop* Ali left for Kuwait to join 
1Uthman? whilst Said was delayed for two months because of 
his wife*s pregnancy.
_When Said left gureidah, the first floods arrived, 
and A^bud, who was left behind, began to prepare the fields. 
The house project would be continued later, when enough 
money had been earned by the migrant sons a
Case II
Place: gureidah
Time: 1954—65.
Karim, an ’Af'fas, is thirty years old. He went to 
Zanzibar in 1954-, where he worked for three years in a shop, 
and then returned to gureidah in 1957? and got married. He 
lived in one part of a large house, which was divided 
between a number of relatives. He occupied three romms, 
which he owned, and he tried unsuccessfully to buy another 
part of the house so_that he could own a whole floor®
After staying in gureijah for nearly nine months, he went 
to Saudi Arabia to work. Por three years he tried his hand 
at different occupations, ranging from a houseboyls job to 
shopkeeping. In 1961 he returned to gureidah.
Within three months of his return, he opened up a 
small shop. He also began to make preparations for building 
a new house. After some difficulty, he found a plot near the 
graveyard. Between 1961 and 1962 he built the new house 
which cost him 15?000 Shs. and at the same time managed his 
shop. He also bought a few palm trees. At the end of 1962 
however, his wife died® Soon afterwards his shop had to be 
sold, partly because he was making a loss and partly 
becatise he wanted the cash to finish the housea Pive months 
after his wife*s death, he married a divorced woman, held 
a very small and cheap ceremony, and then moved into his 
completed new house.
After the marriage, he began to make preparations 
for another journey, this^time to Kuwait. Then suddenly 
the floods arrived in gureidah and Karim postponed his plans 
and started cultivating his holding and preparing his palms. 
He was glad of the floods, because when he migrates to 
Kuwait after the harvest, he can leave food with his family, 
which ih cheaper than buying it all the time. The family 
now consists of his wife, his mother and his maternal 
grandmother*
Case III
Place: HureidahHMIm M mAmmi* >■%*■„•■• 1W I 111.
Time: 1950-64-
_ *Awadh, a member of the Sir than section of the 
Masakln, is fifty years old. He has four daughters, two of 
whom are grown-up, being seventeen and twenty years old 
respectively* He also has two sons of five and twelve years® 
Altogether, with his wife, there are eight people in the 
family. !Awadh owns a number of farm plots and palm trees.
Between 1950 and I960, *Awadh made three journeys 
to Saudi Arabia. Por his first journey in 1950, he sold 
three palms in order to have cash for his fare and to leave 
some money with his wife. His brother, who lives next door, 
looked after the family while he was away.
On the first journey 1 Awadh_worked for two years as 
a clerk. In 1952 he returned to gureidah, but two years 
later he made another journey to Saudi Arabia. This time also 
he worked for two years, also as a clerk. Between 1956 and 
1957 he was in gureidah, and one of his daughters got 
married. On his third journey he spent three years, 1957-60. 
On his return, the husband of his daughter died and the 
widow returned to her fatherfs house. In 1961, the second 
daughter got married, and !Awadh spent about 2,000 Shs. on 
the marriage ceremony. But his daughter refused to have 
sexual intercourse with her husband, and was divorced. *Awadh 
was forced to pay back the bridewealth - 1,000 Shs. He paid 
500 Shs. and is now in debt to the former husband of his 
divorced daughter.
TAwadh occasionally works for the Local Council as 
a clerk, and gets paid on an_informal basis* He Is an 
informal leader of the_girthan section, and would not do 
any manual work in gureigah. In 1962 'Awadh began to borrow 
money and later pawned two of his palms and some silver 
jewellery of his wife. In 1965 he began to talk of making 
a fourth journey to Saudi Arabia, but these pland were 
Interrupted by the arrival of the floods, which tied him 
down at least until the harvest was over.
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Cass IV
Place: Hureidah
Time: 1962-4
Abubakar, an hVfc-fas, is the most important political 
figure in gureidah. He is the President of the Local Council 
and is considered to he the wealthiest person in the town*
He is fifty years old, and his household contains fifteen 
peoplea Two of his eldest sons are married and have children, 
hut they are still living in his house and under his 
authority* One of them looks after his farm and the other 
one is a teacher and acts as his secretary*
Abubakar is the head of a religious Order with 
adherents in Pakistan, India and Burma* He has visited 
these places every two or three years, ever since he became 
the Head of the Order in 1929* Early in 1962 he made one of 
these journeys to the Par East, and in 1963 he visited TAden, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Ethiopia calling on various wealthy 
friends *
His main source of income is from these journeys.
He has many important friends in the Central G-overnment1 s 
hierarchy, and when they visit gureidah he entertains them 
lavishly* While in IJurei^ Lah, Abubakar devotes all his time 
to the Local Council, dealing with local problems. As a 
result, the council revolves around him, and his power is 
increased because of his ability to manipulate his powerful 
friends in the Central Government* Abubakar's house is one 
the finest in Hureidah, with a special guest house attached 
to it. He lives lavishly, almost entirely on imported foods. 
He is also famous for his selective hospitality, and all 
important visitors stay at his guest house. He also finances 
a number of important religious ceremonies which were 
initiated by his father - the founder of the Order.
These four case histories suggest many points which 
could be followed up and discussed* Here however, we are 
only concerned with two aspects of the cases* Pirstly, that 
the process of migration involves a series of journeys which 
are necessitated by constant economic need as well as by 
occasional heavy expenditure. Secondly, the cases show a 
general pattern of expend!time which has important
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implications for the economic organisation* The economic 
necessity for migration has already "been discussed, "but 
what needs emphasising here is that the occasional heavy 
expenditure such as is required for marriage, building 
houses, or buying property, seems to be just as important 
and 'necessary1, requiring an outside source of income, as 
the day-to-day expenses of food* In the previous chapter I 
considered these irregular large expenses as luxuries, in 
order to emphasise the importance and necessity of everyday 
needs* But as the cases show, this is only a half-truth, and 
we must consider them as part of the 'necessities' of an 
average household, and an important reason for migration.
The case histories also illustrate clearly the 
basic pattern of expenditure. The money that a migrant earns 
from outside the country is generally spent on one on more 
of the following items: (i) Pood, (ii) Marriage, (iii) 
Property, (iv) Setting up a shop. The following figures 
indicate the proportion of household heads spending income 
from migration in various ways*
Ho. of 
Households 
receiving 
remittances.
Percentage 
of house­
hold heads 
spending 
mainly on 
marriage
On
property
On
Shops
Other
Expenditure
154- 34.5% 27.7%
_ A
10*7% 27%
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These figures need come explanation. All households 
spend their money primarily on day-to-day food, hut this 
table shows only expenditure other than on food. Column 2 
includes people who spent their income mainly on marriage, 
apart from food. Column 3 is made up of people who spent 
their money largely on buying property (building a house or 
buying farms and palms). Some of the people in this column 
may have spent part of their money on marriage but they are 
not included in the first column. Similarly, column four is 
made up of people who have set up shops in gureidah. For 
instance, Karim of Case II got married twice, and bought 
property, but he is excluded from these two columns because 
he set up a shop. The figures of columns 2 and 3 io not 
therefore reflect the actual percentage of people who have 
spent their income on marriage and on property* Nevertheless, 
they give an indication of the pattern of expenditure, over 
and above the basic necessities of food.
Marriage expenses can be divided into two parts - 
the bridewealth, and the expenses of the presents, the 
ceremonies and the feasts* The bridewealth is paid entirely 
by the husband or his father - no other kinsman contributes 
to it. There is a difference between the amount of bride­
wealth necessary for a virgin girl, and that for a divorced 
woman. Each group in the hierarchy has a fixed rate of 
bridewealth for in-group marriage (see Chapter 17). ’Attas 
bridewealth is the cheapest, whilst that of the Masakln Is
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the most expensive. This has an important hearing on the 
amount of cash appropriated for marriage by the different 
groups.
But the most expensive part of the marriage .is the 
ceremonies, presents and feasts* The family of each prospec­
tive spouse makes its own ceremonies and feasts. These are 
most lavish for the first marriage of hoth the spouses and 
can cost each family anything from 1,000 to 4,000 Shs. The 
most important items in this part of the marriage are 
clothes, jewellery and presents for the "bride, which are 
provided hy hoth parents of the prospective spouses; 
elementary furniture such as mattresses, cooking utensils 
and a linen chest; and the feasts and ceremonies each family 
has to make. The groomfs family however receives some help 
in these expenses from the people invited to the ceremonies. 
Every household head who is invited is obliged to contrihute 
some money at a particular ceremony; this varies from 1 Sh. 
to 20 Sh. The collective contribution can amount to as much 
as twenty-five per cent of the cost of ceremonies and feasts 
Some people make careful calculations in their invitations 
so that the collective contribution can pay as much of the 
expenses as possible. However, the groom is obliged to make 
an equal contribution to the marriage expenses of each 
family which has contributed to his marriage, So in the long 
run this cancels out. This high cost of ceremonies and bride 
wealth applies to first marriages, especially that of the
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bride* Second marriages have small ceremonies and feasts, 
generally costing between 300 and 500 Shs, In general 
marriages are an important way of spending a large part of 
the cash income from labour migration. In many cases a 
considerable amount of saving is necessary.
The buying of property is another way in which a 
large part of the cash income is used. This consists in 
repairing or extending an old house, building a new one, 
buying a farm plot or palm tree, or buying domestic animals. 
Domestic animals are the least important, whilst housing 
and farms are the most important. The rA££as have the largest 
houses in gureidah, most of them having been built in the 
pre-war hey-days, with income from the Far East. A few of 
them are occupied by as many as five nuclear families, but 
most of them are under-occupied by only one or two such 
families. The houses of the other strata are generally very 
small, and those of the girthan are very old, needing 
constant repairing and expansion to accommodate large 
families. The 1A££as as a group also occupy the largest 
residential area in gureidah in relation to their numbers, 
and many own empty spare sites in which they can expand.
The Mashayikh are tightly packed on a small ridge with only 
a small empty area nearby, whose ownership is in dispute.
The G-aba*il have their own settlement areas and finding 
building sites is not a problem, except for those who live 
in the main village. The Mas akin generally have no empty
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sites, especially the girthan whose houses are packed in the 
highest and oldest part of the town, with no room for new 
"building# Thus, apart from the !A£Jas and the Gaba'il, the 
rest of the groups in ]Jureidah need a considerable part of 
their cash to repair and expand their small and old houses 
to accommodate the growing size of family# To build a new 
house, an empty site is required, which is expensive and 
difficult to find. A plot for one house can cost anything 
from 500 to 1,500 Shs. In general then the problem of 
housing constitutes a major item of expenditure for the 
Basahl and the Masakln, and a slightly lesser one for the 
'AJrfas and Gaba!il. The buying of farms and palm trees is 
another expensive item. The price of palm trees and farms 
varies considerably. Palm trees can cost from 100 to 800 Shs. 
a tree, and farms can cost from 10 to 100 Shs. per majylrah* 
Nevertheless the buying of palms and farms constitutes a 
major item of expenditure*
The setting up of shops is primarily aimed at 
providing a regular cash income to cover a man's expenses# 
Many shopkeepers find it difficult to make profits and some 
have closed down (see Case II). This is due partly to the 
problem of debt which I described in the last section and 
also because the shops are highly dependent on the flow of 
income from migrants. But the basic aim of the shopkeeper 
is not so much to make quick profits as to provide a regular 
occupation and enough income to cover his normal expenses.
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The shops vary in size, the largest having a stock worth 
about 20,000 Shs■ with daily sales varying from 10 Shs. to 
a rare 100 Shs. The smaller shops have a stock worth from 
1,000 to 5?000 Shs., mostly in food. They have daily sales 
of 5 to 20 Shs. Shops are therefore a form of investment 
which provides a regular occupation and a meagre income for 
their owners and thereby avoids the necessity for migration.
The Local and the Wider Economy.
If we take an average household and calculate the 
total amount of cash required in a year for the basic 
necessities of food, and then add to it the cost of occas­
ional expenditure such as on marriage ceremonies or property, 
we would find that a regular cash income is necessary over 
a long period of time. Income from migration not only 
provides for the basic necessities but is also a source of 
capital for investment. Extended and patrilineal joint 
families must expand their living accommodation if they are 
to stop the break-up of a family (e.g. Case I), and such 
necessities involve a large sum of money. However there are 
a few people, like Abubakar of Case IV, the Mansabs and a 
few others, who spend most of their regular income on 
entertaining officials and important guests who come to 
Hureidah. They do this partly to maintain their status, and 
partly as a political instrument, trying to influence the 
men of power in the Central Government who visit gureidah.
The handful of individuals who do this are wealthy in the 
first place and receive regular income from overseas on a 
charity basis (see Case IV).
But the most Important aspect of the inflow of cash 
income into gureigah is its effect on the economic organisa­
tion. Eirst of all, a large part of the purchasing power it 
creates is spent on satisfying the newly acquired tastes in 
food. A new sector of the economy - the eleven shops - has 
thus arisen to satisfy this new demand and has become a 
necessary part of the economic organisation of gureidah. The 
shops are very closely related to and dependent on the 
purchasing power created by remittances* In December 1962, 
when the route to and from Saudi Arabia was blocked due to 
political events of the time, the Saudi Arabian mail which 
brought remittances to gureidah stopped coming for three 
months* All the shops experienced a sharp fall in their 
sales and at least one shop closed down (see Case II)* 
However the shops are now an integral part of the economy, 
cashing money orders and cheques and supplying food to 
households on order from migrants who are away working* The 
shops cannot survive without the purchasing power of the 
remittances. But since gureidah*s shops import almost every­
thing from overseas via *Aden and Mukalla, they are also 
part of the wider economic system* In 1962, the price of 
sugar in gureigah suddenly rose by 200 per cent, and within 
two days the BBC reported a world-wide rise in the price of 
sugar•
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/mother and equally important effect of the increase 
in internal purchasing power as a result of migration is 
that the traditional occupations have all "been stimulated*
The building of houses sets in motion a number of activities 
- the making of lime and mud bricks and the transporting of 
stones; and occupies a number of persons - manual labourers, 
carpenters and builders* Marriage ceremonies keep the silver­
smith busy making silver jewellery* Ironsmiths also have 
work repairing pressure lamps and cooking utensils, and 
making agricultural tools* Agricultural labourers get 
employment even during the drought, when wealthy people hire 
them to irrigate young palm trees with well water lest they 
die of drought. The demand for property increases the 
already high value of farms and building sites. The inflow 
of remittances increases the circulation of money and 
thereby stimulates non-agricultural activities in IJurei^ Lah, 
and ultimately provides income to those men who do not 
migrate. The phenomenon of migration keeps ]Jureig.ah*s 
economy working, as well as integrating it with a wider 
economic system* It is the most important factor in the con­
text of present day conditions in gureidah.
Effects of Migration on Stratification*
If then we want to show the effect of migration on 
stratification, we must first of all find out whether the 
traditional differential control of wealth has been changed
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or not* I have so far shown that labour migration from 
gureidah is extensive and intensive and that its effects on 
the general economy have been considerable0 But because of 
the scarcity of resources in gureigah (and in the country as 
a whole) 5 its economy is extremely limited and is now highly 
dependent on the inflow of remittances0 Thus the changes 
that have taken place have not introduced new economic 
avenues (apart from the shops) through which groups can move 
up and down the economic hierarchy* This is to say that the 
total wealth of any group is still dependent ultimately on 
income from abroad* In this sense, the changes within the 
local economic organisation of gureigah have not been 
fundamental. Thus if we want to find out the effects of 
migration on the distribution of wealth within g/urei^ Lah, 
then we must focus our attention not on the local economic 
activities, but on the income from outside* We must examine 
more closely the distribution of migrants between the groups 
and their earning capacity abroad.
There is in fact a definite correlation between the 
total number of migrants and their position in the social 
hierarchy* This is shown in the following table.
Table A.
The table shows that the percentage of migrants who were 
away at the time of the survey, Is highest at the top of 
the hierarchy and lowest at the bottom. A broadly similar 
trend is shown by the column of total migrants. In general
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one can say that migration has been heaviest amongst the 
higher groups and lightest amongst the lower groups* There 
is thus a definite correlation between the number of 
migrants and their position in the stratification system*
It is also clear from the table that there is a 
common factor between the present post-war wave and the pre­
war migration* In spite of the changed conditions, migration 
in both periods has as its main feature the close relation 
between the number of migrants and their position in the 
stratification. Without going into detail we can point to a 
number of factors that have contributed to maintain this 
important feature of labour migration. Firstly, although the 
war made a big break in the process of migration and brought 
about new conditions, there has been no major change in the 
economic organisation to correct the traditional imbalance 
in the number: of migrants from each group. Secondly, the 
educational advantage of the 'AJJas and Basahl has, in 
general, made them get the higher paid jobs abroad than the 
other groups. This has given them an added incentive to 
migrate. Thirdly the inflow of money in Hureidah stimulated 
the traditional occupations in the economy. Since these are 
done mainly by the Mas akin, this development has tended to 
discourage them from migrating because of the new possibili­
ties of earning money at home however little. Fourthly 
although everyone migrates because of economic necessity, 
the process of migrating from ]Jureid.ah to, let us say, Saudi
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Arabia requires high capital (relatively). This capital is 
required for (a) fares, since distances are great and 
travelling expensive; (b) to leave enough food at home, 
especially if floods for that year have failed. Thus the 
wealth acquired by and Basahl from the pre-war migra­
tion is a major factor in enabling them to migrate in larger 
numbers after the war. The reverse applies to the Masakln 
i.e. their poverty ill equipped them to meet the necessary 
expenses to migrate after the war. This has thus produced 
the paradoxical result in which higher number of migrants is 
dependent on fwealth1 rather than poverty* Finally it is 
suggested that the period in which the process of post-war 
migration has been going on, is too short for its effects 
to correct the difference in the ratio of total migrants 
from each group, as well as their differential control of 
wealth* I will discuss this point presently.
To show that the total number of migrants from each 
group is largely dependent on its position in the social 
hierarchy, is to imply that not only are there economic 
differences between the groups, but that these differences 
are correlated with the stratification system. This has been 
shown to be the case in the past. But since at present 
income from abroad is still the decisive factor in the 
distribution of wealth between groups, the main feature of 
the post-war migration indicates that the traditional 
correlation between the economy and the social hierarchy has
not been altered* Below I show that all the evidence points 
out that this is the case,
It is extremely difficult to calculate the total 
outside income of an individual or a group for any given 
period* However, we can make reasonable deductions about 
the relative income of each strata in 1962-3 from the 
following table*
TABLE B
REMITTANCES AND MIGRANTS 1 OCCUPATIONS ABROAD
Key:
A. Number of Heads of households who have migrated.
B. Households receiving remittances,
C. Households with close relatives away.
D. Charity,
E* Labour and Unskilled Work.
E. Shops.
G. Clerks.
Occupations of Migrants
Stratum A B C Abroad
D E F G
No. % % of/o % % ■ %
1. !AJfas 131 80 58.5 69.3 10.8 26.9 26.9 13.1
(Basahl
2. ( n
20 70 65 65 — 4-5 25 5
(Gaba'il1 16 54.8 58 80.6 - 19.3 32.2 —
3* Masakin 14-6
L__
f—1 *
I—1 32o2 38.3 - 26.9 6.8 1.4-
The table gives us some indication of the different­
ial income of the strata derived from labour migration.
There are a number of points in the table that need
1. Eigures based on one Gaba’il settlement only
explanation. Firstly, columns one and two together show the 
extent of migration within each group. They show that the 
'At'fas have the highest percentage of households whose heads 
have migrated, and the Masakxn the least. The remittance 
column also shows a similar trend. However the figures in 
this column show only households which were receiving 
remittances at the time of the survey. This does not include 
all remittances, since every household containing migrants 
receives remittances at one time or another. Nevertheless 
the proportion of remittances going to each stratum may be 
taken as fairly average. It would have been better to know 
the total amount each stratum receives and this would have 
given the figures their proper significance, but all we can 
do here is to assume that all households receive more or 
less the same amount* However column four gives us some 
information which may lead us to change this assumption.
The occupation of the migrants in the host countries is in 
fact a good basis for deducing broadly the total income of 
each strata. Migrants working as labourers - unskilled and 
semi-skilled occupations - are paid the lowest wages. Clerks 
are paid higher wages, and the setting up of one's own shop 
brings in the highest income, Nearly all migrants are 
engaged in one of these three broad occupations, and the 
percentage of the distribution of the strata in these 
occupations is highly significant. From these three occupa­
tions, it is reasonable to assume broadly that the total
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earning power of the strata is graded in the order given in 
the table. But it is the column of 'charity1 which widens 
the gap between the 'A'Jrjpas and the rest of the strata, 
especially the Mas akin» There are a handful of men who 
travel around to a^gLrami 'colonies' abroad or to wealthy 
people of non-IJadrami origin from whom they obtain large 
sums of money, either for their personal use, or with the 
promise of using it for charity in IIurei$Lah. Only people 
with particular qualities can do this. They need to have a 
conspicuously high status in the society, such as a Mansab, 
or to have a reputation as learned religious leaders who 
could be trusted to use such money for the benefit of the 
poor and to advance the cause of religion. Sometimes a 
person believed to have healing powers, or even a jester, 
who, in effect, lives off rich people, can qualify for this 
way of 'earning' money. In the former case, money is gener­
ally given with the ultimate aim of using it for charity, 
although most of it is used by the person who collects it.
In the latter case it is given to the individuals for their 
own use. The handful of people who 'earn* their income in 
this way are all *A££as conforming to the qualities described 
above. But the most important aspect of the 'charity earning1 
is its income value. Such people return to IJurei^ Lah with 
large sums of money which would take an average migrant a 
number of years to earn. The wealthiest 'A^tas in y/urel<3.ah 
earn their income in this way. Abubakar (see Case IY) made
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one of his trips while I was in the field. He travelled by 
air to the different countries. On his return he told me 
that he was satisfied with his trip and that he had collected 
"a few thousands" (E.A. Shillings), Rumour In §urei£ah put 
the sum as Shs.50,000, but this is certainly an exaggeration. 
One of the Mansabs also left Ijlureig.ah He also
travels by air to the other countries. Since he left in 
1962, he is still visiting in East Africa. On one of his 
previous journeys, he returned to gurei^ah with a new Land 
Rover as a present from the then King Saud. A third 'AJ^as 
keeps flying between 'Aden and gurei^ah. This man is reputed 
as possessing a "jinn" (spirit) and his main work is to 
provide charms for curing all sorts of illnesses* However he 
lives In the house of a very wealthy gadrami in 'Aden and is 
known to have considerable Influence on his friend* The 
'Al^ tan once took a month's holiday to Egypt from 'Aden. He 
also has a Land Rover and in 1962 sold his two year old 
vehicle and bought a new one* Other 'A££as who earn their 
income from "charity" (al-djah) make fewer trips and are 
less wealthy outwardly, but their general income is higher 
than most migrants. 'Charity earning' then is a major source 
of income. On the basis of the figures in the table of people 
occupied in different jobs, it Is reasonable to assume that 
the income of the 'A£tas is the highest and that of the 
Masakin the lowest. Between the Basahl and the Gaba'il, the 
tabel as a whole suggests that there is very little
difference* My impression liowever suggests that the Basahl 
have the edge over the GabaTil* This differential in migra­
tion earnings of the strata is confirmed hy the property 
and wealth of each group* The following table will illustrate 
this *
(TABLE 0
CONTROL OF PROPERTY BY GROUPS : 1962-63
Group Percentage 
of total 
Population
Land owned hy group Houses
Area acre 
per house­
hold
Percentage 
of total 
area
1Attas 31,8% 1.3 32% 34.6%
Basahl 4.2% 1.3 4.9% 3.4%
Gaba'il 29,6% 1.3 31.9% 27.4%
Masakin 35.5% 1.0 28.1% 34.6%
Outsiders 
..... .. .........
3.1%
100%
The table shows clearly that the differential control of 
property coincides with the social hierarchy, and in fact 
confirms the deductions I made from table B* It may be 
argued however that the differences shown by the figures 
between the amount of land owned by each group are too small 
to be really significant* But there are a number of factors 
which are not conveyed in this table, which make the small
1* Individual holdings are dispersed throughout the canal 
system in every case and therefore 1*3 acres of 'A-ffas 
land is not necessarily better than 1*3 acres of Gaba*!! 
land.
differences between the wealth of the strata more significant 
than they appear0 Firstly, there are differences in the 
value of houses which are not shown by the figures. All the 
largest and best houses are owned by the 'AJ^ as. Secondly, 
the *A££as own more valuable empty sites for building in 
gureidah town than any other group. Thirdly, given the 
scarcity of material resources, the narrow margin in the 
control over property betx^ een the groups has considerable 
local significance and actual value, which cannot be con­
veyed by the figures. Fourthly, in the local scheme of 
evaluating the wealth of a group, the level of its cash 
spending on food is just as important as its ownership of 
property* Since it is difficult to assess the amount of cash 
spent or earned by any particular group, we can only rely on 
indirect evidence for this. This evidence is provided by 
Table B together with my impressions based on observation, 
which suggests some differences in the regular expenditure 
of the strata, coinciding with the social hierarchy. We can 
therefore say that the social hierarchy is still based on 
differential control of property by the strata, althoiigh the 
margin of difference is quantitatively narrow.
It Is possible now to state that although labour 
migration (with other general factors in the country) has 
considerably affected the economy of gureigah, it has not on 
the whole altered the traditional differential control of 
wealth. If it had been possible to collect accurate data for
both periods, I would have suggested that the gap in the 
wealth between the groups is not as great as it was in the 
past* There is no statistical evidence for this statement, 
but this is my impression. I have also suggested that the 
main reasons for the negative effect of labour migration on 
the economic basis of stratification are twofold:- (a) the 
close correlation between the economy and the social hier­
archy during the traditional period has necessarily affected 
the number of migrants from each group. Since each migrant 
tends to consolidate his economic position at home, the 
result has been so far to maintain the status quo in the 
position of each group in the control of resources; (b) the 
local economy of gureigah is extremely limited because of 
scarcity of resources* This has been aggravated by the 
absence of what Wilson calls an "uneven development" between 
the towns and the rural areas, because in gagramaut no major 
economic development has taken place at all* As a result, 
the limited changes that have taken place in gureigahls 
economy cannot provide new avenues for any group to increase 
its wealth dramatically at the expense of other groups. As 
a corollary to this, the wealth of any group can only be 
increased substantially by income from outside. This brings 
us back to the first point i^e* the question of the different 
number of migrants from each group. This vicious circle in 
gureigah!s economy is very important because it is an
1* M. Wilson, "The Analysis of Social Change", 1945*
(Cdb
■underlying factor in the opposition to the system of strati­
fication, and to the hVjrfas who are seen as representatives 
of the system0
But labour migration has also produced a positive 
economic effect related to the social hierarchy. During the 
traditional period the Masakln were almost entirely dependent 
on the employment provided hy the higher groups, This was an 
important feature of the stratification system* However the 
post-war wave of migration and the changed conditions in the 
country as a whole, have meant that the Masakln also could 
migrate in an increasing number as time passed* As a result, 
a relatively high number of them do migrate at present. 
Migration has thus opened up an alternative avenue of 
employment, albeit outside the country, The Masakln are thus 
no longer entirely dependent on the local economy which tied 
them to the higher groups* They now have a choice of either 
working in gurei^ Lah or to migrate and seek other work* The 
fact that an important proportion of Mas akin men have no 
choice but to work in §ureidah (at least for some time), 
does not invalidate the point that an even larger proportion 
do make a choice to migrate* This was clearly shown in table 
A,(p»AI6) where the total number of migrants amongst the 
Masakin is 58% of the adult males* Similarly the incorpora­
tion of Hureidah's economy into a wider economic system and 
the general effects of the inflow of remittances, have 
introduced new but limited economic possibilities (e*g.
shopkeeping) in which individual Masakln can participate* 
Table C p* Chdll, shows clearly that the rigid tradition­
al division of economic activities is breaking down* Thus 
it is now possible for an Akhdam to refuse to be a labourer 
or a Subyan to perform ceremonial services, because they are 
no longer absolutely dependent on these occupations* They 
can either be shopkeepers or migrate. However the new 
economic possibilities are so limited that they provide 
alternatives to only a few individuals* Such individuals are 
statistically insignificant and the majority of Masakln (and 
other groups) are still engaged in their traditional economic 
activities (see table C, p. n Ch.III). Because of this 
limitation in gurei^lah1 s economy, the alternative avenue for 
employment provided by migration, is more and not less 
significant for the Masakln* Thus labour migration has 
affected and altered a basic feature in the stratification 
system - namely the absolute economic dependence of the 
Masakln stratum on the two higher strata.
Besides economic effects, labour migration also
brings with it important ideological effects* What Watson
calls the "industrial experience" which migrants go through
when working in the towns, has important repercussion in the
rural villages to which migrants return* Watson observes
that the industrial complex of urban centres, is a great
2 -5school; "to labour is to learn"* Abou-Zeidv describing the
1* W.Watson, "Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy", 1958*
2* Ibid., p.192*
3. luhar Pitt-Rivers, "Mediterranean Countrymen", 1963*
effects of labour migration on an Egyptian Oasis, also 
points; out that migrants go through changes of ideas and 
that this change (in conjunction with general economic 
changes) affects the social structure of the rural "society" 
to which the migrants return* It is therefore generally 
accepted that labour migration is followed by important 
Ideological changes In the villages where migrants come from; 
to concentrate on the economic effects only is to present 
only one side of the picture, albeit an Important side. This 
is particularly important in the context of the Middle-East 
today where the transistor radio is carried even by shepherds 
and mass communication is such an important method of 
ideological indoctrination.
In ^ urei^ Lah, the frequent journeys migrants make 
essentially mean a movement from one type of social organisa­
tion to another. Eor men from gurei^ah must comprehend the 
complex organisation of the urban situation in order to 
operate in It for any length of time* This frequent and 
intense interaction with the complex social organisation of 
the urban situation forces the migrant to accept many 
aspects of the urban framework of social life* In time the 
migrant becomes partially or completely urbanised* This 
necessarily involves an ideological change on his part, 
since the urban situation is organised on different princi­
ples from those of IJurei^ lah’s small scale organisation.
This ideological change generally becomes the basis on which
a migrant would question the social stratification of 
ljureijah on his return® One basic principle which migrants 
have questioned in gurei^ah, is the idea of ascribed economic 
roles,
Working abroad involves the exact antithesis of 
ascribed economic roles which are part of IJurei^ ah's strati­
fication, Men migrate in search of work and they may be 
forced to accept any work offered to them. This is especially 
the case in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait where job reservation 
for the citizens of the two countries is a common practice. 
There are 'AJJas who accept menial work and even undignified 
jobs such as houseboys, while some Masakln become clerks or 
set up little shops. In fact some of the richest men from 
]Ja<Jramaut in Saudi Arabia are Masakln and many gajramis, 
both Sadah and non-Sadah work for them. In Saudi Arabia and 
other countries to which gadramis migrate, they get work on 
the basis of their ability. Migrants achieve their economic 
roles either by pulling strings or by having the right 
qualities. This principle contradicts the social attitudes 
concerning ascribed economic roles in ]Jurei<J.ah. All Its 
migrants, who generally tend to congregate in the same towns, 
are subjected to this principle* An JAttas and a Masakln can 
share a room, with the latter having a better job than the 
former. The difference between achievement and ascription 
becomes very obvious. In this way, the relation between 
gureidah!s migrants of different strata is affected when
they are abroad, and their attitudes towards work changed. 
When they return to ^ureidah, a few 'Affas, Mashayikh and 
Gaba'il now do manual and other work without the stigma of 
being inferior persons, while Masakln individuals can stop 
carrying out their ascriptive occupations such as ceremonial 
services or carpentry, without being accused of trying to 
climb up the ladder of social stratification. The experience 
of migration has thus broken down the equation of inferiority 
in status with ascriptive economic roles. But the important 
point here is that the breakdown of this aspect of u^rei<Jah*s 
value system is also related to the minor economic changes 
taking place in IJureicjLah itself which have forced some 
people of high status to take ’inferior’ jobs. In addition 
the opening up of new alternatives has enabled some Masakln 
to drop their 1 inferior’ jobs. The combination of migration 
experience and the incorporation of §uref£ah into a wider 
economic system, has made it possible for Individuals to move 
up and down the economic ladder. However this structural 
possibility of economic mobility has only affected a few 
individuals and therefore is statistically insignificant in 
relation to the ultimate control of resources by the differ­
ent strata.
The second and perhaps more important effect Is the 
Involvement of the migrants with Nationalism and the
1. I use this term here as it is ordinarily used —  namely 
the movements and ideology of political parties and trade 
unions in their struggle to achieve independence or 
further political and economic changes for the countries 
in which they operate.
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inevitable increase in their political consciousness*
Migrants working in urban centres are drawn into the web of
political parties and trade unions, whether these are open
or secret. They are attracted by the activist ideology of
these organisations which always demands changes, either in
the working conditions of the workers or wider changes in
1the whole society, Epstein has shown how workers in a 
Northern Rhodesian copperbelt town (most of whom are migrants 
from the rural areas) participate in the activities of the
p
Trade Union and Political Parties of the area, Watson too 
shows the same process taking place in the rural areas. The 
Mambwe and their chief are shown to be involved in the wider 
political issue of Gentral African Pederation# The involve­
ment of the Mambwe in this political issue was described as 
"Pederation fever". This was correlated with the direct rise 
in the political consciousness of the Mambwe (because of 
their industrial experience) and ultimately to the long-term 
effects of the migration phenomenon. In IJa^ ramaut the condi­
tions are different from those in Central Africa, But the 
immediate effect of the participation of the migrants in 
urban life, is the same, - namely their increased political 
awareness. Secondly, although the migrants in both areas 
live in the turbulent political atmosphere of Nationalism, 
there are fundamental differences in the main features and
1, A.L,Epstein, "Politics in an Urban African Community",
1958.
2, W,Watson, Ibid.
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objectives of the two Nationalism* In Central Africa, 
Nationalism was marked by the Black-White colour issue and 
the achievement of political independence* In the Middle- 
East, Arab Nationalism is dominated by the issue of indepen­
dence only in !Aden and the Federation, In Saudi Arabia,
The Arabian Gulf and Yemen, Nationalism is mainly concerned 
with replacing "reactionary” Arab Governments by "progressive" 
ones, as a means of charging the "traditional societies" and 
ultimately achieving Arab unity in the whole area* The 
emphasis is thus mainly on changing the existing social order 
which is being maintained by certain groups within the 
society itself. The traditional and reactionary1 society of 
gadramaut in general and that of gureigah in particular is 
of course dominated by the stratification system* This is 
the antithesis of a ’progressive1 society propounded by 
Nationalism and whose basis will be "equality"* Thus the 
involvement of gureigah's migrants in the wider ideology of 
Nationalism, is expressed in the questioning of the social 
hierarchy in the village* This was dramatised when the 
Yemeni Revolution took place in September 1962 and generated 
what I can only call "Revolution fever"* There are historical 
and specifically local factors which explain why the ideo­
logical changes in gureidah are directed specifically to its 
system of stratification* This point, and how the neighbour­
ing Yemeni Revolution came to symbolise the politico- 
ideological conflicts within gureigah will be discussed in
a later chapter. The main points I want to make here however 
are threefolds- (a) that labour migration increases the 
political consciousness of the migrants, and (b) that this 
involves the adoption of new concepts and ideas on the 
nature and working of society. The main vehicle of such 
ideas is Nationalism or what I call the 'new ideology of 
social change'; (c) that as a resujt of (a) and (b) gureigah's 
migrants have begun to question or justify the system of 
stratification as it operates in their village.
To sum up then, labour migration has been an import­
ant agent of both economic and ideological changes in 
gureigah* Firstly it seems that the basic feature of the 
pre-war migration has continued into the post-war wave, in 
spite of the major change in destination and the introduction 
of favourable conditions for migration. That this is the 
case should not be surprising if we consider the factors 
involved in the actual process of migration as well as the 
distribution of wealth. This latter factor more than any­
thing else, has made income from the outside unequal between 
the groups and ultimately, this has tended to maintain the 
traditional differential control of wealth* Secondly, 
migration has also brought about some general economic 
changes within gureigah. However, because of the nature of 
the natural resources and the economic organisation based on 
it, the changes have not brought in new economic avenues 
which could alter the wealth of any group substantially.
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This is very important, because it enhances the significance 
of income from outside and especially its distribution 
between the groups0 Finally, migration has made ^ureidah*s 
men participate in the industrial and commercial complexes 
of the neighbouring countries. It also involved them, 
passively or actively, in the turbulent politics of the 
wider field. There are of course other factors related to 
this problem, but the point here is that the process of 
migration has "schooled" u^^ e^ S-ah11 s migrants. As a result, 
they have undergone an important ideological change which 
has a direct bearing to the problem of stratification in 
IJureicjLah. in the next two chapters, I will describe the 
internal political organisation of show that
its conflicts tend to focus on the system of stratification 
because of the influence of the ideology of social change 
emanating from the wider society.
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CHAPTER VII 
POLITICS AM) STRATIFICATION 
Part I
Internal Politics : The Conflict of Change 
Until the intervention of Britain in gagramaut (1937- 
4-0), the main village of gureigah was a gawtah —  a religious 
enclave ruled hy the 'Atjgs (see Ch*l). The creation of the 
Qu'aiti State hy Britain and the imposition of its rule over 
the area (from 194-0 onwards), ignored the traditional 
organisation and brought in a new political structure* The 
Qu’aiti State hacked hy force became the sole legal authority 
in gureidah*
However the different groups in gureidah —  especially 
those which were organised and acted corporately in the past 
-—  continued to act as separate units and relations between 
them are still an important factor. Thus outside the formal 
political structure, imposed hy the Qu'aiti State, there is 
what I will call an informal political structure of the 
groups that are organised and co-operate within the framework 
of traditional principlesc Since the political changes mean 
essentially that all political power is now vested with the 
Government, the interaction between It and the informal 
political structure Is thus an important part of gureidah's 
politics* This interaction means that each group will 
struggle to control and influence the formal power structure 
in gureigah, In this struggle for power, the position of any
group in the social hierarchy, its wealth and unity all 
become important factors in making it easier or difficult 
for the group to attain power* Similarly, factors inherent 
in the circumstances which led to the imposition of Govern­
ment rule in gureigah, and the nature of the new political 
structure, both intervene to help or hinder any given group 
in its struggle for power* These latter factors will be 
taken as given* My discussion will centre on the sociological 
factors related to the stratification system and which have 
a bearing on the power struggle of the groups.
The formal political structure was imposed with a 
number of basic assumptionse Firstly that political power 
will be vested in the institutions and officials of the 
Government and not rest with any given group In gureigah. 
Secondly that all people will have equal legal status as 
citizens of the Qu*raiti State. Thirdly that bureaucratic 
principles will be the basis for the execution of the 
judicial and administrative powers of the Government. How­
ever, the present reality of gureigah’s political structure 
Is that one group controls and Influences almost all the 
decisions emanating from the formal political structure. The 
factors that have led to this contradiction between the 
reality and the ideal of the political system will be 
discussed below, I will suggest that, as a result of this 
contradiction, wider political blocks have formed in gureidah 
and that this development is directly affecting the social
hierarchy. In the second part of this chapter, I discuss 
external factors which have intervened in the situation and 
which are correlated with this significant development.
There I suggest that the development of the wider political 
blocks and the ideological change that has been taking place 
at the same time, are both expressed in a fierce debate on 
the system of stratification in gureigah. Furthermore, the 
'Alawl-Irshadi dispute (see Ch. II), provides a historical 
framework for the debate. Thus the conflicts resulting from 
internal political changes and the intervention of external 
forces, are related to and are affecting the social hier­
archy in gureigah.
The Formal Political Structure.
The formal political structure has two parts; that
of the Central Government and that of the Local Council, The
seat of the Central Government is at the port of Mukalla —
the capital of the Qu'aiti Sultanate. At the apex of the
Central Government is the Sultan (succession is hereditary)
1and under him Is a Wazir —  the head of the Government. At 
this level there are two important Councils. One is the
1. The present Wazir is an 'A^as from the coast. This area 
—  Shihir and Mukalla Province, was under the rule of the 
Qu'aiti Sultan even before the intervention of Britain.
In 1962-63, when I was in the field, the present Wazir was 
then a deputy Wazir being groomed for the present post.
He is a close friend of the 'A^ -fas President of the Local 
Council in gureigah and was the right hand man of the 
Sultan durung the latter!s visit to Hureigah In November 
1962.
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Sultan’s Council, chaired hy the Wazir, which deals with 
day-to-day matters on behalf of the Sultan. Its members —  
four people -—  were appointed by the last Sultan before his 
death* The second body is the Council of State which has 
fourteen members. This is also chaired by the Wazir and Its 
members are drawn mostly from the heads of the various 
Government departments. Ihe British Resident Advisor in 
Mukalla and all the members of the Sultan’s Council, are also 
members of the Council of State. All important decisions and 
legislations are made by this Council*
Ihe Wazir is also the head of the executive branch 
of the administration, consisting of a number of departments 
such as education, treasury, customs, immigration, works and 
building, provincial administration, Beduin affairs etc. 
Another branch - made up of the regular Qu'aiti Army, and 
the police (armed and unarmed), also come under his ultimate 
authority*
The country is divided into five provinces, each 
province having two or three districts. Each province has a 
nafib - a governor, and each district has a ga’im - a 
District Administrative Officer. The governor is responsible 
for the security and administration of the whole province.
He is also a judge of the Criminal Court of the Province. The 
Police and Security Forces also come under his authority.
The Distrcit Administrative Officer (D.A.O.) has the same 
responsibilities over the District« In each province there
are also Shari’a courts dealing with civil cases, one at 
provincial level and others for each district. The kadi - 
the judge of the Shari1 a court - is independent of the 
governor, and comes under the responsibility of the Supreme 
Court in Mukalla. The Criminal Courts also come under the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. However close collabora­
tion exists between the £a<J.i, governor, and D.A.O. at 
different levels, especially over the use of the Police.
The Qu'aiti Government is a Protectorate of the 
British Government* The latter has a Resident Agent In 
Mukalla, who is also an advisor (Resident Advisor) to the 
Qu'aiti Government. He has close and almost daily contact 
with the Wazir, and participates in the making of all 
important decisions of the Qu'aiti Government by being a 
member of the Council of State. The Resident Advisor (R.A.) 
as the British representative, is responsible for the 
external affairs of the Qu'aiti State, and its internal 
security. He has control of the IJagLrami Beduin Legion, the 
most powerful and efficient military force in ga<Jramaut, 
whose main function is to maintain internal security. It is 
backed by the Royal Air Force and the British military force 
in 'Aden. According to the various treaties between the 
British Government and the Qu'aiti Sultanate, the R.A. 
advises the Qu'aiti Government on everything except matters 
concerned with "religion and custom". At present the office 
of the R.A. in Mukalla is more powerful than that of the
Wazir and the Sultan* The R*A. can exercise his Influence 
through the Wazir, even on minor administrative problems.
In recognition of this, people sometimes send their petitions 
direct to the R.A. appealing for his intervention on various 
local problems.
The Qu'aiti Government was reorganised in the early 
forties by the first R.A. Harold Ingrams. His intention 
was to enlarge the traditional Qu'aiti Government structure, 
without introducing any "Western elements". The function of 
the Administration was simply to maintain law and order.
There are a few laws made by the Government as a guide to 
the governors and £a£is in their task of settling disputes.
The ka^ Lis make their decisions within the framework of the 
Shari'a —  the Islamic legal system. Since then, the structure 
has been modified to increase its efficiency, but its 
function is still the same.
The Qu'aiti and Kathlri States were historically 
Gaba'il Sultanates, with a hereditary ruling Sultan at the 
top (see Ch. I). The Qii'aiti Sultanate had, in the tradition­
al period, an embryo administrative structure, with an open 
method of recruitment. When Britain intervened in ga^ramaut 
(1937-9), and the Qu'aiti Sultanate was turned into the sole 
legal government (over a large part of ga^ramaut), its 
administrative structure was reinforced and reorganised on 
bureaucratic lines. As a result, its administrators and other 
officials come from all the three strata of gadrami society.
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Apart from the Sultan, who is a Gaba’il, the top officials 
of the Government consist of Sadah, Hashayikh, Gaba’il and 
Masakln, all of whom come from the areas traditionally -under 
the Qu'aiti Sultanate* Thus one of the important features 
of the Government structure, past and present, is this dis­
regard of the social stratification in its recruitment.
The structure of the Qu’aiti Government is highly 
personalised. The internal organisation is such that its 
officers, at different levels of the structure, have wide 
powers, with very little accountability0 The administrators 
in the provinces, for instance, rarely distinguish between 
their administrative and judicial roles. Similarly, the 
procedures of both Shari’a and Criminal courts give the 
judges very wide room for manipulating the rules of procedure, 
and make them potentially highly partial to one side or the 
other. The judges can initiate action, they can accept or 
refuse a witness, and they can cross examine witnesses.
They alone record the evidence, and this is done by hand in 
the form of a summary of the evidence on which the judgement 
is finally based, The attendance of key witnesses can be 
enforced, speeded up, or delayed, at the judge’s discretion. 
Appeals are possible against coiirt decisions, but the 
courts of appeal at whatever level they have the same proced­
ures, and though court decisions may be revised by the 
Supreme Court, this takes a long time. In general then, the 
legal system potentially gives considerable discretion to
judges. Effective checks in the judicial structure, to 
prevent misuse or make its judges accountable for their 
decisions, are very weak.
Administrators have the same wide powers with very 
little accountability. Decisions made by an administrator 
can be changed or repealed by his superior without any con­
sultation. Written notes from administrators are passports 
for bypassing administrative regulations. Difficulties in 
communications make these notes very valuable, and the more 
senior the administrator who writes them, the greater is the 
importance attached to them*
The administrative and judicial sections are very 
small in size but cover a large geographical area, with no 
facilities such as typewriters or telephones for easing 
administrative work and communication except in the capital. 
Nevertheless the administrators and judges of the higher and 
lower ranks know each other well. Personal influence plays 
an important part in such matters as promotion* This means 
that a decision can be swayed this way or that by interested 
parties. Hence the influencing of decisions of the adminis­
trators and judges (i.e. manipulation) is very important in 
the context of local politics such as those of IJureidah.
Those individuals or groups that can influence decisions most 
consistently become, in the local context, politically 
dominant groups„
The formal political structure of 'Amd District of
which gurei^ah is a part, is at present made up of the 
District Criminal Court, the District Shari1a Court, the 
Police Station and the local council* The Administrative 
Officer of the District, besides being the judge of the 
Criminal Court, is also the head of the District and is 
responsible for everything going on in the area. The local 
council of gureidah and those of other villages are super­
vised by him and generally he appoints their members and 
presidents (IJureicLah is an exception in that the two 
presidents of the council since 194-9 have both been appointed 
by the Governor of the Province —  i.e. from a higher level). 
The police come under the District Administrative Officer*
The judge of the Shari1 a Court is directly responsible to 
the Ka^i of the Province, and from him to the head of the 
Shari1 a judges in Mukalla.
I cannot here discuss in detail the role of the 
Central Government at the village level, but from this brief 
description, two important features of the government 
emerge, which have a bearing on the local political organisa­
tion* Firstly, the Government's administration as a whole is 
in a state of improvisation* Uncertainties abound as to the 
source of power and responsibilities at the different levels, 
even amongst the top officials* The executive legislative 
and judicial functions are rarely separated. There is no 
constitution and there are very few laws defining the powers 
of the Government, the spheres of activities of its different
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departments, and the legal rights of individuals. Administra­
tive decisions are constantly changed and improvised. Appeals 
against legal and other decisions are made to the Resident 
Adviser, the Sultan, and the Waslr, showing confusion as to 
the ultimate source of power. The second important feature 
is that recruitment into the Government is open, in that the 
position in the social stratification is not used as a 
criterion, whatever other criteria are used. This is an 
important feature because it is one of the factors in 
gagrami society which is tending to break down the rigidity 
of social stratification. These two features are related to 
the political problems of gureigah.
The Local Council.
The Local Council in gureigah has limitted functions 
and judicial powers. It can try disputes not involving more 
than £5 and impose fines not exceeding 35 Shs. Its other 
functions are to deal with minor problems that arise from 
agriculture (e.g. repairing the canal system), to be 
responsible for the Waqf Committee (which looks after 
endowed farms and palms), to give birth certificates, 
certify the good conduct of travellers, and to certify 
buildings and public ceremonies. It has no power over the 
police and is completely subordinate to the District Admin­
istrative Officer* Any dispute in gureidah, or any matter 
that the council deals with, can be taken straight to the
District Administrative Officer and so bypass the council.
The role of the Council therefore depends very much on the 
relationship between its President and the District 
Administrative Officer.
The local councils were set up in 1949 primarily as 
1 arbitration committees” to deal with minor local disputes, 
especially those arising from agricultural problems. The 
Government incorporated the "traditional authorities" of the 
villages into the Local Councils, with the assumption that 
they were the most suitable people to deal with local 
problems. In 1952, local councils were given judicial powers 
and their administrative functions widened. In gureigah, the 
introduction of the Local Council system meant the incorpora­
tion of the traditional ,A'£'£as Council into the new body 
with the addition of a few non-fAJfas members to make it 
more representative. All this was done by the Governor of 
the Province. Thus, since its introduction, the Local Council 
of gureigah has been dominated by the 'A J^as. In 1962 it had 
seven members, four fA*$rJ;as (including the President and his 
deputy), one Basahl, one girthan, and one Akhdam. No Gaba'il 
was represented,
Since 1949, there have been two Presidents. The 
first was a Mansab, and the second, the present holder of 
the office, a leading figure of the !At£as House. When the 
second President took over, he began on a deliberate policy 
of increasing the stature of the Council, and removing it
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from the control of the D.A.O, whose offices were then 
centred in IJureidah* (The President is a highly educated and 
wealthy person, who has friends at the highest level of 
the Qufaiti Government, He also claims to have friends 
amongst British officials. In the local context these ties 
are seen as potential sources of power behind the President, 
The President is also very wealthy (as was shown in Case IV 
in Ch. VI)* With all these qualities he has been able to 
employ a number of methods to achieve his aims. These will 
be discussed later.
The meetings of the Council are held at the Presi­
dents house, and these have become synonymous with the 
morning gatherings at his house. The Local Council revolves 
around the person of the President and when he is away 
important decisions are deferred until his return. The 
'A'jjfas, through the President, have absolute control of the 
Local Council. This has been achieved by manipulating the 
Central Government structure, and eisploiting its flexibility. 
The personalisation of Local Council in the person of the 
President is a basic feature of the political organisation 
of §urei<J.ah.
The Informal Structure.
Outside the framework of this formal, but flexible 
government structure, there is an informal political 
structure of the different groups in gureidLah, Of all the
groups only the ’A^as and Gabadil have recognised political 
offices. This Is because the ■Aj^ as were the ruling group 
of the main village in the past, while each of the Gabafil 
settlements was an independent political unit with its own 
headmen (mugaddam) • The Basahl and the Mas akin groups came 
under the political control of the tAt^as and therefore did 
not have recognised political offices, although the Basahl 
and ffirthan had, and still have, informal leaders. What is 
important here is that neither the traditionally recognised 
officers of the 'A^as (Mansabs)nor those of the Gaba'il 
(mugaddam)» play any significant role in the present day 
politics of gureigah.
The internal division of the !A$£as has already been 
described (see Oh.III). In the past, they had a Council 
presided over by the two Mansabs, and made up of a represen­
tative from each of the lineage. This traditional political 
organisation of the !A££as has also already been described 
(see Ch.Ill)* But in 1938 when the British Government had 
established a truce in the country and the process of 
expanding the State to include other areas was under way,
the Mansab of gureigah reconstituted the fA££as Council to
—  -  —  1include two non-fA££as members —  a Basahl and a girthan*
This council continued to be the main political body in
1. Freya Stark gives a brief description of this Council in 
her book "Winter in Arabia" (pp. 60 )♦ She spent a few
months in gureidah in 1938-39*
gureigah with few changes in membership, until around 194-6-75 
when the Qu'aiti Government sent an Administrator (for the 
first time) with a few soldiers and appointed a leading 
'A'Jrfas as the gagi. In 194-9? when the local councils were 
being introduced, the 'A'f'fas Council simply changed its name 
and status and became a Government body. One of the Mansabs 
was its president. In 1956, the Mansab resigned and his 
deputy took over and has remained the President of Council 
until now.
The resignation was the culmination of a power 
struggle within the Council which had been going on for some 
time. The occasion for the change was the setting up, by a 
Central Government directive, of a Waqf Committee under the 
local Council. The function of the Committee was to take 
over the responsibility of looking after endowed property 
(farms and palms) which was traditionally in the hands of 
the Mansabs and other people. The Mansabs and a number of 
other people opposed the setting up of the Committee and the 
Mansab resigned as the President of the Council. But in 
effect the Mansab was also protesting at the loss of his 
powers, since at that time the deputy was the most powerful 
man in the Council (see p.^55) and the Mansab was reduced to 
a figurehead. This crisis marked an important shift of 
political power within the 'A^as House, from the Mansabs 
to a ’new man1, outside the hereditary and 'constitutional1 
leadership. It also brought about internal divisions within
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the MVf'fas* By 1962-3, neither of the t\fo Mansabs nor any 
members of their sub-lineages remained as members of the 
Council* Nevertheless, the Mansabs still remain the Consti­
tutional1 leaders of the fA££as and in informal meetings of 
the CJ’fas House they take their rightful place, albeit 
without any effective political powero Their religious role 
however is still important, and not only as the religious 
leaders of the * Afinas but of gureidah as a whole *
The MVf'fas House still has its traditional political 
organisation, with the Mansabs and leading members of the 
'Af^ as meeting occasionally as an 'Al^ fas Council1, In 1962 
when news came to gureid.ah that the Sultan would visit the 
town, such a meeting took place at the house of the 
President of the Local Council, It was made up entirely of 
leading *A£tas personalities. Decisions about arrangements 
were made with the participation of the Mansabs, But the 
President of the Council, as the most powerful man, 
informally chaired the meeting, which in effect endorsed 
his suggestions. Thus the actual and effective political 
power has shifted from the Mansabs to the President of the 
local Council, The latter recognises the Mansabs* hereditary 
status as the leaders of the *A^as and consults them as a 
matter of formality. He also does not want to deepen the 
existing divisions within the *A^ ;Jas by ignoring them. 
Nevertheless, the President of the local Council is the de
mi » mt
facto political leader of the ^^as and this is recognised
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by all. Hence although, the traditional political organisation 
still exists, the centre of political power has shifted 
away from the Mansabs to the President of the local Council. 
He is the new Mansab1, not only because he controls the 
new and effective political body, but also because he has 
taken over the traditional functions of the Mansabs as 
arbitrators, lA'Jrfas political power is now based on the 
Local Council.
The Basahl and the IJirthan are the only two groups 
within the main village of gureijah which act corporately 
in specific situations. Both have informal leaders and on 
two separate occasions which I xvill discuss later, each 
group was involved in a concerted political action against 
the 5A^as, There is a difference between the two groups 
however; the Basahl are a kin group while the Hirthan are 
united primarily by their common feeling of being the 
indigenous people of gurei^ah, The Basahl act corporately 
on non-political issues, while the girthan need an important 
political problem to make them act corporately. The rest of 
the Masakin groups, the Akhdam and the Subyan, are not 
political groups, in that they do not act corporately and 
have no formal or informal leadership. They have no corporate 
relations with other groups.
In the past the Gaba'il had a headman in each 
settlement who settled internal disputes, and acted on behalf 
of the unit externally0 However, since their incorporation
into the Qu'aiti State, the headmen of the settlements have 
hecome politically insignificant, and in one settlement, 
they decided not to have another headman when the last one 
died, (This is because the necessity for maintaining the 
political independence of the settlements within the segmen­
tary framework of the tribe has now disappeared. Maintenance 
of the political unity of each settlement is also no longer 
of over-riding importance, since there are now alternative 
institutions - the Central Government courts - for settling 
disputes. Nevertheless, in other contexts, each settlement 
identifies itself as a separate unit vis-a-vis the other 
settlements and other groups in gurei^ah. Not only are the 
Gaba'il settlements discrete physical entities hut in many 
situations they still act corporately as political -units.
One of the settlements built a small canal in 1963 to divert 
water from the valley side to a reservoir in the village, 
This project was undertaken by all the men in the settlement 
Similarly, in disputes in which the domestic animals of one 
settlement enter those of another, responsibility is collect 
ively shared. But the existence of the Government institu­
tions has considerably narrowed down the field of corporate 
political relations between the different settlements. 
Disputes between two individuals of different settlements * 
which in the past would have involved corporate action by 
the settlements, are now regarded as the responsibility of 
those individuals concerned in the dispute. The Government
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Courts and administration, which narrow responsibility in 
disputes to individuals, are the antithesis of corporate 
political action. Thus although the Gaba’il in the settle­
ments still constitute separate political groups, the sphere 
of corporate political action either internally or externally, 
is reduced to a very small range*
Interaction between the Formal and Informal Political 
Structures *
Since the imposition of the formal Government 
structure on I£urei£ah, political relations between the 
groups have been regulated by the ability of each group to 
monopolise and influence the effective powers of the officers 
of the formal structure* The formal structure, as I have 
pointed out, is divided into two parts - the Local Councils 
and the Central Government structure - each having its own 
function* The Local Council1s functions are limited to a 
narrow range of activities; problems of the canal system and 
municipal activities* The Central Government on the other 
hand, has a wide range of administrative and judicial 
functionso The Courts deal with all important disputes; 
fighting, marriage, property claims, inheritance, etc*
Thus an individual must deal with the Local Council in a 
narrow range of matters, but has the alternative of going 
to the Central Government over a wide range of disputes* A 
third alternative is to seek arbitration - mostly by the
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President of the Local Council in the case of IJurei^ Lah - hut 
this must he agreed upon hy hoth parties0 However the Local 
Council and the Central Government are the two most import­
ant political bodies settling disputes and carrying out other 
administrative functions, The 'Attas have absolute dominance 
over the Local Council and exercise considerable influence 
over the Central Government structure in ]Jurei$Lah. This is 
done in two ways:
(i) The tAj^as occupy_all the offices of the Central 
Government in §urei<J.ah? except_the two most 
important ones - that of the £acj.i, and that of the 
D.A.O. - which are held by outsiders,, The secre­
taries of the two officers are !A££as however, and 
the Postmaster and the two teachers in the town, 
are all 'Al^ as. They thus monopolise all the posts 
available for local people*
(ii) The £a£i and the D.A.O. are both under the influence 
of the President of the Local Council* He is 
wealthy, and is an important person in ljureijah*
But more important, he has friends in the top 
strata of the Qu'aiti Government, and can easily 
pull strings to the detriment of either the a^^ Li 
or the D.A.O. Por instance, he can easily engineer 
their transfer from ]Jurei<jlah, and probably mar 
their service record by creating difficulties_for 
them and making them 1unpopular'* Hence the £a£i 
and the D.A.O. go out of their way to be 011 the 
right side of the President. It is not an accident 
that the D.A.O. has moved to another village and 
the ^a^i^spends as little time there as possible*
The !AfJas thus control the Local Council and 
influence the Central Government officers.
The Basahl have a member in the Local Council, but
have no influence over Its activities* Similarly, they have
no influence over the Central Government officials. The
Masakin have two members in the Local Council, but these
have been hand-picked by the President to serve his own
purposes5 rather than to represent any group interest. They 
have no influence over the Central Government officials. The 
Gaba'il have no representative at all in the Local Council, 
and their influence over the Central Government officials 
is negligible o The non-'AJ-fas groups generally prefer to 
take their disputes to the Central Government, where 
individuals can influence the decision in a particular case, 
but no more* But if in such cases an fA££as is involved, 
then the judges have to be cautious lest they offend the 
President of the Local Council in their decision. Thus the 
hidden influence of the President, and therefore of the 
'A££as, on the formal political structure is all-pervasive. 
The following case studies will show this.
Case I. irthan versus 'Attas.
Time; 19.32-3
In 1952, three years after the traditional 'AJ^ as 
Council had been turned into the local Council of IJurerdah 
and was thereby a part of the Qu^iti Government structure, 
the elder of the two Mansabs was President of the Council.
At this time the Council had six members; four 'At£as, one 
Basahl and one ffirthan. All had been appointed by the 
Governor of the Province in 194-9.2. iu consultations with the 
1 traditional authorities' of ]Jurei§.ah - i<>a« the 'A££as.
In 1952, Abubakar, now the President of the Council, was then 
deputy to the Mansab, when the Council faced its first 
major crisis* The crisis was precipitated by a fight between 
two boys - an 'A^ tas and a Iprthan, in which the 'A£tas 
father was s.llegecL to have helcHthe Hirthan boy so that his 
son could beat him up. The IjEirthan were outraged by this, 
and their_Council member (a man regarded as the elder of 
the ^irthan) approached the Mansab and complained about 
the xnclcfent. The Mansab advised the ^irthan elder to go 
to the Police for jtistice, because the Council "could do
no more than make a ritual settlement" * By this he meant 
that the two_sid.es would he asked to forgive each other by 
invoking Allah and reading the opening chapter of the 
Qur'an, The girthan then went to the Police and both the 
boys were arrested and locked up. The ’A££as father then 
went to Abubakar and obtained from him a note requesting 
the release of the two children. _The Police officer then 
released the two boys. The girthan were incensed by this 
denial of justice by the 'A££as, and held meetings for 
three successive jaights to decide what their next move 
would be* Some Basahl and a few Akhdam also attended these 
meetings. They decided "to help each other in obtaining 
justice" - i.e. they would contribute money and give backing 
to any of their number involved in legal dispute with an 
'A^as, particularly disputes taken to Government courts. 
This was not an exclueive girthan mutual aid-society, but 
included any other non-'A^fas who wanted to contribute to 
the kitty* Every meeting was 'spied' on by the !A£tas and 
was followed by rumours of threats to all_those who had 
attended. Two leading members of the 'A££as in the Council 
called for a meeting in which they decided to write a 
petition to the Government. In this petition they asserted 
that the girthan had formed a political party (all political 
organisations are banned by the Government), drew analogies 
to Mau Mau, and asked the Government to punish those 
responsible* The girthan member of the Council resigned in 
protest at this 'Attas move. That week the Governor of the 
Province visited gureigah and spent two nights as the guest 
of Abubakar* He ordered the D.A.O. to try those responsible 
for the "nightly meetings". The D.A.O. had been absent 
whilst the meetings were being held, but on his return to 
gureigah, he tried the ring leaders of the meeting and 
found them guilty of forming "a political party". His 
judgement was long and written in immaculate classical 
Arabic, though according to the non-'A££as, the D.A.O. was 
not educated enough to write such prose. The girthan 
appealed to the Governor's court and the same Governor who 
had ordered a trial quashed the D.A.O.!s judgement, on the 
grounds that the people accused were far too ignorant and 
uneducated to form any political party. When the accused 
girthan returned to gureidah, they were re-arrested by the 
D.A.O., Interrogated for a day, kept locked up for two 
days and then released.
Case II: Basahl versus 'Afrfras
Time: 1962-3
One morning in late 1962, a truck-load of stones was 
placed on an empty plot_a few yards away from the Basahl 
residential area. The Basahl were taken by surprise, since 
they considered this place to be part of their residential 
area* The stones had been placed there on the orders of 
the President of the Local Council. They were for the 
foundations of a guest house (magsad) which the Council 
intended to build* No one knew about the project; even the 
other members of the Council, including the Basahl member. 
When, later that day, it was known that the President had 
ordered the stones to be placed there, two leading members 
of the Basahl went to see him. The Basahl put their case 
to the President as follows: First, the plot on which the 
stones were placed was part_of their residential area, and 
therefore belonged to the Basahl collectively. Secondly 
they were willing to give it to the Council as a gift, if 
the Council would ask them for it* The President's reply 
was as follows: If the Basahl claimed the plot, they must 
prove their claim. It was his contention that the plot 
belonged to no one, and was therefore Government property.
He promised however, that work would stop on the building, 
until_the matter had been settled one way or the other. If 
the Basahl's claim were_proved to be right, then the 
Council would ask the Basahl for the plot.
The Basahl, who were then divided amongst themselves, 
held a meeting and decided to press their claim at the 
i^ agi's court. The £agi however, refused to accept the 
documents which the Basahl brought forward. His refusal was 
based on a technical point - that the documents must first 
be registered and their validity approved, before they 
could be used as proof of ownership of any land. The docu­
ments had been drawn up by one of the Basahl*s ancestors, 
and their demarcation of the 'Basahl ridge1 - on which the 
Basahl live - was vague and subject to different interpre­
tations* Until then it was commonly_accepted that a limited 
area around the ridge was part of Basahl land, but no-one 
knew exactly the boundaries of this area. When the £adi 
rejected the Basahl documents, one of the Mansabs claimed 
that he had documents to show that the plot in question in 
fact belonged to an extinct 'AJrfas family. However, the 
Basahl were not deterred by all this. They sent one of 
their men to the capital with their documents, in order to 
register them and have their claim approved by the Sxipreme 
Court. No building was begun on the disputed site.
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A few months later, the Wazxr and the British R.A. 
visited ]Jurei§.ah, to discuss with local officials another 
project of building a new Police Station, They went round 
the town with the President and the D.A.O. and with a large 
crowd of people following behind, looking for a suitable 
site for the new Station, The area they were examining was 
around the Basahl ridge and as they passed the disputed 
plot, the Basahl leader tried unsuccessfully to bring up 
the stibject under dispute to the Wazxr and the R.A. He 
hoped^to convince them of his case by showing them what 
the Basahl regarded as their land. However the attempt 
failed because the officials refused to be drawn into the 
dispute. Since then the Basahl have remained silent, 
waiting for the results from the Supreme Court. By July 
1963? when I left the field, the dispute had still not been 
settled but it looked as if the President would have his 
way in the end.
* >h * * * *
Both the cases show clearly the absolute control of 
the Council by the TA££as and their effective influence on 
the Central Government1s institutions in gurei^ah. Although 
the two cases are separated by a span of ten years, it is 
significant to note that the passage of time has not 
reduced the power of the *A££as which has in fact increased. 
By 1963? the Council was a more powerful body than in 1952? 
because it had become the only Government body in the 
largest "town*1 of the district. As a result, the stature 
and power of the President has increased. But more important, 
the President now has absolute personal control of the 
Council, and can initiate important actions such as the 
building of a guest house without consulting other members 
of the Council (and I suspect the D.A.O. as well). Since 
1952 then, IA-Jrj?as political power has definitely increased 
and, significantly, this increase in their power is
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correlated with the emergence of the existing President 
(Abubakar) as their de facto leader, and the decline of the 
two Mansabs who were the traditional political leaders of 
the 1 A^as •
In Case I the Mansab advised the girthan to go to 
the Police because the Council was "constitutionally” 
powerless to deal with disputes of that nature although he 
and the Council could make a traditional "ritual settlement". 
But because of the existence of the Government, the girthan 
wanted more than a mere 1 ritual settlement' since they 
strongly believed that they had been wronged. As it turned 
out the 'AJ^ iis were able to influence the Government and 
withdraw the dispute from its jurisdiction back to the 
Council. This was done by the deputy President (Abubakar). 
When the girthan, backed by the Basahl and Akhdam, decided 
to take corporate action in future disputes, the 'Attas 
used their dominance in the Council and their influence 
with Government officials to teach the girthan a lesson, 
and break down this wider alignment by inciting the 
Government to persecute the girthan. The curious contradic­
tory behaviour of the Governor shows how strong 'AJJas 
pressure could be when an official was in gureigah* The 
D.A.O. was completely dominated by the 'A££as, and his re­
arrest of the girthan was an attempt at fulfilling the 
'A^as threats of punishing the girthan. In this way he 
placated the 'A^eis and "saved their faces". The Council,
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in spite of the ineffective leadership of the Mansab, acted 
as an effective instrument of ,A^ 'J:as political domination 
as a result of the action of Abubakar (his nephew was also 
widely believed to have composed the D*A.O.!s judgement on 
the girthan).
Apart from the domination of the 'A’ptas and their 
effective manipulation of the formal political structure, 
we see in Case I the girthan acting as a corporate group in 
opposition to the tAJJas, Of all the Masakln occupational 
groups, the girthan alone act corporately in specific 
situations* It is most probable that the girthan have had 
many conflicts with the 'AJJas in the past and there seem 
to be a latent current of long standing hostility between 
the two groups* (The girthan, as the only indigenous group in 
gurei^ah, complain that the Ttimmigrant” 'AJJas have taken 
almost all their land "by cheating"* The reaction to the 
1952 incident was certainly an expression of a deeper con­
flict than the manifest reasons of "injustice"* The support 
of the girthan by other non-!A££as also implies that the 
hostility, and opposition to fAt^as dominance, was not 
confined to the Hirthan only, but included the rest of 
the non-fA‘£;*fas* In 1962, ten years after the incident, 
the girthan were still very bitter about the dispute. How­
ever their bitterness and complaints gave by this time more 
emphasis to the 'A^tas1 monopoly of political power and the 
resultant "injustice" than to the long-standing !land
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question*♦ In 1952, the informal leader of the girthan 
resigned from the Council and has remained outside it to 
the present0 Later however, his brother was appointed to the 
Council by the present ’Al^as President of the Council* This 
expresses both the division within the girthan and the 
political insight of the President in exploiting it.
The most significant factor in Case I was, however, 
the open and tacit support given to the girthan by the other 
groups. Although only a few non-girthan openly attended the 
meetings and were willing to contribute some money, it is 
generally accepted (even by ’A^fas) that most of the people 
of the other groups gave moral backing to the girthan. In 
fact the strong reaction of the ’A^as and their analogy 
between the girthan meetings and Mau Mau, indicate that other 
groups were being strongly influenced by the girthan and 
that this is precisely what the *Af£as feared most. What the 
girthan were in fact doing was to break down the old politi­
cal units by forming a wider non-1 AJ'fas 'block1 to oppose 
the *Af£as0 This wider political alignment, starting as far 
back as 1952, was thus extremely important. But just as 
important was the fact that the object of the new ’block* 
was specifically to oppose the *A££as. It was essentially 
an anti-1 A'jryas ’block1, reacting against the successes of 
the ’Af^as in controlling and influencing the formal politi­
cal structure of gureigah.
As I have pointed out,between 1952 and 1962, lAt*J,;as
control and influence on the formal political structure 
increased. But at the same time the opposition to the !At£as 
became more marked and the anti-1A££as ’block1 which grew 
out of the 1952 incident, showed signs of going through a 
process of forming into a politically corporate group. The 
increasing power of the *A££as, and the rising antagonism 
of the non-’AJrfas to this, has been the most significant 
factor in gurei^ah’s politics in the last ten years. It has 
affected relations between the *A££as and other groups con­
siderably and the dispute in Case II (’A^Jas v« Basahl) can 
only be understood in the light of this growing antagonism. 
Bor instance many people pointed out that the TA££as Presi­
dent could have chosen another plot to place the stones for 
the guest house. There were undisputed Government plots in 
the area which he could have chosen —  later the Wazlr and 
the R.A. did in fact select a plot in that area for building 
the new Police Station. Furthermore the Council at the time 
did not have enough money for building the guest house and 
it would have taken the President at least a year to get the 
money from the Central GovernmentThus many people believe 
that the President chose the particular plot as a deliberate 
provocation of the Basahl. The timing of the dispute is also 
very significant and will be discussed below. The dispute 
was therefore created to serve as a tool for manipulation in 
order to achieve specific political objectives. These 
objectives were determined by the political forces in
gureigah at the time, and it is important to give a brief 
sketch of both before analysing Case II, This perspective 
is necessary for the understanding of the manoeuvres and 
reactions implicit in the dispute.
Case I showed that although the ’A'f'fcas were powerful 
in gureigala itself, their power became, to say the least, 
tenuous outside the village. This was clearly demonstrated 
by the Governor’s court decision which quashed the D.A.O.!s 
judgement against the girthan. Even within gureigah itself 
the ’AJ'fas could never be sure that their pressure will be 
effective on every D.A.O. In 1952 they controlled the 
Council which was not then an important body; this was the 
only instrument of power under their control. Although they 
were the most powerful group in gureigah at the time, their 
power was only effective in so far as they could influence 
Central Government officials in and outside gureigah. 
Influence is by definition, intangible, uncertain and sub­
ject to failure; to the 'A££as this represents the fundamen­
tal political change in the creation of the Qu’aiti State 
and its investiture with all the political power. The main 
objective of the ’Al^as was therefore to make their power 
more ’solid1 and certain and under the circumstances, all 
they could do was to manipulate the formal political 
structure so that the element of uncertainty in their 
’influence1 could be reduced to a minimum, both in and out­
side gureidah* This was made easier by the nature of the
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formal political structure, which, as has heen noted, is
highly amenable to manipulation*
However, up to 1956 the leadership of the 'Ajrjjas
was controlled by the Mansabs (one of whom was the President
of the Council)* But both the Mansabs were and still are
the representative of 'Umar (as a missionary) and therefore
the religious leaders of ]Jurei£.ah* The ideal image of a 
1Mansab is that of a pious person, uninterested in worldly 
affairs (often a §ufi), and an impartial arbitrator when he 
deals with disputes, A good Mansab then is the least suitable 
person to play the role of a cunning politician, manoeuvring 
behind the scenes and playing his cards well with Government 
officials in order to influence their decisions* Of the two 
present Mansabs in u^rei<jLah, one is illiterate in the sense 
that he cannot write, although he has memorised all the 
important religious texts that are necessary to fulfil 
his religious role; the second (and the younger) is a §ufi 
who is considered to be an eccentric by many people* On the 
other hand, the deputy to the President of the Council 
(Abubakar, 1952) has the necessary qualities which are 
important to a good politician* He is highly educated, well 
travelled, wealthy and has many important friends in the 
Government. He had spent many years in India as a head of 
the 'Attas religious order (tarlqa) and was very familiar 
with the methods of dealing with highly placed officials in
1. Bee Twahir, Vol*I, Singapore 194-9.
the Indian Administration* If the main objectives of the 
'A^as were to be achieved, it was functionally necessary 
for the leadership of the House to pass from the Mansabs to 
the 'new men1 in order to meet the changed conditions. This 
did not take place until 1956 after a struggle between the 
President (Mansab) and his deputy (Abubakar)* See pp*«2#f.
When Abubakar took over the leadership of the Council, 
he became in effect the de facto political leader of the 
'A’Jjtas. Since then all political activities In ^ Eureijah have 
centred around him and by 1962, he was the most powerful 
man in $urei§Lah* The President (Abubakar) has been able to 
increase his power and therefore that of the 'Attas House as 
a whole, by working on what he calls a definite 'plan*. This 
plan had three objectives
(a) To increase the limited functions and powers of the 
Local Council*
(b) To minimise the control of the Central Government 
officials on the Council*
(c) To increase his effective influence at the centre of 
power in the capital.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into a detailed
account of how the President achieved these secondary
objectives* However a brief sketch is necessary here.
Firstly the President has always been able to
dominate all the Central Government officials sent to
IjhireicJ.ah, and even those at the capital* This is primarily
due to his personal qualities and strong personality* I am
2 6 6
stressing this point because the Government is highly person-
1alised and run like the "Old Raj”; in this situation where 
personal influence is very important the personality1 of a 
person becomes a crucial factor in the manoeuvring and 
manipulating of people* I have met the majority of Qu’aiti 
officials from the rank of the D,A,0. upward* and apart from 
a few individuals of the highest rank* almost all officials 
have a lower standard of education than the President, The 
President is also a highly capable and experienced person,
pespecially in running an organisation and handling people.
1* Co Johnston, "The View Prom Steamer Point”, 1964-.
Johnston was the British High Commissioner in ’Aden 
between I960 and 1963#
2, The President had been the head of the ’Aipas £ariqa in
India for many years. The religious order has many branches 
in India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Burma, Before the War and 
immediately after, the President used to spend most of 
his time in India running the order. Since the late fort­
ies, he has remained in gureijah making a long visit to 
these countries every two or three years. Some of the 
local branches of the order are being run by experienced 
professionals who write to the President for consultation 
and advice on many problems. Many of the letters were in 
English, which I translated and wrote his replies in 
English® The way the President handled the variety of 
problems referred to him was Impressive and illuminating*
He had a detailed knowledge of the personnel, the local 
difficulties and the general conditions of the different 
branches in the various countries. Thus in 1962-63, he 
followed closely the Indo-Chinese crisis, the Malaysia 
problem and Burmese Revolution at the time and tried to 
relate these general developments and their effects to the 
organisation of the ^ariqa* Por instance, in Burma a 
lawyer and a timber merchant were both important members 
of the local organisation of the ■farlqao The Revolution 
had affected both these men and their income had dwindled 
considerably. This in turn was affecting the economics 
and charitable activities of the order in Rangoon. The 
President was highly concerned by these developments, and 
he used to write often to these two men assuring them of 
his prayers so that conditions would change for the 
better.
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His wide travels, his high intelligence, his strong person­
ality and political insight, his age (50 years old - thus 
the strong seniority principle also operates in his favour) 
all these make up a formidable and powerful 'personality1 
which cause him generally to get what he wants from people* 
This is of obvious importance in his day-to-day dealings 
with the Central Government officials in IJurei^ Lah* For 
instance, when the D.A.O, visits gureitjah and has to do his 
"duty" i*e« to be told what the Council has done during his 
absence, the President delegates this to his secretary (his 
son, 22 years old) who carries out the task in a corner of 
the large room in the guest house, while the President drinks 
his cups of tea and entertains his visitors or deals with 
some minor problem* This is of course a slight on the D*A.O* 
who is officially a superior of the President* But it pro­
duces the 'right1 impression in and shows who is
the "boss" in the village* Furthermore, when the Governor of 
the Province or higher officials from the capital visit 
5urei<Jah, they invariably become the guests of the President 
and are always impressed by his lavish hospitality* In this 
and other ways, the President is able to have a powerful 
influence over officials with whom he deals, either regularly 
or occasionally*
Through a conflict with one of the L*A.O* immed­
iately after becoming President, Abubakar was able to make 
the Governor take his side and give him extra powers in
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order to avoid such, conflicts* These extra powers were;-
(i) the use of the Police without referring to the D.A.O.
(ii) disputes from the Council could go directly to the 
Provincial court i.e* the Governor’s court, bypassing 
the D.AO.* s court.
(iii) He can imprison a person for up to one week and impose 
fines up to £50.
This power is renewed every three years, hut he has 
never used it* These powers were given to the President 
personally and not to the Council. They were approved by the 
highest officials at the capital. As far as I know Abubakar 
is the only President of a Local Council in the Qu’aiti 
State who has been given these extraordinary powers. The 
powers given to the President in fact were aimed at making 
him ’independent* of the D.A.O.
Secondly, Abubakar has enhanced and extended the 
activities of the Council considerably and thereby reduced 
the work of the D.A.O. and the As a wealthy man, he is
not personally engaged in any economic activity in gurei^ah. 
He devotes the best part of his working hours to the business 
of the Council and other political activities. Thus every 
morning, he sits in his well furnished guest room (barzah) 
where people drop in to chat and drink a cup of tea. In these 
daily sittings, many disputes are brought to him, sometimes 
as the President of the Council and sometimes as a private 
person. In such occasions, his barzah turns into what he 
calls a "private court" or a "council court" whichever is
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appropriate for the disputee Abubakar also arbitrates in 
many family disputes where women are involved, since it is 
shameful (’aib) for women to appear in courts* Many disputes 
are taken to him because, (a) if taken to the Government 
courts (the gadis and D.A.O.!s) a lot of money has to be 
paid in bribery, and (b) private arbitration is generally 
preferred since disputes taken to the courts tend to become 
more serious and antagonism between the disputants is 
increased* Thus through both private and official arbitration 
Abubakar has been able to divert most of §ureicj.ah!s disputes 
to himself and thus reduced the work of the Government 
courts and therefore that of the £adi and the D.A.O.
In 1959? the President undertook a large project to 
repair a local dama This very big operation, which cost 
about £A,000, necessitated using the Police to enforce pay­
ment of contributions for the repairs, setting up committees 
to plan and execute the work and keep its accounts etc. All 
this was done without the D.A.O. i.e. it was carried out 
entirely by the Council under the direction and supervision 
of the President. The plan to build a guest house (see Case 
II) was also entirely under the direction of the Council. In 
other villages all important activities and projeots of this 
nature (large or small) are closely supervised by the D.A.O. 
In §urei$Lah however, the D.A.O. has been completely Ignored. 
Thus by 1962, the D.A.O* found it necessary to move to 
another smaller village in the District. He took with him
Top pictures The 'Attaa President of the Local Councilf discusses a 
boundary dispute with a Gabs’il.
Potion pictures The tua*ity Sulten (third fron right) on his visit te 
Hureidoh, is surrounded by 'Attas*
the Police and a few months later the 3£a§Li followed suit.
Both the D.A.O. and the gadi now visit ljureiclah about once 
a month.
Thirdly, the President maintains close contact with 
his friends at the capital. In 1962, a few days before the 
Sultan was due to visit ]Jurei$.ah, Abubakar received a 
personal letter from the then deputy Wazlr, asking him to 
look after all the necessary arrangements. During the prepar­
ation and when the Sultan was in IJureiJah, all important 
decisions were made by the President. Not only was the D.A.O. 
under the President’s 1 command *, but even the Governor of 
the province was not consulted on many aspects of the 
arrangements and accepted the decisions made without protest. 
The visit of the Sultan showed the direct contact the Presi­
dent has with the top officials. It also highlighted the 
strong personality of the President and showed how he domin­
ates officials who are superior to him in status. Burthermore 
it showed his decisiveness and organisational ability, since 
he was in control throughout the visit.
But it Is the contact with the 'men of power' at the 
capital which is important here, and these contacts are 
maintained during his frequent journeys out of and into the 
country when he passes through the capital and stays for 
short periods* The friends are not limited to the Qu'aiti 
hierarchy but extends to that of the British Government, 
from the R.A. in Mukalla to the officer in charge of the
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Eastern Protectorates in 'Aden. The individuals holding 
these two offices, have "been in IJadramaut for over 15 years 
and hoth have become personal friends of the President during 
this period. The two officers and others have all visited 
§urei£ah, especially during the early days of establishing 
the Qu'aiti State, all have invariably been his guests and 
impressed by his hospitality. The President, realising the 
value of ties with such people, has, as a matter of policy, 
maintained the ties by periodic visits and by an occasional 
letter to them* Such contacts are useful for many purposes.
In 1961, the President managed to get a visa and a letter of 
recommendation from these contacts to visit the ruling 
Shaikhs of the Trucial States (a difficult thing) for 
collecting 'charity1. At his guest house, the President 
always tells 'anecdotes' of the impressive receptions given 
to him when he visits his important friends in 'Aden, the 
British Representative in Balp?ein, the British Ambassador in 
Kuweit and of course his host the Shaikh of Kuweit. This 
circle of friends —  mainly important British officials and 
the rulers of the small states —  may or may not be his
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1'good* or even actual friends* They may or may not help him* 
What is important here is that, this account is believed and 
accepted by the right group of people in the capital and the 
general audience in ]JureI$Lah. These accounts are generally 
believed and there is no reason for anyone to doubt the 
President* This circle of friends then, is important to 
Abubakar for a number of reasons, (a) It is an important 
status symbol since this is the circle of the highest 
political authority in the region* (b) His contact and 
friendship with the rulers (Shaikhs) is an important source 
of income to him, and one on which he draws periodically*
(c) The British officials concerned with a^cjramaut (e*g. 
the ReA. and the Head of the Eastern Protectorates in 'Aden) 
makes Abubakar a potentially powerful person in his relations 
with the important officials of the Qu'aiti State hierarchy,
1* It is impossible to check whether all the important
people the President claim to be his friends are in fact 
his friends* The R.A. and the officer in charge of the 
Eastern Protectorate in 'Aden are his 'good friends1*
This they have told me themselves* Similarly, the Presi­
dent showed me a letter from the British Representative 
in Bahrein addressed to him* On the basis of the letter, 
he too is a fgood friend* of the President. I have also 
seen the letter of recommendation given to the President 
by the R.A, and addressed to the Shaikhs and the British 
Agents in the Trucial States* Finally, it is widely 
believed that the President is a personal friend of the 
Shaikh of Kuweit and also a particular friend of one of 
the important Ministers in the Government there* Prom 
his detailed account of his various visits to Kuweit 
and my personal assessment of the honesty of the President, 
I have no reason to doubt the substantial part of his 
accounts* However, I do not know how close Is his friend­
ship with the Ruler of Kuweit and in any case, Abubakar 
does not claim that he is a 'close1 friend of the Ruler.
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since he has access to higher authority in the total politi­
cal system. In this way Abubakar has acquired an informal 
hut unique ?political status' which makes him a very influen­
tial person within a "Raj" type of Administration in IJadra- 
maut. Abubakar thus uses his external ties with the British 
hierarchy to strengthen his position in his dealings with 
top officials of the lower Qu'aiti hierarchy. Similarly he 
uses his ties with top officials of the Qu'aiti State as a 
hacking in his dealings with the Provincial (Governor) and 
District (D.A.O.) officials. Personal ties within the total 
political system, are manipulated at different levels to 
give Abubakar a unique 'political status' which ultimately 
increases his political power in Hurei^ Lah. When the R.A. and 
the Waslr visited ljureijah (see Oase II), Abubakar was 
dealing with long standing friends both of whom were his 
guests. On the other hand, the leader of the Basahl(fUmar) 
was dealing with the two highest officials in the country, 
both of whom he did not know personally, and his attempt 
at winning their sympathy against their friend was obviously 
doomed to failure.
I have given a brief sketch of the methods used by 
Abubakar in his "plan” to increase his personal power in 
IJurei^ ah. He has done this by manipulating the formal 
political structure in the country. This shows the nature of 
this structure which I take here as given and cannot discuss. 
But it also shows the political insight of Abubakar, a
274.
quality which is very important in the situation* Within 
six years of taking over the leadership of the Council and 
that of the ’A^fas, Abubakar made himself the virtual 1 ruler 
of gureigah* This very great success brought with it his 
major difficulties* Firstly, the increasing power of the 
*AJ$as intensified the antagonism of the other groups. This 
will be discussed below* Secondly, in his attempt to popular 
ise himself (in order to counteract the growing antagonism), 
Abubakar took certain steps which were highly criticised by 
the fA*f^ as and publicly divided them.
In 1961, Abubakar formed a Cultural Club in 
gureigah, whose objective was to promote ,Tequality” between 
the people of gureidah. The move was to show that Abubakar 
was a "modern and progressive” man, who had the interest 
of the whole of gureidah at heart and had no intention 
of dominating non-f A££as ♦ The formation of the Club and 
its consequences will be discussed more fully in the 
second part of this chapter* Here it is sufficient to note 
that Abubakarfs action was controversial and was opposed 
by most !Affas* He was criticised for letting down the 
!AJtas and the effect of his action was to divide them 
into two camps. This was important and serious for the 
!A£*fas because they had always presented a -united front and 
had never been disunited publicly* By the middle of 1962 
when the Club was slowly fading away, it was time for 
Abubakar to rally the ’AJrfas together and heal the disunity. 
A dispute with the Basalil seem to be just the right thing
for uniting the 'A'jjtas, {The Mansab for instance immediately 
supported the President (see Case II) although until then he 
had heen his severest critic. This partly explains the 
deliberate provocation of the Basahl. But why did Abubakar 
specifically choose the Basahl and not another group?
I have pointed out that as early as 1952, a wider 
alignment comprising of non-fA*j7^ as groups had begun to form* 
This development was primarily a reaction to the near 
monopoly of political power by the 'A-f-fas* The new block was 
forming specifically to oppose the !A££as* Since then the 
'A££as have changed their leadership and considerably 
increased their control of political power* I have suggested 
that a concomitant increase in the opposition to the 'A’f'fas 
has been developing* This is certainly the case and will be 
shown to be so* However its development is only partially 
due to the internal situation i*e. the increasing power of 
the 'A££as* In fact, as I will suggest in the next section, 
since 1952 the experience of migrants abroad and the inter­
vention into 5urei$ah of an 'ideology of change' have been 
major factors in the increasing antagonism between 'A££as 
and non-'Aftas• It is therefore necessary here to assume a 
proposition —  which I discuss later —  that by 1962, many 
non- ’A'Jrfas had been considerably affected by their migration 
experience and the 'new' ideology emanating from the outside. 
That is to say, many of the non-'Attas have assimilated an 
'ideological framework1 that rejects a stratified society
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like that in gureidah and that their hostility to the system 
is directed against the 'AJrfas who are seen to defend, 
maintain and symbolise the system* The increasing antagonism 
between the !A££as and the non-'A££as is therefore partly 
due to external factors intervening in the situation* This 
will be discussed in the next section*
By 1962 the anti-'A^as block was showing signs of
\
revolving around one man* The man whom I will call 'Umar, 
is the informal leader of the Basahl group. As far back as 
1952, 'Umar played a leading role in the release of the 
girthan when they were re-arrested after their return to 
gureidah (see Case I). The object of the re-arrest was to 
fulfil the 'A't’j^as pledge that they would punish the girthan. 
Thus 'Umar's effort to release the girthan, not only showed 
his personal alignment in the conflict but also his potential 
as the leader of the new block. At the time 8Umar was not
even a leader of the Basahl and his action was out of step
with the then leader of the Basahl who remained neutral in 
the Council. However since then 'Umar has become owner of 
the largest shop in gureidah and early in 1962 became the 
leader of the Basahl when the previous leader died.
'Umar is educated although not as highly as Abubakar.
He is intelligent, has spent over 15 years abroad as a 
businessman and has a wide range of experience especially in 
dealing with people. Since 1952 he has cultivated close
1. This name is fictitious*
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■business ties with a powerful trader in the capital (Mukalla) 
who hacks him financially and ‘politically*. Through the 
trader ‘Umar has cultivated contacts with many middle-range 
officials of the Government. However the trader (who is from 
a nearby Mashayikh group) acts as a link between ‘Umar and 
the high officials at the capital. Thus ‘Umar has certain 
personal qualities and contacts outside gureidah which, 
though not comparable with those of Abubakar, are the best 
any non-'A££as has in gureidah. He is the most suitable 
candidate for the leadership of the new anti-'A*j;£as block.
In IJureitjLah ‘Umar has a unique position for recruit­
ing support from all non-‘ A^as groups. His shop is at the 
market square where people always gather to talk and to buy 
things (this can be compared with Abubakar’s guest room
*T
where people gather every morning). He has the biggest shop 
and the majority of his customers are non-1 A^as, The Gaba’il 
especially do most of their shopping with lUmar, generally 
on a credit basis. Credit, as has been pointed out before, 
is an important element in the exchange system in $urei£ah,
1. Barth (1953) describes a parallel situation in the tradi­
tional political system of Kurdistan villages.There the 
formal political leader of a village, has daily informal 
gatherings in what Barth described as the “smoked filled 
room“ in the leader's house. Such gatherings consisted 
of the higher 'caste'„ The lower 1 caste' also met 
informally on the rooftop of a house —  the 'roof top 
society'. In both gatherings village politics inevitably 
dominated the conversation.
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making the customers particularly amenable to the shop­
keeper’s pressure (or recruiting campaign). ’Umar’s shop 
therefore acts as an important centre for recruiting 
supporters *
A major qualification of ’Umar is the fact that he • 
is accepted by the 1Afrfras as an ’important personality of 
the village’ (min ’ayan al~bilad). He is a member of the 
Council and is always invited to any important occasion 
organised by the ’A*JrJ;as. Since the two groups have a 'special 
relationship’ from the traditional period, which is restated 
regularly on specific occasions (see Ch. Ill) this may 
account for ’Umar's recognition by the !A£tas. Because of 
his position and recognition, 'Umar is considered as one of 
the few people capable of dealing with Abubakar and standing 
up to him. He can argue with Abubakar and even make him 
change his mind on a specific matter. Thus many people take 
’Umar with them when they go to Abubakar’s house to discuss 
any particular problem.
’Umar is also considered to have some influence with 
the D.A.O. and the gadi. He is wealthy and can afford to 
offer hospitality and bribes to such officials. During the 
brief periods when these officials are in gurei^ah, I have 
seen 'Umar pay many night visits to the respective officials 
in order to ’straighten things out’ on behalf of disputants 
whose cases were pending in the courts. Sometimes this 
’straightening out1 can merely mean that a particular case
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should be heard during this visit and not be delayed till 
the next one. By 1962 then, ’Umar was playing an important 
political role on behalf of the non-1 A'Jrt;as. He had become so 
important and indispensable that he was ’automatically1 drawn 
in almost every dispute involving non-1 A'Jrfas * His intervention 
became even more important in situations of ’A^tas v, non- 
’A£t;as conflict, TUmar had in fact become the informal 
leader of the non-* A^as,
In 1962 when the *A££as vs* Basahl dispute took 
place, the political situation in ]Jurei<jjLah was not very 
favourable to the President, In the first place, his group 
was divided and there was considerable criticism of his 
leadership from his own ranks. Secondly the anti-1 Af’J?as 
opposition had increased and had become centred around the 
Basahl leader* This situation was viewed with misgivings 
by Abubakar for a number of reasons:- (a) his authority 
within his own group was being undermined by disunity; (b) 
’Umar was in effect becoming a rival to him and a contender 
for his position; (c) the opposition between the !AJj?as and 
the non-’A-j^ as was undermining his claim that he speaks for 
the whole of gurei^ Lah which is an important card in strength­
ening his hand when he deals with the Central Government, It 
was therefore necessary for Abubakar to take action which 
would simultaneously achieve three things:-
(i) Rally the ’A’JrJjas behind him and so restore their unity,
(ii) Humiliate ’Umar with a defeat and thereby contrast 
their respective power.
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(iii) Break down the anti-'At^as^camp and so remove a major 
threat to his and the 'A^as political dominance *
The President's deliberate provocation of the Basahl by his
action was calculated to achieve these three political
objectives *
The dispute in Case II then was primarily a political 
conflict between Abubakar and 'Umar. Both the leaders were 
supported by their respective groups —  'A'f'fas and Basahl*
The Mansab immediately supported Abubakar* The Basahl held 
a number of meetings to discuss the situation. A Basahl, a 
close friend of !Umar, resigned as the treasurer of the 
Cultural Club in protest against the 'A£fas. This is inter­
esting because it does indicate that the Basahl saw them­
selves as opposing the 'Ai^as rather than fighting a 
particular issue with the Council. Similarly, the fact that 
the project was not discussed in the Council initially, 
merely confirmed the prevalent interpretation that the dis­
pute was the making of the President alone. The girthan 
leader for instance summed up the dispute by saying that 
Abubakar was "hitting 'Umar on the head" meaning that 
Abubakar was using the Council to put 'Umar in his 'proper 
place *.
Abubakar's action rallied the 'A^as behind him and 
so one of his aims was achieved immediately. His second 
objective — - to defeat 'Umar and contrast their respective 
powers —  could not be achieved immediately because the
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outcome of the dispute would take some time* However the 
President was confident of his victory, partly because the 
claim of the Basahl was intrinsically weak (because the 
demarcation of the ridge was vaguely defined in their 
document) and partly because the head of the Supreme Court 
( a personal friend of the President) would ultimately 
decide the issue. A foretaste of the President's victory and 
therefore of 'Umar's humiliation, was the ga^ Li's rejection 
of the Basahl documents on a technical point. Similarly the 
public refusal of the Wazlr and the R.A* to listen to 'Umar, 
was a humiliation which symbolically showed to the bystanders 
which side the 'powers that be1 were on, in this contest.
Thus even before the dispute was officially settled, the 
President's victory was seen as inevitable and his power 
demonstrated.
The third objective of Abubakar —  to break down the 
anti-'A^as block —  was contained in the manifest purpose 
of the action. This was to build a guest house. At the time 
there was no talk at all of such a house being built and the 
news was a complete surprise to everyone. The project could 
have been started a year or two later without making the 
slightest difference to 3Jurei£Lah. There was no overriding 
necessity for it to be built at the particular time, 
especially when most of the money was not available in the 
first place. It seems that either that Abubakar made a hasty 
decision to build the guest house (which I think is unlikely)
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or that this was a carefully thought out project to he played 
out at the most suitable occasion. Whichever way the decision 
was arrived at, it is clear that the purpose in building the 
guest house was to popularise Abubakar and to show that he 
was concerned with the welfare of all and not of the 'A'f'fas 
alone. The idea was to make ]Umar oppose the building of a 
guest house and therefore show that he was more concerned 
with the interests of Basahl rather than the interests of 
gurei<J.ah. The contrast between Abubakar fighting for a 
project that will benefit the public as a whole, and !Umar 
fighting against the project because of the interest of his 
agnatic group, would obviously be to the advantage of Abub­
akar. However, *Umar9 perceiving this implication, counter­
acted by agreeing to the building of the guest house provided 
Abubakar asked the Basahl for the plot,
Abubakar *s action was obviously an attempt at 
recruiting non-’A^as supporters* His choice of provoking 
the Basahl into a dispute which he was confident of winning, 
was primarily aimed at obstructing 'ITmar from assuming the 
new role as a leader of the solidifying anti-!A££as camp. 
However it is not clear why he started the dispute at this 
particular time* This can only be explained if we relate it 
to the setting up of the Cultural Club* The Club was set up 
early in 1961 and was his first major attempt at recruiting 
non-!A£i;as. The creation of the Club as has been pointed 
out, seriously divided the fA£{as. Yet Abubakar went ahead
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with the project in spite of the predictable division within 
his group. This indicates that Abubakar thought that the 
anti-1 Af^as antagonism was very serious and required such a 
risky action. However, when by the end of 1962 the Glub was 
fading away, it became clear to Abubakar that his bold 
attempt had failed and that anti-T A'f'fas opposition was still 
as strong if not stronger* Another attempt to break down 
this opposition was therefore necessary. Hence the production 
of the guest house project at this time with its desired 
effects of forcing TUmar to oppose it.
The *Af•fas-Basahl dispute was started by Abubakar 
with specific objectives in mind. He succeeded in achieving 
two of his immediate aims — ■ uniting the *Af*jfas and con­
trasting his power with that of ’Umar. His major objective 
of breaking down the anti-!A-Jrfas alignment is a long term 
’plan*. One can safely predict that he will make other
i
attempts towards this end.
The political power of any group in the new context 
is based on its ability to dominate and influence the formal 
political structure. This is what the ‘A’Jrfas have done and 
the change is reflected in their absolute control of the 
Council and the personal powers of its President, Abubakar. 
The other groups in ]Jurei£Lah have failed to gain any
1* In June 1963? a short article appeared in one of the 
weekly newspapers^of Mukalla, attacking Abubakar as the 
"dictator’1 of Hurei^ Lah. The writer did not disclose his 
name •
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influence within the new structure, and are therefore 
politically under 'AJJas domination* Relations between the 
rA££as and non-1Ai^as are primarily regulated by this factor* 
Hon-1 A^as groups have a common political status as the 
dominated groups, and the success of the 'Afrfas in increasing 
their power, has tended to consolidate the new alignment of 
the non-Vif'fas groups* This basic political division was 
clear as early as 1952 (see Case I) but the important point 
here is that the last ten years has sharpened this cleavage, 
with the result that the non-1 A^as camp has become more 
1 solid1 in spite of Abubakarls attempt at breaking it*
The 'AJrpas are by far the largest single kin group 
in ]Jurei§.ah, and all are concentrated in one area* Unlike 
the G-abafil and Masakin groups, they are united in one 
House —  politically, residentially and by descent. They are 
politically organised and have a deep sense of unity —  
unlike the non~!A££as who have no political organisation at 
present, are internally divided and whose only unifying 
factor is their dominated status and common anti-1A££as 
opposition* The ‘AJ'fas monopolise the religious leadership 
of IJurei^ Lah, through the Mansabs as well as other individual 
scholars whose reputation is spread beyond the ^a^ramaut*
All leading members of the 'A^as have regular income from 
overseas and are therefore able to live in IJurei§.ah for most 
of the time in comparative wealth, and concentrate on local 
affairs —  like Abubakar in the Council, Because of this and
through labour migration, they have been able to control 
political power and maintain their pre-eminent economic 
position in the social hierarchy* The hVfJas therefore have 
a vested interest in maintaining the status quo* They have 
at their disposal all the local forces to maintain it, and 
until a few years ago, they had in fact, been very successful 
in doing this*
But §urei<jLah has now been lifted into a wider con­
text with intense political interaction with outside urban 
centres and has felt the full force of Rationalism* The 
success of the *A££as in maintaining their traditional 
politico-economic position as a dominating group, has 
sharpened the contrast between IJurei^ ah's social hierarchy 
and the egalitarian ideology of Rationalism* Thus the 
politically and economically dominated non-fA££as groups see 
their interest is best served in bringing about changes in 
the existing social order* However, sudden changes in the 
economic organisation and the formal political structure is 
not possible because of the existing allocation of material 
resources and the overall political system. Hence the 
opposition of the dominated groups to the status quo is an 
ideological one and not an organised activity devoted to 
changing the economic and political structure. The two 1 sides'
i.e. the 'Airfas who want to maintain the status quo and non- 
'AJJas who want change, is expressed in the polarisation 
of political alignment into the two 'camps' respectively*
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These two camps are antagonistic because their basic inter­
ests are contradictorye This contradiction has resulted from 
the continuance of the coincidence between the control of 
politico-economic power and the social hierarchy in a new 
setting dominated by the egalitarian ideology of Nationalism* 
To sum up then, Abubakar!s attempts have all been 
directed at solving a basic dilemma* The social structure 
of 3Jurei$lah and Abubakar1s personal qualities have combined 
to make the 'Al^ as the most powerful group in ^ urei^ah.
Their interest is therefore in consolidating their power and 
maintaining the status quo* On the other hand, the dominated 
non-'A-j^ as see their interest in acquiring political power 
and this can only be attained by a change in the status quo* 
The corollary to pursuing non-1A^as interest, is their 
increasing co-operation and opposition to the ’AJ-fas* This 
contradiction in the interests of the two sides, has led to 
the inevitable conflict. This is inherent in the social 
structure and the dynamics of change* Abubakar as an individ­
ual can do nothing to remove it (given the existing social 
structure) and is therefore unlikely to achieve his ultimate 
objective of breaking down the non-'Alphas block*
The development of this conflict is also partly due 
to external factors as well as the existence of the !AlawI- 
Irshadi dispute in the recent past. These two aspects of 
the conflict are discussed in the next part of the chapter.
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PART II 
POLITICS AND STRATIFICATION
External Politics
The polarisation of political alignment on ^AJ^as/
non-*A^Jas line in u^rei^ Lah has heen the most significant
development of the last ten years. I have argued that this
is mainly correlated with a structural conflict within the
village. In this section however I will suggest that the
development must also he related to the interaction of
IJurei^lah with the wider field of the Arah World if it is to
he explained fully. The effect of this interaction has heen
to add a new dimension to the conflict and to provide an
idiom which links the local situation with the hew ideology1
of the wider field* This culminated in the "Revolution
Fever" of September 1962 (as a reaction to the nearhy Yemen
Revolution) dramatising the two 1 camps * as representing
1what Mannheim calls 1 ideology and utopiaT.
1. Karl Mannheim1s concepts seem appropriate to the situa­
tion in ^ urei^ah. He defines them as:-
"The concept of "ideology" reflects the one discovery
which emerged from political conflict, namely, that 
ruling groups can in their thinking hecome so intensively 
interest-hound to a situation that they are simply no 
longer ahle to see certain facts which would undermine 
their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word 
"ideology" the insight that in certain situations the 
collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the
real condition of society both to itself and to others
and thereby stabilizes it."
"The concept of utopian thinking reflects the 
opposite discovery of the political struggle, namely that 
certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly
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It is not necessary here to justify theoretical 
stand that certain events in a village situation can he 
fully explained only hy tracing their links with the larger 
and complex field of which they are a part,'*' This is generally 
true of most parts of the world today, hut it is even more 
relevant to the Arah World,
ljureijlah participates in the wider field of the Arah 
World in two ways:- (a) through a high rate of labour 
migration, and (h) through the extensive and increasingly 
intensive use of the mass media —  especially the radio*
This interaction cuts across political boundaries end is 
part of the intense feeling behind the political drive 
towards Arah unity; this drive is a major force in the area
interested in the destruction and transformation of a 
given condition of society that they unwittingly see 
only those elements in the situation which tend to 
negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly 
diagnosing an existing condition of society. They are not 
at all concerned with what really exists; rather in their 
thinking they already seek to change the situation that 
exists. Their thought is never a diagnosis of the 
situation; it can he used only as a direction for action. 
In the utopian mentality, the collective unconscious, 
guided hy wishful representation and the will to action, 
hides certain aspects of reality* It turns its hack on 
everything which would shake its belief or paralyse its 
desire to change things"* Mannheim (I960 ed,)f p,36, 
Mannheim uses these concepts to describe large historical 
and political movements and their relations to the social 
structure of a given society* I believe it is possible 
and even necessary to Identify similar movements within 
a micro-situation and within a limited span of time, In 
y/ureijah and in the wider field we can identify the two 
sides as defined by Mannheim, It is not an accident that 
the two sides at the village, identify themselves with 
their equivalent camp in the wider field,
1, Max GTuckman 1964,
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whose aims, theoretically, is to remove such boundaries* The 
Arabs,in spite of the many important cleavages and serious 
internal conflicts, can be described as being one 'unit' or 
Tsocial field1 at the highest level. They have what has been 
described as a Mystical1 feeling towards their ultimate 
unity*^ Pan-Arab Nationalism operates at this level. Its 
main expression, drive and symbol is the Voice of the Arabs 
which dessimate the 'new ideology1 throughout the Arab World. 
It is with this widest field that IJurei^ Lah interacts intense­
ly through labour migration, and participates in the 'new 
ideology1 through the transistor radio. It is only by 
examining the effects of this wider context that we can 
explain fully the events that took place in ^ urei^ah in 1961 
and 1962.
Migrants from ^ureijah go to the various Arab 
countries where they go through what Watson calls the
p
'industrial experience'* Lerner, after an extensive survey 
in seven Middle -^ Eastern countries, describes the effects of 
the city on the migrants in the following terms: "Some 
migrants never penetrate the urban curtain and live out their 
lives in a miserable daily dying. Others find in the indus­
trial discipline a full and satisfying life. Still others 
are infused with new dreams of glory —  imagining themselves 
at the head of an Islamic brotherhood or of a proletarian
1* Ingrams 1964-*
2. Watson 1958*
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union, or of a Titoist state defying all the mighty. Many, 
perhaps most, simply try to learn a little more, get a little 
more, have a little more”
Many !ga<Jrami migrants do in fact get involved, 
directly or indirectly, with political movements in the 
countries to which they migrate* It is impossible here to 
give any account of the extent of their political participa­
tion. But it is interesting to note that gajrami migrants 
play a leading, if not dominating, role in all the political 
parties in ‘Aden# Purthermore, all the banned political 
parties and Cultural Clubs in ]JaJramaut itself have been led
mostly by migrants who had returned home after lengthy
2 -spells abroad. In ]Jurei<jLah itself, there were some people 
who had participated in political and trade unions organisa­
tions abroad and were then actively engaged in political
g
movements within the country. Thus although not all of 
gureidah*s migrants engage in political activities on their 
return, the majority of them however do become politically 
conscious and follow with considerable interest political 
issues of the wider field and of gadramaut itself* This is
1, D, Lerner 1958®
2* It is interesting to note that a recent booklet tracing 
the political struggle of §a^ramaut against local 
‘reactionaries* and British Imperialism, is entitled 
”The Country of the Emigrants”,
3. Political activities within the Qu‘aiti State are out­
lawed* It Is therefore impossible here to give any facts 
or clues that might lead to the identification of the 
individuals concerned.
2 91
important since it is this highly emotional political 
consciousness which is related to the particular events in 
IJurei^ ah to he discussed he low.
But it is not only the migrants who have become 
politically conscious in ljureidah, There are some people who 
have never migrated and who show just as high a degree of 
political consciousness as the migrants. This is largely due 
to the transistor radio which in the last seven years have 
spread extensively in the whole country. In 1962-63 there 
were between 150 to 200 radio sets in 3Jurei<jLah, Such radios 
can he bought from ^ urei^ah's shops at a cost of from £5 0^ 
£15. Most of the sets are however brought in by returning 
migrants, partly because the sets have become a status 
symbol and partly because they can be sold or pawned easily 
when a person is in need of cash.
People tune to the wireless for many reasons and 
listen to many different programmes. Everyone with a set 
tunes to the Voice of the Arabs and most people listen to its 
political programmes. Other stations such as San'a Radio, 
!Aden, the Arabic Service of the B.B,C. are also widely 
listened to. One leading 'A^as sends regular reports to the 
B,B,C.fs audience research unit. Others ask questions from 
the B.B.C. on specific topics.^ During the early days of the
1. When I arrived in gureidah, the people there had known 
for some time that I was going to !study1 :gureidah. Some 
people had heard the broadcast of an interview I had with 
the Arabic Service of the B.B.C., in which I stated that 
I was going to do field research in ]Jurei£Lah, The 'AJ'fas 
then_spread the rumour that I was going to do research in
1Afias history which will subsequently be published in 
Europe,
Yemeni Revolution, Abubakar used to tune to nine different 
Radio Stations (in Arabic) and spent as many as six hours a 
day listening* On the average, people spend between 4 to 5 
hours a day listening to the radio; the size of the regular 
audience to one set, varies between one to ten people. The 
radio in gurei^ah is thus an important 'source of informa­
tion ’ and entertainment *
In the Arab World as a whole, broadcasting as a mass 
media, has been used in the last fifteen years, as an import­
ant political instrument. Its effect in 'arousing the masses’ 
has been widely recognised by the opposing political groups 
within the Arab World, Even before the Suez crisis (i.e. 
before 1956) and the spread of transistors, Lerner emphasised 
that a major factor in the social change taking place in the 
Middle-East then, was "the shift in modes of communicating 
ideas and attitudes...." to the large public. The "mass 
media" he continued, "of tabloids, radio and movies are now 
the dominant modes". Since 1956? when cheap transistor 
radios have become available, the radio has assumed a major 
role in this new mode. The Voice of the Arabs, the most
important broadcasting station in the Arab World, has been
1described as having a "pervasive agitational impact". It 
"received major credit for inciting the riots which toppled 
two Governments and prevented Jordan's adherence to the
1, Hurwitz, J.C. 1958,
293
1Baghdad Pact", More recently, Cohen points out the strong
influence and even instructions of the Voice of the Arabs to
2Arab villagers in the Triangle Area in Israel*
Within the region of South Arabia, the dominant role 
of the Voice of the Arabs has been recognised and attempts 
made to counteract its influence. In 1962 !Aden Radio-' 
suddenly became more powerful and the range and clarity of 
its broadcasts increased, with additional time on the air, 
Similarly after the Yemeni Revolution, a new and powerful 
transmitter was installed in Saudi Arabia, with an increase 
in its political programmes and their presentation/*- In pre- 
Republican Yemen, "the Imam had learnt the power of radio 
and did his best to control its use, but he was defeated by
1* Lerner 1958*
2, Cohen, A. 1965* Cohen points out however that the instruc­
tion given to the villagers (to abstain from voting In
the 1959 general election) were partially obeyed because 
of specific factors within the village' which dominated 
the situation at the time*
5, In 1958, new studios were opened for the ’Aden Broad­
casting Service. ’Aden, Report for the years 1957 and. 1958
H.M.Stationary Office 1961. ’Aden Radio now transmits 80 
hours a week in Arabic. In the South Arabian Pederation 
(including ’Aden, but excluding IJa^ ramaut) there are an 
estimated 80,000 radios to a population of 605,000 people. 
In my opinion the estimate is very conservative. In 
]Ja<Jramaut, no estimate of the number of radios has been 
done, but my guess is that the ratio of the number of 
radios to population is probably the same as that of the 
Pederation.
4* According to 3Ja$rami migrants, listening to the Voice of 
the Arabs was forbidden in Saudi Arabia! Those listening 
to it had their sets broken and fines Imposed, I have 
not been able to check on the existence of such a law 
or practice in Saudi Arabia, There are an estimated
I,000,000 radio sets to a population of 6 million.
1the small transistor *,." * However within a week of the 
Revolution in Yemen, San1 a Radio was completely reorganised, 
its time increased from about two hours a day to thirteen, 
and its programmes and their contents changed radically to 
reflect the change that had taken place in the Yemen-* 
Ingrams2 (who opposes hoth the Revolution and Nasser's Pan- 
Arab Rationalism) thinks that the Revolution was master­
minded in Cairo and that the Voice of the Arabs provided 
the link between Cairo and the Yemen —  the place of the 
Revolution* According to him the Voice of the Arabs not only 
incited the Yemenis to revolt against the Imam, but it 
hailed the coming revolution and introduced its leaders 
before the coup de tat* In special broadcast to the Yemen, 
"the Voice of the Arabs gradually made clear the pattern 
intended for the revolution In al-Yemen"; four months before 
the coup de tet, it broadcast "a blueprint for a Yemeni 
Republic based on Arab Rationalism"* "Rasser's propaganda 
campaign showed results during the year* Iheir nature 
reflected much more the impact of the Voice of the Arabs 
than local activities, and illustrated well the power of... 
radio «>"
1* Ingrams H., 1965*
2. Ibid* I am not concerned with Ingrams' views nor his 
interpretation of the events* What is important is his 
argument that the radio and the broadcasts from the 
Voice of the Arabs, are Important factors in the politi­
cal situation of the whole region. Whether this is a 
good thing or bad, is beside the point.
2 9 5
In ’Aden and the Protectorate (this includes the
gajramaut), the Voice of the Arabs plays just as important
a role as in the Yemen, All former Governors of ’Aden accuse,
in their published writings, the Voice of the Arabs for
inciting the workers in ’Aden and the tribesmen (Gaba'il)
in the Protectorate, The workers strike and the tribesmen
make armed revolts. One of the main reasons for postponing
the creation of the South Arabian Federation in 1956, was
the fear induced by the Voice of the Arabs on some of the
Sultans. "Individual Rulers were mentioned by name (by the
Voice of the Arabs) and the faint-hearted began to hedge and
counsel a postponement until the atmosphere was more con-
1ducive to calm considerations".
In gajramaut, whose townspeople are "more sophisti-
2cated than anywhere else in the area outside Aden", there 
is a similar, though not as violent, political situation. 
There the people of the towns "listened to the radio and 
knew all the propaganda theme from the Voice of the Arabs by 
heart. They include a strong nationalist element," According 
to the former British High Commissioner for ’Aden, "the main 
problems of the Qu’aiti State were a nationalistically 
minded city mob *♦<> which required constant watching#" 
Another problem was caused by "a number of turbulent tribes
1# Hickinbotham, T* 1956. Sir Tom Hickinbotham was the
Governor of ’Aden end the Protectorates between 1951 and 
1956.
2# Johnston. 1964. High Commissioner for Aden between I960 
and 1963.
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in the interior” who revolted a number of times (the last
time being in 1961) and required punitive expeditions by
both the Sultan's army and R.A.F. to put them down.
In 194-7 > there were two political parties in IJa^ ra-
maut, but they were later banned; even Cultural Clubs with
political orientation have since been banned. Thus by 1962-
63 all political demonstrations were being done by school 
1boys. Even school girls, for the first time in IJadrami 
history, once staged their own demonstration against the 
Government (1963)*
The general political situation in ga^ramaut then
p
is far from being calm and settled. Inherent in the society 
are factors which are generally correlated with the rise of 
Nationalism. The fact that organised political activity is 
outlawed, makes the 'nationalistically minded1 townspeople 
even more receptive to broadcasts from the Voice of the 
Arabs which has now been joined by the Republican Ban1 a 
Radio. Broadcasts from these radio stations have specific 
programmes directed at the "occupied south"* Within 3Ja$Lramaut 
itself, its three weekly papers (printed in Nukalla) are 
always full of demands for political changes. As a result of 
these internal and external pressures, the Qu'aiti Government 
is now considering introducing some political changes (e.g. 
writing a Constitution, probably permitting political
1. I saw two such demonstrations in June 1963? at the 
capital - Mukalla.
2. For a fuller description of the important political events 
of Hadramaut till 1961 see M.Gibrils "Madlnat-ul-Muhajirin1 
especially Ch.V ("On the Road to Revolution").
parties and introducing some form of elections). The mass 
media is thus an important factor in the political situation 
of ]Ja<3.ramauto The Voice of the Arabs especially, has in­
creased the political consciousness of the people by 
constant 'political education'*
This political education makes /^urei^ ah participate 
in the ideology of Pan-Arab Nationalism of the wider Arab 
field. In this way, the 'mystical1 feeling for unity is given 
expression and this partly explains the popularity of the 
Voice of the Arabs. At a lower level, the Voice of the Arabs 
provides sanction to particular Nationalist movements. It is 
at this level that the ideology propounded by the Voice of 
the Arabs is translated into political action. Political 
organisations and activities (whether open or underground), 
and the political education of the broadcasts, are different 
aspects of the same phenomenon referred to as Pan-Arab 
Nationalism. Although this is a subject outside the scope of 
the Anthropologist,*** the important point here is that 
ga^ .ramaut cannot be isolated from what goes on at this high 
level of Pan-Arab Nationalism. In fact, I will go further 
than this and stress that gadramaut has been considerably 
affected by both the 'new ideology' of Pan-Arab Nationalism 
and the concomitant political movements at the regional 
level. Thus a proper analysis of the situation in :gurei£ah
1. For a theoretical discussion of this point see Gluckman 
(1964), especially the essay by F.G.Bailey.
must relate It with, this wider context*
But what is the effect on gurei<jLah In particular, 
of this interaction with the wider field? Since organised 
political activity was outlawed and since I did not carry 
out extensive attitude tests to find out the changes in the 
value system of the people of IJurei^ ah, it is difficult to 
measure the effects of the important force of Pan-Arab 
Nationalism, However by analysing two recent events in 
:gurei£ah, it will become clear that the 'new ideology' from 
the wider field has provided another dimension within which 
the local conflicts are fought* Events, personalities and 
political alignments in the wider field, are identified to 
the cause and become the symbol of, the two conflicting 
'blocks' within IgureijLah,
The Cultural Club 1961*
Early in 1961, two of Abubakar's sons, both of whom 
are nationalistically minded, discussed the possibility of 
forming a Cultural Club in gurei^ah. The elder of the two 
sons —  C^asern —  is a school teacher and 22 years old; the 
younger son (18 years) is a student. Both have been to Saudi 
Arabia and 'Aden where they worked and studied. Abubakar 
encouraged them to form the Club and promised them his 
support,
The two brothers then contacted §ureid.ah's migrants 
abroad, informing them of their intention and asking them to
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contribute news of the migrants to a newsletter which would 
he edited by the two brothers* The appeal was mainly 
directed to young migrants from all strata, The response, 
from §urei<jLah and abroad, was good, A nex^ sletter was then 
edited by the two brothers (written by hand) and then hung 
on the wall outside their house.
At this point Abubakar took up the project and wrote 
letters to most of the ’important men' of §urei<J.ah, asking 
them to join him in forming the Club. The term Saiyid pre­
ceded all the names on each envelope i.e. all those invited, 
•A'ffas and non-1 Attas» were addressed by this term. In 
^ureijah this term Saiyid had always been exclusively applied 
to ’At-fas only, since they belonged to the Sadah stratum.
Never before in the village has a prominent ’Afinas nsed the
-  1 -term publicly to refer to non-’A'fJas. Ordinary ’Af^as also
never used the term to non-1 A'Jrfas, even privately. As was 
expected most of the lA££as were angered and displeased by 
this, especially since it was used ’officially1 (i*e. in 
writing) and by no lesser a person than their own political 
leader. On the other hand, non-’A^as were highly pleased by 
this ’recognition1, especially because it came from Abubakar. 
As a result, most of the !A££as opposed the Club while the 
non-’Al^as enthusiastically supported it. The meeting was 
attended mainly by the latter with very fex\r ’A^as.
1. Nor a further discussion of the -use of this term see 
Chapter I.
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The Club was then formed with Abubakar as its 
President and gasem, his son, as the secretary.* Another 
young *A££as (the son of the Deputy President of the Council) 
was made the Publicity Officer, a Basahl was made Treasurer, 
and a G-abaiil, a girthan and an Akhdam adopted as members of 
the Committee. Punds were collected and a Constitution was 
written. The main aims of the Club, according to the Consti­
tution, were;- (a) to promote culture (thagafah) in gureigah;
(b) to provide a social centre, with facilities, where young 
men can meet and spend their leisure hours profitably, and
(c) to unite and promote 1brotherly* feelings amongst the 
people of gureigah* Abubakar lent the Club a house, many of 
his books for the library, and furniture (chairs, tables 
etc). Evening classes were started to teach people writing 
and reading and simple arithmetic* gasem and the Publicity 
Officer were the teachers, and most of the students were 
non-!A££as. Pootball games were organised, and the Basahl
1 offered* the ground —  since it was the only suitable place 
in gureigah for playing. The newsletter was edited by gasem, 
his younger brother (as a volunteer) and the Publicity 
Officer.
One of the first major activities undertaken by the 
Club, was to organise a meeting to celebrate the independence 
of Algeria. At the celebration, Abubakar gave a long and 
rousing speech about the brotherhood and unity of the Arabs, 
and the 1 equality* of people taught by Islam. He indirectly
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attacked those who opposed the Club by saying that they must 
1march with time*. In August 1962, the Club, after long 
preparation, staged a play at the Mashhad ziara whose theme 
was to show the ideals of Islam in upholding 1 equality* 
amongst its converts during its early period. After this the 
initial enthusiasm began to fade away and the regular 
activities of the Club dropped one by one. Thus by October 
when the Suit an visited §ureicj.ah, the Club found it very 
difficult to gather a team in order to display a show of 
gymnastics to the Sultan. At the end of the year, the resig­
nation of the Basahl Treasurer (during the 1 as-Basahl 
dispute) was the final act in the fall of the Club. How it 
exists in name only and its premises have been closed.
One immediate reason for the failure of the Club was 
that the majority of its supporters are drawn from the young 
men of IJurei^ ah who are the most mobile group. Bor instance, 
in January 1963, the Publicity Officer and the G-aba*il 
member of the Committee, left ]Jurei<J.ah for Kuweit in search 
of work* At the same time the Akhdam member went to Mukalla 
and took a job there* The second immediate factor in the 
failure of the Club, was the strong opposition and effective 
boycott by the majority of Apart from Abubakar and
his two sons, the Publicity Officer and about five other 
young *A^as, the rest refused to join the Club and opposed 
it by spreading rumours that the Club ’was not a good place* 
for children and young men to go to. Both these factors
3d2
partially explain the failure of the Club*
However the most important factor was the fall of 
non-'A£;j;as confidence in the Club, because they thought that 
it was not serving their interest* In the first place, the 
Club was effectively run by the ’A'ffasj 3£asem, his younger 
brother and the Publicity Officer were the most active 
members, for the simple reason that they had the time, 
facilities, ability and enthusiasm to run the Club* The most 
important decisions were first discussed by Abubakar and his 
two sons and later put to the Committee for endorsement. 
Secondly many non-1A££as soon became suspicious of Abubakar*s 
motives in starting and running the Club, There is a strong 
belief among non-'AJrJias that *A*J;£as are always united, that 
they never quarrel publicly and that the interest of their 
House is always important in their actions. Thus Abubakar*s 
setting up of the Club, against !A£$as opposition and mani­
festly for the benefit of non-*A|r£its, puzzled many of the 
latter* The fact they considered Abubakar as a clever man 
(shatir) and a politician (siyasi) increased their suspicion 
that he wanted his * power* (gultah) * This suspicion was 
fanned by the open opposition of the §ufi Mansab who grumbled 
that Abubakar not only had 'usurped* the powers of the 
Mansabs, but was destroying the institution in his attempt 
to gain personal power * Thirdly, many non-!At*£as believed 
that the success of the Club would enhance the reputation of
IJurei^ lah in the country. But since Hurei^ah is known as the 
"'A^as town", this would merely increase 'A^as reputation 
and prestige which is ultimately against the interest of 
non- * AJrfas•
Abubakar1s primary concern is to maintain his 
political power and curb the growing antagonism between 
'Af'fas and non-1 A^as which has been given a new dimension 
by Nationalism, It is in this new field that Abubakar makes 
his most strenuous efforts to recruit non-'A££as* support. 
Within his own group, there is no danger of being outflanked 
by another leader for two reasons;- (a) there is no one 
amongst the 'A*Jj$as who is of the same stature and ability as 
Abubakar, apart from his ailing and older nephew who is 
confined to the house because of ill health; (b) his power 
within gureidah is also sanctioned by ties outside u^reiiJLah. 
Thus Abubakar is safe from competition and serious revolt 
from his own group. Because of this he can go a long way in 
his attempt to recruit non-'A^as without jeopardising his 
own position. Thus of all the hVJrfas elite, he alone is pro- 
Nasser. He has two large photographs of Nasser in his guest 
room, which 'annoy* the Sadah, as he often declares. All 
leading 'Ai^as have pictures of the former Imam of Yemen,
King Husein of Jordan, the late King Paisal of Iraq, hung on 
the walls of their reception rooms <, (These personalities are 
all Hashimite i*e. descendants of the Prophet). At Abubakar*s
guest room, politics is a constant subject of discussion at 
the daily gatherings and Abubakar generally supports Nasser 
in such discussionso Thus his speech at the celebration of 
the Algerian independence, was full of praise of the Algerian 
heroes and support for Pan-Arab Nationalism, Once he even 
rebuked the §ufi Mansab for being excessively 'conservative1.
Abubakar's political stand and his attempt to portray 
himself as a *modern person* , is aimed at recruiting non- 
'Af’fas support. But his most important step in this direction 
was the setting up of the Club itself. Thus the strong 'A'ffas 
opposition and their attack on Abubakar, is used as an 
example of his sincerity and as 'proof* that he is concerned 
with the interest of all the people of ]Jurei£ah and not only 
that of the 'At^as. The use of the term Baiyid in addressing 
non-'A^as had a symbolic significance to both blocks; it 
showed that Abubakar was a modern man and believed in the 
'equality* of people.
The theme of 'equality* dominated the activities of 
the Club, It was stressed in the celebration speech, in the 
play, and the whole atmosphere at the regular 'social 
gatherings' and activities of the Club, This is a recognition 
of the importance of the 'new ideals' or the 'modern outlook1 
which pervades the village and which is associated with the 
wider force of Pan-Arab Nationalism. Abubakar*s perception 
of this new factor in the situation made him take his most 
controversial actions in this field. The importance he and
Bottom picturos Tho Cultural Club advertising its activities at the
Mashhad ziara.
Top picturos Tho Cultural Club 
of Huroidah veil coming tho 
Qua'ity Sultan on his visit to 
tho village.
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most people attach to this aapect of social activity, is an 
indication that the people are preoccupied with the system 
of stratification in £Eurei£ah. This preoccupation is 
expressed in the conflict between the two blocks and the 
antagonism that exists between them. This has become the 
most important cleavage in ]Jurei$Lah overshadowing and mini­
mising the traditional divisions within the non-1 A^as block, 
Hence the strenuous efforts of Abubakar to minimise the 
antagonism and to stop non-1 A'f'fas becoming a strong anti- 
,A'J;'J;as block. By stressing the theme of 1 equality1 and the 
unity of the people of IJurei^ ah, he is trying to meet the 
complaint of non^A’Jrfas and at the same time make the whole 
of 3Jurei$ah as one unit. In this attempt, Abubakar uses the 
language of nationalism because it is now the prevailing 
idiom throughout the country and because the non- *AJJas 
justify their opposition to •AJ'fas in this language. But the 
failure of the Club showed that Abubakar was not successful 
in his attempt and that the antagonism between the two 
blocks was just as strong if not stronger. This was shown 
clearly by the intense but predictable reaction of the 
people of t^areidnh to the Yemeni Revolution.
gURElQAH1S REACTION TO THE YEMENI REVOLUTION.
Early on the morning of the 27th September 1962,
1 —an ’A'JiJas accidentally timed on San*a Radio. The ’A^as
had a transistor set and was sitting with a group of people 
at the Market Square. He heard martial music which sounded 
out of place from San1a Broadcasting Station. Soon the 
music was interrupted with an announcement that a coup de 
tet had successfully overthrown the recently installed Imam, 
and that a Republican Government had been formed under the 
leadership of ’Abdalla Sallal. The announcement became 
longer and included violent attacks on the Imam as a person 
and his regime. It justified the coup de tet by calling it
1. Until then San1 a Radio did not broadcast in the morning*
2. During the last seven years, people all over the Arab 
World had become familiar with a number of set pieces of 
martial music composed mainly in Egypt. Such music was 
only broadcast at times of important political crisis. 
Most of the coup de tet that have taken place during this 
time, have all been followed immediately by broadcast of 
this music from the Radio Station of the particular 
country. The music is interrupted regularly for import­
ant announcements. This normally lasts for a few days 
until the crisis has 1 subsided*„ Thus people have come
to expect important announcements when they hear such 
music* Since the music is 1 revolutionary1 in spirit i.e. 
it appeals to the ’people’ to be militant in times of 
crisis, it is normally heard from the Voice of the Arabs 
and the Broadcasting Stations of the more militant 
countries (!the liberated countries1), such as Iraq, 
Syria, Algeria* Thus San1a Radio, before the Revolution, 
was the Station of a ’reactionary country’ and such 
music was not expected to be broadcast from there.
3* Imam Aljmad died on September 19th, and was succeeded by 
his son —  Badar — . The coup de tet took place in the 
night of the 26th, and was announced early next morning.
"a revolt of the poor and oppressed people" against the 
"unjust and oppressive rule" of the Imam and his "reactionary 
cliques"* It promised a new social order of "justice, 
equality and freedom"*
The immediate reaction of the small group who 
listened to the announcement intensely, was a complete 
surprise* The group consisted of an ’A'Jrfas shopkeeper (owner 
of the radio set), who had spent four years in Zanzibar and 
three years in Saudi Arabia; the ’A^as vice-president of 
the Local Council who had never been abroad; the leader of
the Hirthan group, who had spent five years in Saudi Arabia;
- 1and a young Akhdam who was born in Africa and had spent a 
number of years in Saudi Arabia and ’Aden before coming to 
]JureigLah. Within a few minutes, the leader of the Basahl 
left his shop and joined the group. Other people who were 
scattered In different parts of the Square, congregated on 
the small group. The group was situated under the shadow of 
my house, and I was called within five minutes when the 
announcement was first heard.
The first committed comment came from the ’Alrfas 
Vice-President, who expressed his shock at the reported 
killing of the Imam and said that the coup de tet would fail 
like the many previous attempts at rebellions against the 
Imam. The Imam, according to him, was not called self al­
ls lam (the sword of Islam) for nothing* The young Akhdam1s
1. He was a member of the Committee of the Cultural Club.
comment was more Nationalistic1 in language which, was in 
support of the Republican coup de tet* He said that the 
Revolution was necessary to end the injustice1 in Yemen and 
to bring the country forward from its present conditions 
which were those of the 1middle-ages1. The TA££as shopkeeper 
was guarded in his reaction, but came down decidedly for the 
Imam* The Hirthan leader was puzzled and found it difficult 
to believe that the Imam had been overthrown* From what he 
had seen of the Yemen (he passed through the Yemen on his 
first trip to Saudi Arabia), he thought that the Imamfs 
power was too strong to be removed by a coup de tet* However 
he gave a lurid picture of how the Imam * oppressed’ the 
peasants and villagers. The Basahl leader expressed a non­
committal surprise and then returned to his shop* The rest 
of the crowd had a Nixed reaction1 —  some expressing 
support and others opposition to the Revolution (thawrah) * 
All however were surprised since no one had expected such an 
event to take place in the Yemen* Many considered the Yemenis 
as more ‘backward1 than the ga^ramis, and until recently, 
some Yemenis seasonally passed through gureidah begging and 
performing magical acts (sibir)* Jokes were made about the 
‘beggars making a Revolution1 i.e. they thought it was an 
absurd and a comical situation At the same time some 
praised the ‘fearlessness and bravery1 of the Zeidis (zuyud)'
1. Followers of Zeidi Shi1a sect, headed by the Imam of the 
Yemen who was both ^Ee religious head of the sect and the 
ruler_of the country* The Yemen is roughly divided into 
the Zeidi minority (one-third) in the north and the Sunni 
majority (two-thirds) in the south* The latter are the 
backbone of Republican supporters* The gadramis are all 
Sunnis *
and some predicted a ‘bloodbath’ (madhbab), between them and 
the Republicans.
Late in the afternoon, the market was unusually 
crowded. There were five radio sets, all tuned to San’a Radio 
which by this time was making rousing and revolutionary 
speeches, and announcing names of tribes and important 
people who had declared their support for the Republican 
regime. At this time it was becoming clear that the fA££as 
were supporting the Imam —  at least those present at the 
Market Square. Republican support at the Square, came mostly 
from a group of non-*A££as ’led1 by the young Akhdam. These 
young men were highly pleased and made many disrespectful 
references to the Imam and his ’lackeys’ in the Yemen who 
have now been overthrown. The ’A'ffas were sullen and angered 
by this ’talkative’ group; some *A££as retaliated by making 
insulting remarks at the 1 traitor Sallal1 and made nasty 
insinuations about his descent status as a dfoa’If i.e. of the 
Masakln stratum, saying that ’treachery’ is the sort of thing 
one expects from such people (the Masakln). When darkness 
fell and people dispersed, it was clear that the ’A££as had 
identified themselves with the Imam, since he was a Saiyid, 
and therefore supported his cause. Some of the non-*A££as 
however wholeheartedly identified their support with the 
Republican Government.
During the next few weeks, all conversation in 
."gureijah was dominated by the subject of the Yemeni
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Revolution. In all gatherings, at the Market Square, the 
shops, Abubakarfs guest room, and at samar (night gatherings 
in the houses where people visiting sit and talk and drink 
tea) in most houses, conversation was dominated hy heated 
discussions on the Revolution. Feeling rose very high between 
i^.'pjas, as supporters of the Imam, and non-'Af'fas who sup­
ported the Republican Government and opposed the Imam.
During this time, six people at different occasions were 
stopped from fighting as a result of arguing on the Xemeni 
situation* Three 'Affias and three non-!A;Jr£as took opposing 
sides. As time passed, it was clear that 1 A£$as/non-1 A^as 
was the main cleavage in the strong reaction to the Revolu­
tion. Even Abubakar supported the Imam, Amongst the non- 
‘A’Jrfas* most of the men supported the Republicans, although 
there were some (especially the older generation) who were 
uncommitted. But even the uncommitted non-'AJJas said that 
they knew why the !A££as strongly supported the Imam. At 
this time rumours were spreading in gureijah that the 
Revolution had reached parts of the §adramaut and that some 
of the Gaba*il tribes were taking up arms in its support. 
These rumours lasted for a number of days and although they 
were unfounded, many people at the time took them seriously 
and some believed that eventually the rumours will be 
realised. Attitudes in §urei<3.ah went through a remarkable 
change. The Akhdam for instance became more aggressive and 
vocal in their denouncing of tAffas domination. Their jokes
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"became distinctly political, and street jibes against the
*A££as became open and frequent* Even some 'A’Jjfas widows
were heard muttering a welcome to the Revolution, because
when it comes to 3Jurei£ah ,fit will bring freedom to marry"
i«e. to marry non-*A££as. The *A££as on the other hand
complained the Masakln had become more arrogant (kibr) and
that 'modern changes* was 'spoiling* many people including
some of their women*
As the civil war in the Xemen took shape and each
side increased its military strength, attitudes in
hardened* Conflicting claims on the progress of the civil
war, made the source of daily news an important problem*
Similarly at the wider level, there were divisions and new
alignments arising from the Xemeni Revolution* In ]Jureidah
every afternoon people would bring their radio sets to the
Market Square and tune to different Radio Stations for the
latest news* Republican supporters would listen to San*a
Radio while the opposing side would listen to the Pirate
Radio of the Imam hastily set up immediately after the coup 
1de tet * In the evening the Republicans would listen to the 
Voice of the Arabs, while the Imam supporters would range 
widely listening to 'Aden Radio, Saudi Arabian broadcast, 
the BBC and even Radio Israel, in order to get information 
and 'facts* to contradict the Republican's claims about the
1* At the Market Square, the two sides kept in discreet and 
separate groups.
progress of the war* Thus each side had different 'facts1 
about the progress of the war and this increased the tension 
and the incessant arguments* The two sides in gurei^ah 
identified themselves with the respective forces in the widei 
field* The Republicans were the Nasser supporters (Abubakar 
became anti-Nasser at this time) and were accused by the 
other side as being 'communists'* The 'A££as on the other 
hand were accused of being 'imperialist supporters and re­
actionaries 1 since they were on the same side as Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Britain and even Israel* They would believe 
London end 'Aden but not Cairo, which, according to the 
Republican non~'A££as showed which side they belonged in 
the wider ideological battle.
The reaction to the Yemeni Revolution dramatised the 
importance of the 'A£$as and non-'Aiy£as cleavage which had 
been developing for some time* As the situation in the Yemen 
settled down to a prolonged civil war, the Revolution became 
a symbol of the 'coming changes' to both sides. To the 
the Revolution symbolised a deliberate change in the social 
order in which the traditional principles and ideals of the 
society are radically displaced and substituted by a social 
organisation based on "modern" principles and ideals as 
expressed by the ideology of Pan-Arab Nationalism. It 
symbolised the situation in gureidah, because the Imam was a 
Saiyid —  a kinsman and the Sadah groups in Yemen ruled 
the countryThe Revolution was also a symbol to non~'A££as
1. Brown, W*R. 1963.
for the same reasons. It overthrew the domination of the 
Sadah and placed at the helm of the country, a Masakln 
(Sallal) from the "oppressed and dominated stratum" of 
Yemeni society, thus reversing what was. thought to he an 
inviolable social order* It brought home to them that all 
the fiery Nationalist talk from the Voice of the Arabs about 
changing and reorganising the society for the benefit of the 
'oppressed', was possible and attainable. The Revolution 
therefore symbolised the structural conflict of interests 
existing in gureigah between the *A£$as end the non-1 At£as. 
The idiom of Nationalism through which this conflict was 
expressed suddenly became an idiom expressing a real and 
actual situation closely related to that of gureidah and 
geographically within its 'backyard'. It was not surprising 
therefore that the Revolution in the Yemen, raised the 
structural conflict in gureigah to an ideological arena and 
made it the dominating issue until my departure in July 1963 
The continuation of the civil war in the Yemen, fanned the 
debate in gureigah and gave it a longer life* It created in 
gureigah and throughout the country, a "Revolution fever".
Both the Cultural Club and the Yemeni Revolution 
provided a new arena in which 'A££as/non-'A$£as cleavage 
expressed itself. The formation of the Club by Abubakar 
showed not only the importance of the cleavage, but also the
1. I use this phrase in the same sense as "Rederation fever" 
the latter was used to describe the opposition of the 
Africans to the Central African Rederation. See Watson 
1958, p.213*
necessity of using the 'new ideology1 in order (according 
to Abubakar's thinking) to remedy the cleavage and remove 
the antagonism. But the failure of the Club showed the 
strength of the antagonism between the two sides* The Revo­
lution dramatised this antagonism and evoked the fears and 
hopes of the two blocks. It made clear that the root of the 
conflict was concerned with change. One side opposed it and 
insisted on the status quo, while the other side hoped for 
the change and demanded it. The Revolution was thus seen as 
a foretaste of what would happen in gureigah (and in gagra- 
maut in general) if the status quo is changed, not necessar­
ily in the same way, but certainly to an approximate extent 
as the changes in the Yemen. The stakes in the conflict then, 
was nothing less than the system of stratification in 
gureigah. The 'A-Jrjpas as the dominating group have the "ideo­
logy" (in Mannheim's sense) of maintaining the status quo, 
since their interest is in it. The non-'A^as on the other 
hand, are the dominated group and are therefore the "utopian* 
who want change in the society since they believe that their 
interest will be best served in the coming social order.
The question that arises here is why does the con­
flict centre on the system of social stratification? There 
are two answers to this. Firstly the structural reality of 
gureigah today shows that the control of economic resources 
within gureigah is unevenly distributed and that this is 
correlated with the traditional social hierarchy. It also
shows that within the political system, the tA^as control 
almost absolutely the political power within the village 
context* As a result, the ’A^as dominate ]Jurei<J.ah politic­
ally sind economic ally« This has produced an antagonistic 
cleavage in terms of politico-economic power, between V^Jrfas 
and non-!A££aSc The conflict is based on a traditional 
cleavage —  within the framework of the stratification 
system —  but the antagonism between the two sides has been 
sharpened by the changing conditions, since in the new 
situation a possibility of change exists* It is not surpris­
ing therefore that structural conflict is expressed in terms 
of the system of stratification.
Secondly, as has been pointed out in Chapter II,the 
system of stratification in ya<Jramaut has been a subject of 
violent discussion amongst the gagrami community in the Far 
East* The Sadah defended the system, marshalled religious 
arguments to justify it (or at least their own position in 
It) and organised themselves both abroad and in ^ [a^ ramaut 
to maintain the system. On the other hand, non-Sadah have 
violently attacked the system and have appealed to Islamic 
authority outside ^a^ramaut in order to condemn and counter­
act the religious arguments of the Sadah, Abroad they 
organised themselves and took positive action to eliminate 
stratification amongst themselves i.e. the non-Sadah (the 
reformist Irshadi), They built their own schools, had their 
own propaganda paraphernalia and spread their ideas to
awaken the ga^ramls from Sadah 1indoctrination*» The debate 
between the two sides covered detailed aspects of the 
stratification system as it operates in Hajramaut, Such 
symbolic aspects of stratification as the kissing of the 
hand, exclusive terms of address and hypergamous marriage, 
became the subject of heated attack and defence* During the 
many years of conflict between the ’Alawl and Irshadi In the 
Far East, there was a constant interaction of people and 
ideas between the community abroad and gajramaut itself.
The controversy in the Far East was ultimately incorporated 
in the society in £[a<Jramaut itself. In the past however 
^agramaut was Isolated from the rest of the Arab World, but 
since the War, it has become incorporated within the 
turbulent Pan-Arab Nationalism of the Arab World* Thus the 
traditional 1Alawi-Irshadi conflict provides a historical 
framework and a point of reference within which present day 
conflicts are fought* The very notion of Reform1 that is 
to say, deliberate change in the society, is not a ’modern1 
thing in §ajramaut or in gurei^ Lah, However the 1 modern out­
look1 whose main source is Nationalism, not only provides a 
new idiom and new ideas to the debate, but decidedly 
strengthen the Irshadi case* In this sense, the Sadah are 
fighting a losing battle*
In the context of igureijah, 1 Alawl-Irshadi con­
flict has been latent within the village even before the 
post-war period of ’peace1 and change* Many incidents have
occurred in the past "between ’A|r£as and the non-’Aftas 
returning from Indonesiaa One famous incident is always 
recounted in which a Gaba’il took a vow in Indonesia that he 
would come to gurei^ah, take an ?A$£as woman and return with 
her to Indonesia where he would marry her* He did this "but 
while waiting to sail at Mukalla on his return, the Sultan 
(under ’A'Jrfas pressure) stopped the woman and returned her 
to gurei<Jah* Other incidents are recounted in which non- 
’A-Jrfas Irshadi returning from Indonesia, have deliberately 
stopped conforming to certain rules related to the stratifi­
cation system, especially those which symbolised the superior 
status of the ’A£$as —  such as kissing their hands, calling 
them Saiyid or .^ablb, visiting their shrines or participating 
in the ’Id ritual of ’paying respect* to the *A££as at the 
Friday mosque * One particular Gaba’il (now dead) is renowned 
for his public attack on ’A^as ’domination1 and inciting 
non-’AJJas to stop being the ’blind slaves’ of the ’A££as* 
All this was before the establishment of the Qu’aiti State, 
when ’A^tas ’power’ (spiritual) was at its highest* The 
’ Alawl-Irshadi conflict thus laid down the foundation on 
which the ’AJtas/non-’AJ£as blocks developed under the 
present politico-economic conditions of §ureidah0 It also 
provided the precedence and ideological justification for 
the unity of the non-’AJJas block* The recent dominance of 
Nationalism in the region increased this unity and provided 
it with a more relevant idiom with which to fight their
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struggle# The Yemeni Revolution thus symbolised a historical 
trend which both blocks thought was inevitable and made it 
the issue of their conflict.
Prom the discussion in the two sections of this 
chapter, two things have emerged# Firstly, there has devel­
oped in ^nrei^ah, a structural conflict between two political 
blocks the ’A-ftas and non-’A££as —  which dominate the 
political activities of the village* Secondly, the wider 
force of Nationalism has provided a new and more relevant 
dimension to the historical *Alawx-Irshadi controversy, thus 
providing a deeper framework within which local conflicts 
are fought and the stratification system made the issue at 
stake# The question that inevitably arises is why is the 
local conflict expressed mainly as an ideological attack on 
stratification and not an actual breakdown in terms of major 
activities against the rules of the system?
The answer to this question has two aspects* In the 
first place, within ga<Jramaut as a whole, the political and 
economic changes have not been profound and extensive enough 
to minimise the importance of this form of stratification* 
Politically, in spite of the establishment of the Qu’aiti 
and Kathiri States, the Sadah still ’exert a particular 
influence’ on these States, according to former Governor 
Johnston# The Vazlr of the Qu'aiti State is in fact an 
’A£tas, and although recruitment into the Government is
theoretically based on achievement and qualification, the
political system as a whole allows for no avenues in which
the population at large can participate and wield political
power* As a result, we see in a local situation as that in
]Jurei£ah, the ’A'Jrfas have in fact increased their political
power* Similarly, in the economic field, there have been no
major economic enterprise in industry nor has there been any
increase in agricultural area or productivity. What has
expanded is the distributive trade —  little shops like
those In $urei$.ah —  In most of the villages and towns* This
1is because the increase in remittances from extensive labom 
migration, has increased the purchasing power of the people 
and caused the Importation of food and light manufactured 
goods from the free port of Aden* Apart from the growth in 
the distributive ’industry’, there has been no other economic 
growth in the country* Thus as a pre-industrialised country 
with no economic development, ga^ Lramis have relied almost 
entirely on migration and not on the economic organisation 
within the country itself# Within the village context, we 
have seen in IJurei^ Lah that labour migration lias in fact
1* A senior Qu'aiti Government official estimated that about 
£2 million enter the country annually as remittances 
from abroado The total Qu’aiti Government expenditure and 
revenue for the year 1957-58* was as follows 
Revenue £617*265* Expenditure £605,845* See Aden Report 
(1957-58). Pub. 1961* For the year 1962-65 it was as 
follows:- Revenue £715*105. Expenditure £705,642. See 
The Middle-East and North Africa 1964-65? London,
tended to maintain the traditional distribution of wealth 
and the ’A*t?$as have thereby continued their economic domin­
ance. This is to say that the politico-economic changes 
within the country as a whole, and within gureidah in 
particular have not been extensive and profound enough to
minimise the importance of ascription as a basis of the
1 _stratification system. In gurei<Jah then, ascriptive strati­
fication of the gadrami type, is still an important principle 
of social organisation. This has been strengthened by the 
distribution of economic and political power within the 
village.
Secondly within 5urei$ah many non-*A£fas would con­
demn the system of tabaqat (strata, classes) as being ’out 
of date’ (’adi) and attack the ’A^fas for upholding the 
system. Some individuals have in fact acted against certain 
rules of the system and have made symbolic rebellion against 
specific acts. Similarly, some ’A£$as, especially Abubakar, 
have taken specific steps and actions against the rules of 
the system e.g. the extension of the term Saiyid to non- 
TAJ£as, the acceptance of the principle of ’equality’ 
publicly etc. Yet both ’A'ffas and non-’Attas act primarily 
as members of specific groups and categories and in the case
1* Professor Hoselitz argues that economic development in 
the emerging countries, is closely correlated with a 
change from the traditional system of stratification 
based on ascription to another system based on achieve­
ment* Hoselitz B.F, 1964.
of the latter, do not generally act as members of a ’block1 
(e.g. the case of Basahl, Case II). This is even more so in 
marriage in which hypergamy and in-group marriages are 
rigidly followed. Marriage is significant because in a 
society with an ascriptive system of stratification, the 
breakdown of the rule of hypergamy is an important criterion 
in measuring any change in the system. The fact that in 
3Jurei£ah the marriage pattern has not changed is thus signi­
ficant. This is mainly attributed to the fact that women, as 
mothers of the prospective spouses, have important say in 
the choice of a spouse, and since they do not migrate, they 
have been least affected by the ’modern outlook1 and there­
fore would tend to uphold the traditional principles in 
marriage. This is a partial, though important factor, in 
explaining the marriage pattern. It does not explain the 
apparent contradiction in other aspects of social activities.
A more important factor is the process of situational 
selection# Thus a Gaba’il would for instance attack the 
*A£$as on the question of marriage, and his superior status, 
but would not himself allow his daughter or let his sister 
marry a Mas akin. He would also consider himself —  as a. 
Gaba’il —  to have a higher status than the Masakin, On the 
other hand, non-’AJJas would join together in certain 
political situations e.g. Case I, the Cultural Club, the 
reaction to the Yemeni Revolution. In such situations they 
join together as "equals” and act corporately. This
situational selection is carried to a fine point by Abubakar, 
He would form a Cultural Club to emphasise the "equality1 
and "brotherhood" of ]Jureidah*s people, make speeches on 
this theme and even anger his own group by other symbolic 
acts. Yet he would insist that people are also ranked by 
descent in spite of equality, that hypergamous marriage is 
necessary as a consequence of this, and that the fA££as have 
inherent 1 sacred powers1 (karamah)* By the principle of 
situational selection, it is possible therefore for a person 
to perform contradictory activities and invoke contradictory 
sets of ideals in different situational contexts.
To sum up, I have discussed in the first section of 
this chapter, the development of 1Aj^as/non-1A££as conflict. 
I argued that this development is due to the continuance of 
the politico-economic dominance of the and the con­
comitant clash of interests between the two blocks. In the 
second section, I related this conflict with the wider force 
of Nationalism and the historical framework of the ’Alawl- 
Irshadi conflict. Here 1 argued that both these factors have 
reinforced the cleavage and provided an idiom and an ideo­
logical justification to the conflict.
But in spite of the development of the two blocks 
and the intense controversy over stratification, 1 pointed 
out that no major breakdown of the social hierarchy has takei 
place in yureidah, This was clearly shown by the marriage 
pattern* Here I argued that although some structural changes
have taken place e0gc in the political and economic organisa­
tions, these have not been the necessary changes which bring 
about a breakdown in stratification* In fact the small 
degree of politico-economic change that has so far taken 
place, has tended to maintain the traditional correlation 
between the distribution of politico-economic power and the 
social hierarchy* Yet major changes are possible under the 
new conditions* Because of this, the ubiquitous ?new ideo­
logy1 of Nationalism has provided a field in which the 
stratification system as a whole is questioned* As a result, 
there is thus a gap, a discrepancy, between the ideological 
controversy and a major part of the actual behaviour of the 
people* Hence the principle of situational selection 
operates to close the contradiction between the ideological 
committment of the people and most of their actual behaviour.
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
The system of social stratification in Hadramaut is 
today still based on ascription. People are placed in the 
three ranked strata by virtue of being born in them; they 
automatically assume a cluster of attributes, roles and 
statuses as members of their respective strata* Mobility is 
very difficult* This type of social stratification and the 
caste system of India, are generally contrasted with the 
class type of stratification system in which achievement is 
a basic principle of conferring status and in which mobility 
of individuals (up and down) is easy and continuously taking 
place. In the literature of social stratification, a dichot­
omy is thus always made between these two types —  the 
ascription oriented and the achievement oriented stratifica­
tion systems. This dichotomy is correlated with a similar 
dichotomy in the type of societies in which these two 
systems are found. Thus the ascription oriented stratifica­
tion is found only in non-industrial societies, and the 
achievement oriented type in industrialised societies only. 
Sometimes the racial differentiation in South Africa and in 
the Southern States of America, is referred to as a 1 caste 
system1 i.e. an ascriptive stratification system in an 
industrialised Society1. But this argument has never been 
developed properly, and the case for calling the two 
situations as 1 caste systems* has been convincingly rejected
"by Bailey,^ Thus the hroad classification of the two types 
of societies correlated with the two types of stratification 
system, is valid and generally accepted,,
However it has been argued, especially by Professor
pHoselitz, that economic development in the non-industrial­
ised societies, is correlated with a concomitant change in 
their stratification systems. That is to say, as a society 
becomes industrialised, so the basis of its stratification 
system changes from ascription to achievement, nThus 
economic development relies upon gradual replacement of the 
principle of ascription by the principle of achievement in 
the realm of role allocation,” The same argument is put 
forward by Hallers when he says ”In modern societies [i,e, 
industrialised], one’s occupation tends to determine onefs 
place in the stratification system. In non-modern 
societies, on the other hand, one’s place in the stratifica­
tion system tends to determine one’s occupation,”^  The 
introduction of complex economic and technological organisa­
tions in a non-industrial society, are thus central factors 
in changing an ascriptive oriented stratification system 
to a class system,
ga<Jrami society belongs to the non-industrialised
1. Bailey F.Gr* 1963,
2. Hoselitz B.F. 1964,
3. Ibid,
4. Hallers L.A. 1964.
category, since as 5^et no economic development lias taken 
place in 3Ja<Jramauto As a corollary, its system of stratifi­
cation is also ascriptive oriented, This partially explains 
why the social hierarchy in ]Jurei$Lah is still a dominant 
feature of the social structure, as is clearly shown by the 
continuity of hyper gamy* But societies today are never 
either industrialised or non-industrialised* In the 1960s 
all previously non-industrialised 1 societies’ have been 
brought into the world-wide economic system, and have been 
affected by the colonial system, the rise of Nationalism 
and the attempts at ’social engineering' in the broad sense 
of the word. Thus although economic development i.e* 
industrialisation (or modernisation) is a ma^or and often 
deciding process in bringing about changes in the type of 
stratification system of a given society, it is by no means 
the only process* This was clearly recognised by Professor 
Hoselitz when he said T,It is not easy to indicate what 
factors in a social system are likely to bring about this 
change from ascription to achievement most rapidly* Such 
changes as secularisation, the imposition of non-indigenous 
values especially in the productive sector, the development 
of new occupational roles, the migration of persons out of 
their highly culture-bound villages to the culturally more 
diversified cities, and other related changes may be some 
of the developments which make possible the decline of 
ascription and its replacement by achievement principles in
the realm of role assignments But it is impossible to offer
a generally valid solution of this problem, since it dependi
upon the gx'eat variations in underlying cultural norms and
1
existing arrangements in different social systems#1 Hence 
to place JJa<Jraini society in the second of the two industrial 
ised/non-industrialised categories, will certainly not help 
us explain the processes taking place in §urei$ah* It would 
be more useful and helpful to our analysis, if we have a 
continuum —  starting from no industrialisation to a highly 
industrialised society as represented by, let us say the 
American Society* Societies can then be placed at different 
points on this continuum, using economic development as a 
basic criterion but at the same time giving importance to 
other major factors (as those mentioned above by Professor 
Hoselitz), especially in a society where hardly any economi 
development has taken place*
Igadrami society then is one type in which no econom 
development has taken place within its territory* But at th 
same time other processes are operating in the society e*g. 
secularisation, migration, and the imposition of Nationalis 
ideology* Furthermore, certain politico-economic changes 
have taken place as part of this complex of processes, lo 
what extent then have these processes and changes affected 
the stratification system as it operates in the village of 
§urei£ah —  the unit of study?
1. Hoselitz, B*P. 1964*
The incorporation of gureidah as part? of the Qu'ait: 
State has raeant a radical change in the sense that ultimate 
political power has been transferred to the Government as 
the sole authority* This change, important though it is, 
nevertheless continued the traditional position of the 
*AJ$as as the Establishment* of gureidah* That is to say, 
the *AJ^as have maintained their political dominance within 
the village* Yet the change has also meant that ultimate 
power resides outside gureigah and that competition for
power between the different groups is possible within the
total system* Thus although within gureigah competition is
restricted —  by the nature of the new structure and by
E-f^ as exploitation of it —  non~!A*£$as have been able to 
establish ties outside the village and in certain situation* 
utilise these ties* This possibility of non-'AJ'fas acquiring 
political power, led the *A'ti?as to Increase their power 
within and outside the village* This has been possible by 
manipulating the new political structure, which, by its 
nature, is highly amenable to this treatment* The result ha* 
been the inevitable conflict within gureiglah between E^as 
and non~!At£as*
Changes have also taken place in the economic 
organisation* But the changes have made gureigah's people 
more dependent on labour migration and not less* As a resull 
cash from outside has become the main source of income 
without at the same time producing new alternative avenues
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in ^ [ureidah within which groups could move up and down the 
economic ladder. As I have argued, this increasing dependem 
of migration has tended to maintain the traditional distri­
bution of wealth within §urei£ah* Although the Masakin, who 
were formerly dependent on the higher groups for employment 
are now independent because of migration (as an alternative 
source of employment), the significance of this is minimise* 
by the paradoxical result that migration has so far continue 
the traditional economic hierarchy. Thus since the •AJrfas 
have maintained their economic dominance, and that the local 
resources in 3Jurei<J.ah are extremely limited, competition fo: 
economic power within the economic organisation of the 
village is also restricted* The economic cleavage between 
and non-1 A^as has thus reinforced the political 
cleavage which runs on the same line.
This is to say that the type of politico-economic 
changes that has taken place in gurei^ah, has led to the 
development of the 'A^Jas/non-'Atfas cleavage. The cleavage 
rooted in the conflict of interest between the two blocks 
as a result of the structural changes, has nevertheless 
found a ready made historical framework in the 'Alawl- 
Irshadi conflict. The fA££as/non~1A a s  conflict is seen by 
the people of lgurii^ .ah, as a re-enactment in microcosm of 
the past 1Alawl-Irshadi conflict. The latter thus strengthen 
the unity of the two blocks In ]Jurei£ah and provides an 
ideological justification for their conflict. The narrow
local issues of 3Jureidah!s conflict, are raised to a higher 
plane and merge as a single issue —  an attack and defence 
of the system of stratification. At this level, the ubiqui­
tous presence of the ’new ideology1 of Arab Nationalism 
provides a new dimension and a more relevant Idiom to the 
conflict. Since both the 1A1awl-Irshadi conflict and 
Nationalism, advocated as a central theme, a deliberate and 
major change of the social system, the conflict of ljureidah 
becomes, at this level, concerned with this very theme. The 
change or maintenance of the system of stratification become 
the issue in the *A££as/non-'A’irfas conflict. Hence the Yemen 
Revolution symbolised both the issue and the contesting 
blocks of ]JureI£ah* It also forcefully brought the whole 
question down to earth, to an actual situation. Hence the 
Intense reaction and close identification of ]JureiJahrs 
blocks with their counterparts in the nearby Yemen.
It is clear that the system of stratification in 
gurei^ah is being questioned and in certain minor aspects 
changed. This is independent of any economic development 
within gureijah in particular or fjajramaut in general. What 
has taken place in !g/urel<Jah is correlated with a specific 
historical factor in the society, and with a general process 
in which the society as a whole participates intensely with 
a wider field. In this wider field, the process of economic 
development is taking place as well as major political 
conflicts and upheavals. That the developments in gureidah
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must ultimately "be explained by relating them to processes
talcing place in the wider field? indicates the degree of
interaction between the two fields i«e, the micro and macro
fields* But more important , it indicates that we can no
longer (at least in the Arab World) study processes in the
villages in isolation from the macro field of an ever
widening boundary. "In social situations where the key
decisions are taken outside the milieu; where 1 commanding
heights1 exist; where the decision may be taken by remote
Elites rather than by men in face-to-face relationships;
where the decision may be imposed and one sided; in all thes
situations the primary-group orientation is no longer
adequate. Equally, where the value-systems are not unitary,
and the fprimordial symbols1 themselves are objects of
manipulation and redefinition, orthodox structural-function-
1alism cannot help us."
1. Worsley, In his comment on Eisenstadt!s essay
"Anthropological Studies of Complex Societies" Current 
Anthropology 1961. See also the comment of Laila Shukry 
El-Hamamsy on the same essay.
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